From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt
DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195)
A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected.
(Patch borrowed from Fedora.)
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggle...@linux.intel.com>
---
.../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++
.../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
create mode 100644
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
diff --git
a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c43919
--- /dev/null
+++
b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+commit 208d54db20d58c9a5e45e856a0650caadd7d9612
+Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <st...@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue May 13 18:48:31 2014 +0100
+
+ Fix for CVE-2014-0195
+
+ A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
+ to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
+ run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
+
+ Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments.
+
+ Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.
+
+Patch borrowed from Fedora
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggle...@linux.intel.com>
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 2e8cf68..07f67f8 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -627,7 +627,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st*
msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+ }
+ else
++ {
+ frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
++ if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
++ {
++ item = NULL;
++ frag = NULL;
++ goto err;
++ }
++ }
++
+
+ /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
+ * retransmit and can be dropped.
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
index 842a903..7783206 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
file://0001-Use-version-in-SSL_METHOD-not-SSL-structure.patch \
file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \
file://openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch \
+ file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"
--
1.9.3
--
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