From: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang....@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang....@intel.com> --- .../json-c/json-c/CVE-2020-12762.patch | 160 +++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.14.bb | 5 +- 2 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c/CVE-2020-12762.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c/CVE-2020-12762.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c/CVE-2020-12762.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a45cfb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c/CVE-2020-12762.patch @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +From 099016b7e8d70a6d5dd814e788bba08d33d48426 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tob...@stoeckmann.org> +Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:41:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Protect array_list_del_idx against size_t overflow. + +If the assignment of stop overflows due to idx and count being +larger than SIZE_T_MAX in sum, out of boundary access could happen. + +It takes invalid usage of this function for this to happen, but +I decided to add this check so array_list_del_idx is as safe against +bad usage as the other arraylist functions. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/json-c/json-c/commit/31243e4d1204ef78be34b0fcae73221eee6b83be] +CVE: CVE-2020-12762 +Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang....@intel.com> + +--- + arraylist.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/arraylist.c b/arraylist.c +index 12ad8af6d3..e5524aca75 100644 +--- a/arraylist.c ++++ b/arraylist.c +@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ int array_list_del_idx(struct array_list *arr, size_t idx, size_t count) + { + size_t i, stop; + ++ /* Avoid overflow in calculation with large indices. */ ++ if (idx > SIZE_T_MAX - count) ++ return -1; + stop = idx + count; + if (idx >= arr->length || stop > arr->length) + return -1; + +From 77d935b7ae7871a1940cd827e850e6063044ec45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tob...@stoeckmann.org> +Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:46:45 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Prevent division by zero in linkhash. + +If a linkhash with a size of zero is created, then modulo operations +are prone to division by zero operations. + +Purely protective measure against bad usage. +--- + linkhash.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/linkhash.c b/linkhash.c +index 7ea58c0abf..f05cc38030 100644 +--- a/linkhash.c ++++ b/linkhash.c +@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ + + #include "config.h" + ++#include <assert.h> + #include <limits.h> + #include <stdarg.h> + #include <stddef.h> +@@ -499,6 +500,8 @@ struct lh_table *lh_table_new(int size, lh_entry_free_fn *free_fn, lh_hash_fn *h + int i; + struct lh_table *t; + ++ /* Allocate space for elements to avoid divisions by zero. */ ++ assert(size > 0); + t = (struct lh_table *)calloc(1, sizeof(struct lh_table)); + if (!t) + return NULL; + +From d07b91014986900a3a75f306d302e13e005e9d67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tob...@stoeckmann.org> +Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 19:47:25 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Fix integer overflows. + +The data structures linkhash and printbuf are limited to 2 GB in size +due to a signed integer being used to track their current size. + +If too much data is added, then size variable can overflow, which is +an undefined behaviour in C programming language. + +Assuming that a signed int overflow just leads to a negative value, +like it happens on many sytems (Linux i686/amd64 with gcc), then +printbuf is vulnerable to an out of boundary write on 64 bit systems. +--- + linkhash.c | 7 +++++-- + printbuf.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- + 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/linkhash.c b/linkhash.c +index f05cc38030..51e90b13a2 100644 +--- a/linkhash.c ++++ b/linkhash.c +@@ -580,9 +580,12 @@ int lh_table_insert_w_hash(struct lh_table *t, const void *k, const void *v, con + { + unsigned long n; + +- if (t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR) +- if (lh_table_resize(t, t->size * 2) != 0) ++ if (t->count >= t->size * LH_LOAD_FACTOR) { ++ /* Avoid signed integer overflow with large tables. */ ++ int new_size = INT_MAX / 2 < t->size ? t->size * 2 : INT_MAX; ++ if (t->size == INT_MAX || lh_table_resize(t, new_size) != 0) + return -1; ++ } + + n = h % t->size; + +diff --git a/printbuf.c b/printbuf.c +index 976c12dde5..00822fac4f 100644 +--- a/printbuf.c ++++ b/printbuf.c +@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ + + #include "config.h" + ++#include <limits.h> + #include <stdio.h> + #include <stdlib.h> + #include <string.h> +@@ -65,10 +66,16 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printbuf *p, int min_size) + + if (p->size >= min_size) + return 0; +- +- new_size = p->size * 2; +- if (new_size < min_size + 8) ++ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */ ++ if (min_size > INT_MAX - 8) ++ return -1; ++ if (p->size > INT_MAX / 2) + new_size = min_size + 8; ++ else { ++ new_size = p->size * 2; ++ if (new_size < min_size + 8) ++ new_size = min_size + 8; ++ } + #ifdef PRINTBUF_DEBUG + MC_DEBUG("printbuf_memappend: realloc " + "bpos=%d min_size=%d old_size=%d new_size=%d\n", +@@ -83,6 +90,9 @@ static int printbuf_extend(struct printbuf *p, int min_size) + + int printbuf_memappend(struct printbuf *p, const char *buf, int size) + { ++ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */ ++ if (size > INT_MAX - p->bpos - 1) ++ return -1; + if (p->size <= p->bpos + size + 1) + { + if (printbuf_extend(p, p->bpos + size + 1) < 0) +@@ -100,6 +110,9 @@ int printbuf_memset(struct printbuf *pb, int offset, int charvalue, int len) + + if (offset == -1) + offset = pb->bpos; ++ /* Prevent signed integer overflows with large buffers. */ ++ if (len > INT_MAX - offset) ++ return -1; + size_needed = offset + len; + if (pb->size < size_needed) + { diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.14.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.14.bb index 99fde87..1d501d1 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.14.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/json-c/json-c_0.14.bb @@ -4,7 +4,10 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://github.com/json-c/json-c/wiki"; LICENSE = "MIT" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=de54b60fbbc35123ba193fea8ee216f2" -SRC_URI = "https://s3.amazonaws.com/json-c_releases/releases/${BP}.tar.gz"; +SRC_URI = "https://s3.amazonaws.com/json-c_releases/releases/${BP}.tar.gz \ + file://CVE-2020-12762.patch \ +" + SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b377de08c9b23ca3b37d9a9828107dff1de5ce208ff4ebb35005a794f30c6870" UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/${BPN}/${BPN}/releases"; -- 2.7.4
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