CVE-2014-6271 aka ShellShock.
"GNU Bash through 4.3 processes trailing strings after function definitions in
the values of environment variables, which allows remote attackers to execute
arbitrary code via a crafted environment."
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.bur...@intel.com>
---
.../bash/bash-3.2.48/cve-2014-6271.patch | 77 +++++++++++++
.../recipes-extended/bash/bash/cve-2014-6271.patch | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_3.2.48.bb | 1 +
meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_4.3.bb | 1 +
4 files changed, 193 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash-3.2.48/cve-2014-6271.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/cve-2014-6271.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash-3.2.48/cve-2014-6271.patch
b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash-3.2.48/cve-2014-6271.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7226ffb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash-3.2.48/cve-2014-6271.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+Fix CVE-2014-6271, aka ShellShock.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.bur...@intel.com>
+
+*** ../bash-3.2.51/builtins/common.h 2006-03-06 09:38:44.000000000 -0500
+--- builtins/common.h 2014-09-16 19:08:02.000000000 -0400
+***************
+*** 34,37 ****
+--- 34,39 ----
+
+ /* Flags for describe_command, shared between type.def and command.def */
++ #define SEVAL_FUNCDEF 0x080 /* only allow function
definitions */
++ #define SEVAL_ONECMD 0x100 /* only allow a single command */
+ #define CDESC_ALL 0x001 /* type -a */
+ #define CDESC_SHORTDESC 0x002 /* command -V */
+*** ../bash-3.2.51/builtins/evalstring.c 2008-11-15 17:47:04.000000000
-0500
+--- builtins/evalstring.c 2014-09-16 19:08:02.000000000 -0400
+***************
+*** 235,238 ****
+--- 235,246 ----
+ struct fd_bitmap *bitmap;
+
++ if ((flags & SEVAL_FUNCDEF) && command->type != cm_function_def)
++ {
++ internal_warning ("%s: ignoring function definition attempt",
from_file);
++ should_jump_to_top_level = 0;
++ last_result = last_command_exit_value = EX_BADUSAGE;
++ break;
++ }
++
+ bitmap = new_fd_bitmap (FD_BITMAP_SIZE);
+ begin_unwind_frame ("pe_dispose");
+***************
+*** 292,295 ****
+--- 300,306 ----
+ dispose_fd_bitmap (bitmap);
+ discard_unwind_frame ("pe_dispose");
++
++ if (flags & SEVAL_ONECMD)
++ break;
+ }
+ }
+*** ../bash-3.2.51/variables.c 2008-11-15 17:15:06.000000000 -0500
+--- variables.c 2014-09-16 19:10:39.000000000 -0400
+***************
+*** 319,328 ****
+ strcpy (temp_string + char_index + 1, string);
+
+! parse_and_execute (temp_string, name, SEVAL_NONINT|SEVAL_NOHIST);
+!
+! /* Ancient backwards compatibility. Old versions of bash exported
+! functions like name()=() {...} */
+! if (name[char_index - 1] == ')' && name[char_index - 2] == '(')
+! name[char_index - 2] = '\0';
+
+ if (temp_var = find_function (name))
+--- 319,326 ----
+ strcpy (temp_string + char_index + 1, string);
+
+! /* Don't import function names that are invalid identifiers from the
+! environment. */
+! if (legal_identifier (name))
+! parse_and_execute (temp_string, name,
SEVAL_NONINT|SEVAL_NOHIST|SEVAL_FUNCDEF|SEVAL_ONECMD);
+
+ if (temp_var = find_function (name))
+***************
+*** 333,340 ****
+ else
+ report_error (_("error importing function definition for `%s'"),
name);
+-
+- /* ( */
+- if (name[char_index - 1] == ')' && name[char_index - 2] == '\0')
+- name[char_index - 2] = '('; /* ) */
+ }
+ #if defined (ARRAY_VARS)
+--- 331,334 ----
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/cve-2014-6271.patch
b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/cve-2014-6271.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d33a5c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash/cve-2014-6271.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+Fix CVE-2014-6271, aka ShellShock. This is the upstream 4.3 patchlevel 25,
minus the hunk to
+set the patch level.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.bur...@intel.com>
+
+ BASH PATCH REPORT
+ =================
+
+Bash-Release: 4.3
+Patch-ID: bash43-025
+
+Bug-Reported-by: Stephane Chazelas <stephane.chaze...@gmail.com>
+Bug-Reference-ID:
+Bug-Reference-URL:
+
+Bug-Description:
+
+Under certain circumstances, bash will execute user code while processing the
+environment for exported function definitions.
