Backport the fixes for several CVEs from the 2.28 stable branch: - CVE-2016-10739 - CVE-2018-19591 - CVE-2019-9169
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.bur...@intel.com> --- meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2016-10739.patch | 232 +++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2018-19591.patch | 48 +++++ meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2019-9169.patch | 40 ++++ meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.28.bb | 4 +- 4 files changed, 323 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2016-10739.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2018-19591.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2019-9169.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2016-10739.patch b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2016-10739.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7eb55d6663d --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2016-10739.patch @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +CVE: CVE-2016-10739 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.bur...@intel.com> + +From 8e92ca5dd7a7e38a4dddf1ebc4e1e8f0cb27e4aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2019 08:59:42 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] resolv: Reformat inet_addr, inet_aton to GNU style + +(cherry picked from commit 5e30b8ef0758763effa115634e0ed7d8938e4bc0) +--- + ChangeLog | 5 ++ + resolv/inet_addr.c | 192 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- + 2 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/resolv/inet_addr.c b/resolv/inet_addr.c +index 022f7ea084..32f58b0e13 100644 +--- a/resolv/inet_addr.c ++++ b/resolv/inet_addr.c +@@ -1,3 +1,21 @@ ++/* Legacy IPv4 text-to-address functions. ++ Copyright (C) 2019 Free Software Foundation, Inc. ++ This file is part of the GNU C Library. ++ ++ The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ++ modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public ++ License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either ++ version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. ++ ++ The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, ++ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ++ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU ++ Lesser General Public License for more details. ++ ++ You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public ++ License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see ++ <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */ ++ + /* + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. +@@ -78,105 +96,97 @@ + #include <limits.h> + #include <errno.h> + +-/* +- * Ascii internet address interpretation routine. +- * The value returned is in network order. +- */ ++/* ASCII IPv4 Internet address interpretation routine. The value ++ returned is in network order. */ + in_addr_t +-__inet_addr(const char *cp) { +- struct in_addr val; ++__inet_addr (const char *cp) ++{ ++ struct in_addr val; + +- if (__inet_aton(cp, &val)) +- return (val.s_addr); +- return (INADDR_NONE); ++ if (__inet_aton (cp, &val)) ++ return val.s_addr; ++ return INADDR_NONE; + } + weak_alias (__inet_addr, inet_addr) + +-/* +- * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation +- * of an Internet address and convert to a binary address. +- * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not. +- * This replaces inet_addr, the return value from which +- * cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address. +- */ ++/* Check whether "cp" is a valid ASCII representation of an IPv4 ++ Internet address and convert it to a binary address. Returns 1 if ++ the address is valid, 0 if not. This replaces inet_addr, the ++ return value from which cannot distinguish between failure and a ++ local broadcast address. */ + int +-__inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr) ++__inet_aton (const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr) + { +- static const in_addr_t max[4] = { 0xffffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff, 0xff }; +- in_addr_t val; +- char c; +- union iaddr { +- uint8_t bytes[4]; +- uint32_t word; +- } res; +- uint8_t *pp = res.bytes; +- int digit; +- +- int saved_errno = errno; +- __set_errno (0); +- +- res.word = 0; +- +- c = *cp; +- for (;;) { +- /* +- * Collect number up to ``.''. +- * Values are specified as for C: +- * 0x=hex, 0=octal, isdigit=decimal. +- */ +- if (!isdigit(c)) +- goto ret_0; +- { +- char *endp; +- unsigned long ul = strtoul (cp, (char **) &endp, 0); +- if (ul == ULONG_MAX && errno == ERANGE) +- goto ret_0; +- if (ul > 0xfffffffful) +- goto ret_0; +- val = ul; +- digit = cp != endp; +- cp = endp; +- } +- c = *cp; +- if (c == '.') { +- /* +- * Internet format: +- * a.b.c.d +- * a.b.c (with c treated as 16 bits) +- * a.b (with b treated as 24 bits) +- */ +- if (pp > res.bytes + 2 || val > 0xff) +- goto ret_0; +- *pp++ = val; +- c = *++cp; +- } else +- break; +- } +- /* +- * Check for trailing characters. +- */ +- if (c != '\0' && (!isascii(c) || !isspace(c))) +- goto ret_0; +- /* +- * Did we get a valid digit? +- */ +- if (!digit) +- goto ret_0; +- +- /* Check whether the last part is in its limits depending on +- the number of parts in total. */ +- if (val > max[pp - res.bytes]) ++ static const in_addr_t max[4] = { 0xffffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff, 0xff }; ++ in_addr_t val; ++ char c; ++ union iaddr ++ { ++ uint8_t bytes[4]; ++ uint32_t word; ++ } res; ++ uint8_t *pp = res.bytes; ++ int digit; ++ ++ int saved_errno = errno; ++ __set_errno (0); ++ ++ res.word = 0; ++ ++ c = *cp; ++ for (;;) ++ { ++ /* Collect number up to ``.''