On 2010-07-14 4:12 PM, Eric Norman wrote:
If I understand the alleged attack correctly, it depends on the timing
difference if a standard
byte sequence comparison is "optimized" by exiting as soon as two bytes differ.
Has code been written that actually demonstrates that this can be effective?
That is, has code
been written to demonstrate that the time to execute, for instance, about two
instructions
between failure of the byte comparison at the first byte and failure at the
second byte can
actually be detected over a network?
While timing leaks need to be fixed as a matter of policy, perhaps by
starting the compare at a random point within the token, this is not a
real leak, since the timing difference is nanoseconds, and routing
jitter is milliseconds
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