Fix CVE-2018-1122 & CVE-2018-1122
Signed-off-by: Hong Liu <hongl.f...@cn.fujitsu.com>
---
.../procps/procps/CVE-2018-1122.patch | 70 ++++++++++++++++++
.../procps/procps/CVE-2018-1123.patch | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.12.bb | 2 +
3 files changed, 156 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1122.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1123.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1122.patch
b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1122.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f840873
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1122.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From 3cf9b0f403f758a2cfdc6f52f76c261b0f6ce924 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Qualys Security Advisory <q...@qualys.com>
+Date: Thu, 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 097/126] top: Do not default to the cwd in configs_read().
+
+If the HOME environment variable is not set, or not absolute, use the
+home directory returned by getpwuid(getuid()), if set and absolute
+(instead of the cwd "."); otherwise, set p_home to NULL.
+
+To keep the changes to a minimum, we rely on POSIX, which requires that
+fopen() fails with ENOENT if the pathname (Rc_name) is an empty string.
+This integrates well into the existing code, and makes write_rcfile()
+work without a change.
+
+Also, it makes the code in configs_read() easier to follow: only set and
+use p_home if safe, and only set Rc_name if safe (in all the other cases
+it is the empty string, and the fopen() calls fail). Plus, check for
+snprintf() truncation (and if it happens, reset Rc_name to the empty
+string).
+
+Important note: top.1 should probably be updated, since it mentions the
+fallback to the current working directory.
+[carnil: Backport to 3.3.12: p_home -> p, context]
+
+Signed-off-by: Qualys Security Advisory <q...@qualys.com>
+---
+ top/top.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/top/top.c
++++ b/top/top.c
+@@ -3423,6 +3423,19 @@ static int config_cvt (WIN_t *q) {
+ return 0;
+ } // end: config_cvt
+
++static int snprintf_Rc_name (const char *const format, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf,1,2)));
++static int snprintf_Rc_name (const char *const format, ...) {
++ int len;
++ va_list ap;
++ va_start(ap, format);
++ len = vsnprintf(Rc_name, sizeof(Rc_name), format, ap);
++ va_end(ap);
++ if (len <= 0 || (size_t)len >= sizeof(Rc_name)) {
++ Rc_name[0] = '\0';
++ return 0;
++ }
++ return len;
++}
+
+ /*
+ * Build the local RC file name then try to read both of 'em.
+@@ -3445,8 +3458,17 @@ static void configs_read (void) {
+ FILE *fp;
+ int i;
+
++ Rc_name[0] = '\0'; // "fopen() shall fail if pathname is an empty string."
+ p = getenv("HOME");
+- snprintf(Rc_name, sizeof(Rc_name), "%s/.%src", (p && *p) ? p : ".",
Myname);
++ if (!p || p[0] != '/') {
++ const struct passwd *const pwd = getpwuid(getuid());
++ if (!pwd || !(p = pwd->pw_dir) || p[0] != '/') {
++ p = NULL;
++ }
++ }
++ if (p) {
++ snprintf_Rc_name("%s/.%src", p, Myname);
++ }
+
+ fp = fopen(SYS_RCFILESPEC, "r");
+ if (fp) {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1123.patch
b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1123.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2060e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/CVE-2018-1123.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From 136e3724952827bbae8887a42d9d2b6f658a48ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Qualys Security Advisory <q...@qualys.com>
+Date: Thu, 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] ps/output.c: Fix outbuf overflows in pr_args() etc.
+
+Because there is usually less than OUTBUF_SIZE available at endp.
+
+Signed-off-by: Qualys Security Advisory <q...@qualys.com>
+---
+ ps/output.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ps/output.c b/ps/output.c
+index 0c63bb6..4456f28 100644
+--- a/ps/output.c
++++ b/ps/output.c
+@@ -389,6 +389,9 @@ Modifications to the arguments are not shown.
+
+ // FIXME: some of these may hit the guard page in forest mode
+
++#define OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp) \
++ (((endp) >= outbuf && (endp) < outbuf + OUTBUF_SIZE) ? (outbuf +
OUTBUF_SIZE) - (endp) : 0)
++
+ /*
+ * "args", "cmd", "command" are all the same: long unless c
+ * "comm", "ucmd", "ucomm" are all the same: short unless -f
+@@ -402,15 +405,15 @@ static int pr_args(char *restrict const outbuf, const
proc_t *restrict const pp)
+ rightward -= fh;
+
+ if(pp->cmdline && !bsd_c_option)
+- endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE, &rightward);
++ endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
&rightward);
+ else
+- endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE, &rightward, ESC_DEFUNCT);
++ endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), &rightward,
ESC_DEFUNCT);
+
+- if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1) {
++ if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1 && OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp)>1) {
+ if(pp->environ && *pp->environ) {
+ *endp++ = ' ';
+ rightward--;
+- endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE, &rightward);
++ endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
&rightward);
+ }
+ }
+ return max_rightward-rightward;
+@@ -429,15 +432,15 @@ static int pr_comm(char *restrict const outbuf, const
proc_t *restrict const pp)
+ rightward -= fh;
+
+ if(pp->cmdline && unix_f_option)
+- endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE, &rightward);
++ endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
&rightward);
+ else
+- endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE, &rightward, ESC_DEFUNCT);
++ endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), &rightward,
ESC_DEFUNCT);
+
+- if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1) {
++ if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1 && OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp)>1) {
+ if(pp->environ && *pp->environ) {
+ *endp++ = ' ';
+ rightward--;
+- endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE, &rightward);
++ endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
&rightward);
+ }
+ }
+ return max_rightward-rightward;
+@@ -469,11 +472,13 @@ static int pr_fname(char *restrict const outbuf, const
proc_t *restrict const pp
+ if (rightward>8) /* 8=default, but forest maybe feeds more */
+ rightward = 8;
+
+- endp += escape_str(endp, pp->cmd, OUTBUF_SIZE, &rightward);
++ endp += escape_str(endp, pp->cmd, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), &rightward);
+ //return endp - outbuf;
+ return max_rightward-rightward;
+ }
+
++#undef OUTBUF_SIZE_AT
++
+ /* elapsed wall clock time, [[dd-]hh:]mm:ss format (not same as "time") */
+ static int pr_etime(char *restrict const outbuf, const proc_t *restrict const
pp){
+ unsigned long t;
+--
+2.14.3
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.12.bb
b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.12.bb
index ecf215f..29fa95e 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.12.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.12.bb
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ inherit autotools gettext pkgconfig update-alternatives
SRC_URI =
"http://downloads.sourceforge.net/project/procps-ng/Production/procps-ng-${PV}.tar.xz
\
file://sysctl.conf \
+ file://CVE-2018-1122.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-1123.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "957e42e8b193490b2111252e4a2b443c"
--
2.7.4
--
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