. Values are specified as for C: ++ 0x=hex, 0=octal, isdigit=decimal. */ ++ if (!isdigit (c)) ++ goto ret_0; ++ { ++ char *endp; ++ unsigned long ul = strtoul (cp, &endp, 0); ++ if (ul == ULONG_MAX && errno == ERANGE) + goto ret_0; +- +- if (addr != NULL) +- addr->s_addr = res.word | htonl (val); +- +- __set_errno (saved_errno); +- return (1); +- +-ret_0: +- __set_errno (saved_errno); +- return (0); ++ if (ul > 0xfffffffful) ++ goto ret_0; ++ val = ul; ++ digit = cp != endp; ++ cp = endp; ++ } ++ c = *cp; ++ if (c == '.') ++ { ++ /* Internet format: ++ a.b.c.d ++ a.b.c (with c treated as 16 bits) ++ a.b (with b treated as 24 bits). */ ++ if (pp > res.bytes + 2 || val > 0xff) ++ goto ret_0; ++ *pp++ = val; ++ c = *++cp; ++ } ++ else ++ break; ++ } ++ /* Check for trailing characters. */ ++ if (c != '\0' && (!isascii (c) || !isspace (c))) ++ goto ret_0; ++ /* Did we get a valid digit? */ ++ if (!digit) ++ goto ret_0; ++ ++ /* Check whether the last part is in its limits depending on the ++ number of parts in total. */ ++ if (val > max[pp - res.bytes]) ++ goto ret_0; ++ ++ if (addr != NULL) ++ addr->s_addr = res.word | htonl (val); ++ ++ __set_errno (saved_errno); ++ return 1; ++ ++ ret_0: ++ __set_errno (saved_errno); ++ return 0; + } + weak_alias (__inet_aton, inet_aton) + libc_hidden_def (__inet_aton) +-- +2.11.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2018-19591.patch b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2018-19591.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9c78a3dfa02 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2018-19591.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +CVE: CVE-2018-19591 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.bur...@intel.com> + +From ce6ba630dbc96f49eb1f30366aa62261df4792f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2018 16:12:43 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2018-19591: if_nametoindex: Fix descriptor for overlong + name [BZ #23927] + +(cherry picked from commit d527c860f5a3f0ed687bd03f0cb464612dc23408) +--- + ChangeLog | 7 +++++++ + NEWS | 6 ++++++ + sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/if_index.c | 11 ++++++----- + 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/if_index.c b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/if_index.c +index e3d08982d9..782fc5e175 100644 +--- a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/if_index.c ++++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/if_index.c +@@ -38,11 +38,6 @@ __if_nametoindex (const char *ifname) + return 0; + #else + struct ifreq ifr; +- int fd = __opensock (); +- +- if (fd < 0) +- return 0; +- + if (strlen (ifname) >= IFNAMSIZ) + { + __set_errno (ENODEV); +@@ -50,6 +45,12 @@ __if_nametoindex (const char *ifname) + } + + strncpy (ifr.ifr_name, ifname, sizeof (ifr.ifr_name)); ++ ++ int fd = __opensock (); ++ ++ if (fd < 0) ++ return 0; ++ + if (__ioctl (fd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &ifr) < 0) + { + int saved_errno = errno; +-- +2.11.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2019-9169.patch b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2019-9169.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8f28b56fa05 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/CVE-2019-9169.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +CVE: CVE-2019-9196 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.bur...@intel.com> + +From 2aee101ff6075dd97a99982a1ba29e21ec25c52f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paul Eggert <egg...@cs.ucla.edu> +Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2019 11:08:13 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH] regex: fix read overrun [BZ #24114] + +Problem found by AddressSanitizer, reported by Hongxu Chen in: +https://debbugs.gnu.org/34140 +* posix/regexec.c (proceed_next_node): +Do not read past end of input buffer. + +(cherry picked from commit 583dd860d5b833037175247230a328f0050dbfe9) +--- + ChangeLog | 8 ++++++++ + posix/regexec.c | 6 ++++-- + 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/posix/regexec.c b/posix/regexec.c +index 73644c2341..06b8487c3e 100644 +--- a/posix/regexec.c ++++ b/posix/regexec.c +@@ -1289,8 +1289,10 @@ proceed_next_node (const re_match_context_t *mctx, Idx nregs, regmatch_t *regs, + else if (naccepted) + { + char *buf = (char *) re_string_get_buffer (&mctx->input); +- if (memcmp (buf + regs[subexp_idx].rm_so, buf + *pidx, +- naccepted) != 0) ++ if (mctx->input.valid_len - *pidx < naccepted ++ || (memcmp (buf + regs[subexp_idx].rm_so, buf + *pidx, ++ naccepted) ++ != 0)) + return -1; + } + } +-- +2.11.0 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.28.bb b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.28.bb index 72cee04d9a7..ffc4be814b9 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.28.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.28.bb @@ -47,7 +47,9 @@ SRC_URI = "${GLIBC_GIT_URI};branch=${SRCBRANCH};name=glibc \ file://0032-sysdeps-ieee754-soft-fp-ignore-maybe-uninitialized-w.patch \ file://0033-locale-prevent-maybe-uninitialized-errors-with-Os-BZ.patch \ file://0034-inject-file-assembly-directives.patch \ -" + file://CVE-2016-10739.patch \ + file://CVE-2018-19591.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-9169.patch" NATIVESDKFIXES ?= "" NATIVESDKFIXES_class-nativesdk = "\ -- 2.11.0 -- _______________________________________________ Openembedded-core mailing list Openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core