From: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampa...@windriver.com> In ssh in OpenSSH before 9.6, OS command injection might occur if a user name or host name has shell metacharacters, and this name is referenced by an expansion token in certain situations. For example, an untrusted Git repository can have a submodule with shell metacharacters in a user name or host name.
References: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51385 Upstream patches: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampa...@windriver.com> --- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-51385.patch | 97 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_8.9p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 98 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-51385.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-51385.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-51385.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b8e6813857 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2023-51385.patch @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +From 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "d...@openbsd.org" <d...@openbsd.org> +Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:47:44 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: ban user/hostnames with most shell metacharacters + This makes ssh(1) refuse user or host names provided on the commandline that + contain most shell metacharacters. + +Some programs that invoke ssh(1) using untrusted data do not filter +metacharacters in arguments they supply. This could create +interactions with user-specified ProxyCommand and other directives +that allow shell injection attacks to occur. + +It's a mistake to invoke ssh(1) with arbitrary untrusted arguments, +but getting this stuff right can be tricky, so this should prevent +most obvious ways of creating risky situations. It however is not +and cannot be perfect: ssh(1) has no practical way of interpreting +what shell quoting rules are in use and how they interact with the +user's specified ProxyCommand. + +To allow configurations that use strange user or hostnames to +continue to work, this strictness is applied only to names coming +from the commandline. Names specified using User or Hostname +directives in ssh_config(5) are not affected. + +feedback/ok millert@ markus@ dtucker@ deraadt@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b487348b5964f3e77b6b4d3da4c3b439e94b2d9 + +CVE: CVE-2023-51385 + +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a] + +Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampa...@windriver.com> +--- + ssh.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c +index 8ff9788..82ed15f 100644 +--- a/ssh.c ++++ b/ssh.c +@@ -611,6 +611,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) + free(cinfo); + } + ++static int ++valid_hostname(const char *s) ++{ ++ size_t i; ++ ++ if (*s == '-') ++ return 0; ++ for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) { ++ if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL || ++ isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i])) ++ return 0; ++ } ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static int ++valid_ruser(const char *s) ++{ ++ size_t i; ++ ++ if (*s == '-') ++ return 0; ++ for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) { ++ if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL) ++ return 0; ++ /* Disallow '-' after whitespace */ ++ if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-') ++ return 0; ++ /* Disallow \ in last position */ ++ if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0') ++ return 0; ++ } ++ return 1; ++} ++ + /* + * Main program for the ssh client. + */ +@@ -1097,6 +1132,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + if (!host) + usage(); + ++ if (!valid_hostname(host)) ++ fatal("hostname contains invalid characters"); ++ if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user)) ++ fatal("remote username contains invalid characters"); + host_arg = xstrdup(host); + + /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ +-- +2.40.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.9p1.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.9p1.bb index 3860899540..bc8e2d81b8 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.9p1.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.9p1.bb @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar file://fix-authorized-principals-command.patch \ file://CVE-2023-48795.patch \ file://CVE-2023-51384.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-51385.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fd497654b7ab1686dac672fb83dfb4ba4096e8b5ffcdaccd262380ae58bec5e7" -- 2.40.0
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