.. and if anyone notices, there's a kernel part to this CVE as well. I've applied to fix to all the active linux-yocto kernels, and the change will be part of my consolidated pull request that comes out later today.
Cheers, Bruce On Thu, Sep 14, 2017 at 8:27 AM, Ross Burton <ross.bur...@intel.com> wrote: > All versions of the SDP server in BlueZ 5.46 and earlier are vulnerable to > an > information disclosure vulnerability which allows remote attackers to > obtain > sensitive information from the bluetoothd process memory. This > vulnerability > lies in the processing of SDP search attribute requests. > > Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.bur...@intel.com> > --- > meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc | 1 + > .../bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch | 34 > ++++++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017- > 1000250.patch > > diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc > b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc > index ecefb7b593e..3421c382063 100644 > --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc > +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc > @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\ > file://run-ptest \ > ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'systemd', '', > 'file://0001-Allow-using-obexd-without-systemd-in-the-user-sessio.patch', > d)} \ > file://0001-tests-add-a-target-for-building-tests-without-runnin.patch > \ > + file://cve-2017-1000250.patch \ > " > S = "${WORKDIR}/bluez-${PV}" > > diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch > b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 00000000000..9fac961bcf6 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ > +All versions of the SDP server in BlueZ 5.46 and earlier are vulnerable > to an > +information disclosure vulnerability which allows remote attackers to > obtain > +sensitive information from the bluetoothd process memory. This > vulnerability > +lies in the processing of SDP search attribute requests. > + > +CVE: CVE-2017-1000250 > +Upstream-Status: Backport > +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.bur...@intel.com> > + > +From 9e009647b14e810e06626dde7f1bb9ea3c375d09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.de...@intel.com> > +Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2017 10:01:40 +0300 > +Subject: sdp: Fix Out-of-bounds heap read in service_search_attr_req > function > + > +Check if there is enough data to continue otherwise return an error. > +--- > + src/sdpd-request.c | 2 +- > + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/sdpd-request.c b/src/sdpd-request.c > +index 1eefdce..318d044 100644 > +--- a/src/sdpd-request.c > ++++ b/src/sdpd-request.c > +@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ static int service_search_attr_req(sdp_req_t *req, > sdp_buf_t *buf) > + } else { > + /* continuation State exists -> get from cache */ > + sdp_buf_t *pCache = sdp_get_cached_rsp(cstate); > +- if (pCache) { > ++ if (pCache && cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent < > pCache->data_size) { > + uint16_t sent = MIN(max, pCache->data_size - > cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent); > + pResponse = pCache->data; > + memcpy(buf->data, pResponse + > cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent, > sent); > +-- > +cgit v1.1 > -- > 2.11.0 > > -- > _______________________________________________ > Openembedded-core mailing list > Openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org > http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core > -- "Thou shalt not follow the NULL pointer, for chaos and madness await thee at its end"
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