+
+Patch (apply with `patch -p0'):
+
+*** ../bash-4.3-patched/builtins/common.h 2013-07-08 16:54:47.000000000
-0400
+--- builtins/common.h 2014-09-12 14:25:47.000000000 -0400
+***************
+*** 34,37 ****
+--- 49,54 ----
+ #define SEVAL_PARSEONLY 0x020
+ #define SEVAL_NOLONGJMP 0x040
++ #define SEVAL_FUNCDEF 0x080 /* only allow function
definitions */
++ #define SEVAL_ONECMD 0x100 /* only allow a single command */
+
+ /* Flags for describe_command, shared between type.def and command.def */
+*** ../bash-4.3-patched/builtins/evalstring.c 2014-02-11 09:42:10.000000000
-0500
+--- builtins/evalstring.c 2014-09-14 14:15:13.000000000 -0400
+***************
+*** 309,312 ****
+--- 313,324 ----
+ struct fd_bitmap *bitmap;
+
++ if ((flags & SEVAL_FUNCDEF) && command->type != cm_function_def)
++ {
++ internal_warning ("%s: ignoring function definition attempt",
from_file);
++ should_jump_to_top_level = 0;
++ last_result = last_command_exit_value = EX_BADUSAGE;
++ break;
++ }
++
+ bitmap = new_fd_bitmap (FD_BITMAP_SIZE);
+ begin_unwind_frame ("pe_dispose");
+***************
+*** 369,372 ****
+--- 381,387 ----
+ dispose_fd_bitmap (bitmap);
+ discard_unwind_frame ("pe_dispose");
++
++ if (flags & SEVAL_ONECMD)
++ break;
+ }
+ }
+*** ../bash-4.3-patched/variables.c 2014-05-15 08:26:50.000000000 -0400
+--- variables.c 2014-09-14 14:23:35.000000000 -0400
+***************
+*** 359,369 ****
+ strcpy (temp_string + char_index + 1, string);
+
+! if (posixly_correct == 0 || legal_identifier (name))
+! parse_and_execute (temp_string, name, SEVAL_NONINT|SEVAL_NOHIST);
+!
+! /* Ancient backwards compatibility. Old versions of bash exported
+! functions like name()=() {...} */
+! if (name[char_index - 1] == ')' && name[char_index - 2] == '(')
+! name[char_index - 2] = '\0';
+
+ if (temp_var = find_function (name))
+--- 364,372 ----
+ strcpy (temp_string + char_index + 1, string);
+
+! /* Don't import function names that are invalid identifiers from the
+! environment, though we still allow them to be defined as shell
+! variables. */
+! if (legal_identifier (name))
+! parse_and_execute (temp_string, name,
SEVAL_NONINT|SEVAL_NOHIST|SEVAL_FUNCDEF|SEVAL_ONECMD);
+
+ if (temp_var = find_function (name))
+***************
+*** 382,389 ****
+ report_error (_("error importing function definition for `%s'"),
name);
+ }
+-
+- /* ( */
+- if (name[char_index - 1] == ')' && name[char_index - 2] == '\0')
+- name[char_index - 2] = '('; /* ) */
+ }
+ #if defined (ARRAY_VARS)
+--- 385,388 ----
+*** ../bash-4.3-patched/subst.c 2014-08-11 11:16:35.000000000 -0400
+--- subst.c 2014-09-12 15:31:04.000000000 -0400
+***************
+*** 8048,8052 ****
+ goto return0;
+ }
+! else if (var = find_variable_last_nameref (temp1))
+ {
+ temp = nameref_cell (var);
+--- 8118,8124 ----
+ goto return0;
+ }
+! else if (var && (invisible_p (var) || var_isset (var) == 0))
+! temp = (char *)NULL;
+! else if ((var = find_variable_last_nameref (temp1)) && var_isset (var)
&& invisible_p (var) == 0)
+ {
+ temp = nameref_cell (var);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_3.2.48.bb
b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_3.2.48.bb
index fe04b28..5849ed0 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_3.2.48.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_3.2.48.bb
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/bash/bash-${PV}.tar.gz;name=tarball \
file://mkbuiltins_have_stringize.patch \
file://build-tests.patch \
file://test-output.patch \
+ file://cve-2014-6271.patch;striplevel=0 \
file://run-ptest \
"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_4.3.bb
b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_4.3.bb
index 25b7410..febaf33 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_4.3.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/bash/bash_4.3.bb
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/bash/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz;name=tarball \
file://mkbuiltins_have_stringize.patch \
file://build-tests.patch \
file://test-output.patch \
+ file://cve-2014-6271.patch;striplevel=0 \
file://run-ptest \
"
--
1.7.10.4
--
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