On Fri, Jan 9, 2026 at 11:47 PM Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> This patch needs a bit of caution, because it requires kernel 6.13 at
> least, without it it has not effect. The required kernel change[1] was
> not backported to older stable versions (both Scarthgap and Kirkstone
> are out of luck with the default kernel).
>
> Not saying the patch should be dropped, rather that CVE tag in the patch
> will mark is patched, but it's only half of the fix. Not sure what (if
> anything at all) should be done about this.
>
> [1]:
> https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/fs/smb?id=db363b0a1d9e6b9dc556296f1b1007aeb496a8cf

Thanks Gyorgy, I overlooked that aspect.
It will be misleading to mark CVE tag as patched when vulnerability
still exists.

I am in favor of dropping this patch.

>
> On 1/9/26 10:28, Ankur Tyagi via lists.openembedded.org wrote:
> > From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
> >
> > Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2312
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
> > ---
> >  .../cifs/cifs-utils/CVE-2025-2312.patch       | 136 ++++++++++++++++++
> >  .../recipes-support/cifs/cifs-utils_7.0.bb    |   4 +-
> >  2 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >  create mode 100644 
> > meta-networking/recipes-support/cifs/cifs-utils/CVE-2025-2312.patch
> >
> > diff --git 
> > a/meta-networking/recipes-support/cifs/cifs-utils/CVE-2025-2312.patch 
> > b/meta-networking/recipes-support/cifs/cifs-utils/CVE-2025-2312.patch
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 0000000000..3e62b0f1c3
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/cifs/cifs-utils/CVE-2025-2312.patch
> > @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
> > +From faf6ce0abd6fbca95721eb88754add9c0c700a5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> > +From: Ritvik Budhiraja <[email protected]>
> > +Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2024 06:07:58 +0000
> > +Subject: [PATCH] CIFS.upcall to accomodate new namespace mount opt
> > +
> > +NOTE: This patch is dependent on one of the previously sent patches:
> > +[PATCH] CIFS: New mount option for cifs.upcall namespace resolution
> > +which introduces a new mount option called upcall_target, to
> > +customise the upcall behaviour.
> > +
> > +Building upon the above patch, the following patch adds functionality
> > +to handle upcall_target as a mount option in cifs.upcall. It can have 2 
> > values -
> > +mount, app.
> > +Having this new mount option allows the mount command to specify where the
> > +upcall should happen: 'mount' for resolving the upcall to the host
> > +namespace, and 'app' for resolving the upcall to the ns of the calling
> > +thread. This will enable both the scenarios where the Kerberos credentials
> > +can be found on the application namespace or the host namespace to which
> > +just the mount operation is "delegated".
> > +This aids use cases like Kubernetes where the mount
> > +happens on behalf of the application in another container altogether.
> > +
> > +Signed-off-by: Ritvik Budhiraja <[email protected]>
> > +Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
> > +
> > +CVE: CVE-2025-2312
> > +Upstream-Status: Backport 
> > [https://git.samba.org/?p=cifs-utils.git;a=commit;h=89b679228cc1be9739d54203d28289b03352c174]
> > +(cherry picked from commit 89b679228cc1be9739d54203d28289b03352c174)
> > +Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
> > +---
> > + cifs.upcall.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> > + 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> > +
> > +diff --git a/cifs.upcall.c b/cifs.upcall.c
> > +index 52c0328..0883afa 100644
> > +--- a/cifs.upcall.c
> > ++++ b/cifs.upcall.c
> > +@@ -953,6 +953,13 @@ struct decoded_args {
> > + #define MAX_USERNAME_SIZE 256
> > +     char username[MAX_USERNAME_SIZE + 1];
> > +
> > ++#define MAX_UPCALL_STRING_LEN 6 /* "mount\0" */
> > ++    enum upcall_target_enum {
> > ++            UPTARGET_UNSPECIFIED, /* not specified, defaults to app */
> > ++            UPTARGET_MOUNT, /* upcall to the mount namespace */
> > ++            UPTARGET_APP, /* upcall to the application namespace which 
> > did the mount */
> > ++    } upcall_target;
> > ++
> > +     uid_t uid;
> > +     uid_t creduid;
> > +     pid_t pid;
> > +@@ -969,6 +976,7 @@ struct decoded_args {
> > + #define DKD_HAVE_PID                0x20
> > + #define DKD_HAVE_CREDUID    0x40
> > + #define DKD_HAVE_USERNAME   0x80
> > ++#define DKD_HAVE_UPCALL_TARGET      0x100
> > + #define DKD_MUSTHAVE_SET (DKD_HAVE_HOSTNAME|DKD_HAVE_VERSION|DKD_HAVE_SEC)
> > +     int have;
> > + };
> > +@@ -979,6 +987,7 @@ __decode_key_description(const char *desc, struct 
> > decoded_args *arg)
> > +     size_t len;
> > +     char *pos;
