From: Changqing Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 8e57fb9b1e4da504ceeaadcff2fe38555a47b6b6) Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <[email protected]> --- .../postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch | 116 ++++++++++++++++ .../postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch | 131 ++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 249 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..58bf810626 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +From 24c2b9e42edb6d2f4ef2cead3b0aa1d6196adfce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tom Lane <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 11:01:43 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption + handshake. + +The server collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data +from the client socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested +during startup, any additional data received with the initial +request message remained in the buffer, and would be treated as +already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed. +Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the +TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of +a supposedly encryption-protected database session. + +This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server, +although that would only work if the server did not demand any +authentication data. (However, a server relying on SSL certificate +authentication might well not do so.) + +To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer +is not empty after the encryption handshake. + +Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. + +Security: CVE-2021-23214 + +Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/28e24125541545483093819efae9bca603441951] +CVE: CVE-2021-23214 + +Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]> + +--- + src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c | 11 +++++++++++ + src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- + src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 1 + + 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c +index ee2cd86..4dd1c02 100644 +--- a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c ++++ b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c +@@ -1183,6 +1183,17 @@ pq_getstring(StringInfo s) + } + } + ++/* ------------------------------- ++ * pq_buffer_has_data - is any buffered data available to read? ++ * ++ * This will *not* attempt to read more data. ++ * -------------------------------- ++ */ ++bool ++pq_buffer_has_data(void) ++{ ++ return (PqRecvPointer < PqRecvLength); ++} + + /* -------------------------------- + * pq_startmsgread - begin reading a message from the client. +diff --git a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c +index 5775fc0..1fcc3f8 100644 +--- a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c ++++ b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c +@@ -2049,6 +2049,17 @@ retry1: + return STATUS_ERROR; + #endif + ++ /* ++ * At this point we should have no data already buffered. If we do, ++ * it was received before we performed the SSL handshake, so it wasn't ++ * encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle. ++ * We report this case to the client. ++ */ ++ if (pq_buffer_has_data()) ++ ereport(FATAL, ++ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), ++ errmsg("received unencrypted data after SSL request"), ++ errdetail("This could be either a client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack."))); + /* + * regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow, but not + * another SSL negotiation request, and a GSS request should only +@@ -2080,7 +2091,17 @@ retry1: + if (GSSok == 'G' && secure_open_gssapi(port) == -1) + return STATUS_ERROR; + #endif +- ++ /* ++ * At this point we should have no data already buffered. If we do, ++ * it was received before we performed the GSS handshake, so it wasn't ++ * encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle. ++ * We report this case to the client. ++ */ ++ if (pq_buffer_has_data()) ++ ereport(FATAL, ++ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), ++ errmsg("received unencrypted data after GSSAPI encryption request"), ++ errdetail("This could be either a client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack."))); + /* + * regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow, but not + * another GSS negotiation request, and an SSL request should only +diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h +index b115247..9969692 100644 +--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h ++++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h +@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern int pq_getbyte(void); + extern int pq_peekbyte(void); + extern int pq_getbyte_if_available(unsigned char *c); + extern int pq_putbytes(const char *s, size_t len); ++extern bool pq_buffer_has_data(void); + + /* + * prototypes for functions in be-secure.c +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..42b78539b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +From 79125ead2a6a234086844bb42f06d49603fe6ca0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tom Lane <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 11:14:56 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption + handshake. + +libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from +the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup, +any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply +remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data +once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle +with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff +some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected +database session. + +This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the +client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior +make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to +exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might +be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with +a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214. + +To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer +is not empty after the encryption handshake. + +Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. + +Security: CVE-2021-23222 + +Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/160c0258802d10b0600d7671b1bbea55d8e17d45] +CVE: CVE-2021-23222 + +Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]> +--- + doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml +index e26619e1b5..b692648fca 100644 +--- a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml ++++ b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml +@@ -1471,6 +1471,20 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional --> + and proceed without requesting <acronym>SSL</acronym>. + </para> + ++ <para> ++ When <acronym>SSL</acronym> encryption can be performed, the server ++ is expected to send only the single <literal>S</literal> byte and then ++ wait for the frontend to initiate an <acronym>SSL</acronym> handshake. ++ If additional bytes are available to read at this point, it likely ++ means that a man-in-the-middle is attempting to perform a ++ buffer-stuffing attack ++ (<ulink url="https://www.postgresql.org/support/security/CVE-2021-23222/";>CVE-2021-23222</ulink>). ++ Frontends should be coded either to read exactly one byte from the ++ socket before turning the socket over to their SSL library, or to ++ treat it as a protocol violation if they find they have read additional ++ bytes. ++ </para> ++ + <para> + An initial SSLRequest can also be used in a connection that is being + opened to send a CancelRequest message. +@@ -1532,6 +1546,20 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional --> + encryption. + </para> + ++ <para> ++ When <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption can be performed, the server ++ is expected to send only the single <literal>G</literal> byte and then ++ wait for the frontend to initiate a <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> handshake. ++ If additional bytes are available to read at this point, it likely ++ means that a man-in-the-middle is attempting to perform a ++ buffer-stuffing attack ++ (<ulink url="https://www.postgresql.org/support/security/CVE-2021-23222/";>CVE-2021-23222</ulink>). ++ Frontends should be coded either to read exactly one byte from the ++ socket before turning the socket over to their GSSAPI library, or to ++ treat it as a protocol violation if they find they have read additional ++ bytes. ++ </para> ++ + <para> + An initial GSSENCRequest can also be used in a connection that is being + opened to send a CancelRequest message. +diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c +index f80f4e98d8..57aee95183 100644 +--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c ++++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c +@@ -3076,6 +3076,19 @@ keep_going: /* We will come back to here until there is + pollres = pqsecure_open_client(conn); + if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK) + { ++ /* ++ * At this point we should have no data already buffered. ++ * If we do, it was received before we performed the SSL ++ * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted and indeed may have ++ * been injected by a man-in-the-middle. ++ */ ++ if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd) ++ { ++ appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, ++ libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after SSL response\n")); ++ goto error_return; ++ } ++ + /* SSL handshake done, ready to send startup packet */ + conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE; + return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING; +@@ -3175,6 +3188,19 @@ keep_going: /* We will come back to here until there is + pollres = pqsecure_open_gss(conn); + if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK) + { ++ /* ++ * At this point we should have no data already buffered. ++ * If we do, it was received before we performed the GSS ++ * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted and indeed may have ++ * been injected by a man-in-the-middle. ++ */ ++ if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd) ++ { ++ appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, ++ libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after GSSAPI encryption response\n")); ++ goto error_return; ++ } ++ + /* All set for startup packet */ + conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE; + return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING; +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb index f63d23dbef..2ed0fa49bb 100644 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ SRC_URI += "\ file://0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch \ file://0001-Improve-reproducibility.patch \ file://0001-configure.in-bypass-autoconf-2.69-version-check.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-23214.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-23222.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ea93e10390245f1ce461a54eb5f99a48d8cabd3a08ce4d652ec2169a357bc0cd" -- 2.25.1
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