> > +     const char *tkn = desc;
> > ++    arg->upcall_target = UPTARGET_UNSPECIFIED;
> > +
> > +     do {
> > +             pos = index(tkn, ';');
> > +@@ -1077,6 +1086,31 @@ __decode_key_description(const char *desc, struct 
> > decoded_args *arg)
> > +                     }
> > +                     arg->have |= DKD_HAVE_VERSION;
> > +                     syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "ver=%d", arg->ver);
> > ++            } else if (strncmp(tkn, "upcall_target=", 14) == 0) {
> > ++                    if (pos == NULL)
> > ++                            len = strlen(tkn);
> > ++                    else
> > ++                            len = pos - tkn;
> > ++
> > ++                    len -= 14;
> > ++                    if (len > MAX_UPCALL_STRING_LEN) {
> > ++                            syslog(LOG_ERR, "upcall_target= value too 
> > long for buffer");
> > ++                            return 1;
> > ++                    }
> > ++                    if (strncmp(tkn + 14, "mount", 5) == 0) {
> > ++                            arg->upcall_target = UPTARGET_MOUNT;
> > ++                            syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "upcall_target=mount");
> > ++                    } else if (strncmp(tkn + 14, "app", 3) == 0) {
> > ++                            arg->upcall_target = UPTARGET_APP;
> > ++                            syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "upcall_target=app");
> > ++                    } else {
> > ++                            // Should never happen
> > ++                            syslog(LOG_ERR, "Invalid upcall_target value: 
> > %s, defaulting to app",
> > ++                                   tkn + 14);
> > ++                            arg->upcall_target = UPTARGET_APP;
> > ++                            syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "upcall_target=app");
> > ++                    }
> > ++                    arg->have |= DKD_HAVE_UPCALL_TARGET;
> > +             }
> > +             if (pos == NULL)
> > +                     break;
> > +@@ -1440,15 +1474,20 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[])
> > +      * acceptably in containers, because we'll be looking at the correct
> > +      * filesystem and have the correct network configuration.
> > +      */
> > +-    rc = switch_to_process_ns(arg->pid);
> > +-    if (rc == -1) {
> > +-            syslog(LOG_ERR, "unable to switch to process namespace: %s", 
> > strerror(errno));
> > +-            rc = 1;
> > +-            goto out;
> > ++    if (arg->upcall_target == UPTARGET_APP || arg->upcall_target == 
> > UPTARGET_UNSPECIFIED) {
> > ++            syslog(LOG_INFO, "upcall_target=app, switching namespaces to 
> > application thread");
> > ++            rc = switch_to_process_ns(arg->pid);
> > ++            if (rc == -1) {
> > ++                    syslog(LOG_ERR, "unable to switch to process 
> > namespace: %s", strerror(errno));
> > ++                    rc = 1;
> > ++                    goto out;
> > ++            }
> > ++            if (trim_capabilities(env_probe))
> > ++                    goto out;
> > ++    } else {
> > ++            syslog(LOG_INFO, "upcall_target=mount, not switching 
> > namespaces to application thread");
> > +     }
> > +
> > +-    if (trim_capabilities(env_probe))
> > +-            goto out;
> > +
> > +     /*
> > +      * The kernel doesn't pass down the gid, so we resort here to scraping
> > +@@ -1495,7 +1534,7 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[])
> > +      * look at the environ file.
> > +      */
> > +     env_cachename =
> > +-            get_cachename_from_process_env(env_probe ? arg->pid : 0);
> > ++            get_cachename_from_process_env((env_probe && 
> > (arg->upcall_target == UPTARGET_APP)) ? arg->pid : 0);
> > +
> > +     rc = setuid(uid);
> > +     if (rc == -1) {
> > diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/cifs/cifs-utils_7.0.bb 
> > b/meta-networking/recipes-support/cifs/cifs-utils_7.0.bb
> > index c78bbae7b8..4e27491bba 100644
> > --- a/meta-networking/recipes-support/cifs/cifs-utils_7.0.bb
> > +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/cifs/cifs-utils_7.0.bb
> > @@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ LICENSE = "GPL-3.0-only & LGPL-3.0-only"
> >  LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=d32239bcb673463ab874e80d47fae504"
> >
> >  SRCREV = "316522036133d44ed02cd39ed2748e2b59c85b30"
> > -SRC_URI = "git://git.samba.org/cifs-utils.git;branch=master"
> > +SRC_URI = "git://git.samba.org/cifs-utils.git;branch=master \
> > +           file://CVE-2025-2312.patch \
> > +"
> >
> >  S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
> >  DEPENDS += "libtalloc"
> >
> > 
> >
>
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