OpenPKG CVS Repository
http://cvs.openpkg.org/
____________________________________________________________________________
Server: cvs.openpkg.org Name: Ralf S. Engelschall
Root: /e/openpkg/cvs Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Module: openpkg-src Date: 20-Mar-2003 21:09:40
Branch: OPENPKG_1_2_SOLID Handle: 2003032020093900
Modified files: (Branch: OPENPKG_1_2_SOLID)
openpkg-src/openssl openssl.patch openssl.spec
Log:
include OpenSSL security fix (OpenPKG-SA-2003.026-openssl)
Summary:
Revision Changes Path
1.7.4.3 +56 -0 openpkg-src/openssl/openssl.patch
1.37.2.1.2.5+1 -1 openpkg-src/openssl/openssl.spec
____________________________________________________________________________
patch -p0 <<'@@ .'
Index: openpkg-src/openssl/openssl.patch
============================================================================
$ cvs diff -u -r1.7.4.2 -r1.7.4.3 openssl.patch
--- openpkg-src/openssl/openssl.patch 17 Mar 2003 14:54:13 -0000 1.7.4.2
+++ openpkg-src/openssl/openssl.patch 20 Mar 2003 20:09:39 -0000 1.7.4.3
@@ -173,3 +173,59 @@
}
void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+Index: ssl/s3_srvr.c
+============================================================================
+$ cvs diff -u -r1.104 -r1.105 s3_srvr.c
+--- ssl/s3_srvr.c 28 Feb 2003 15:37:10 -0000 1.104
++++ ssl/s3_srvr.c 19 Mar 2003 19:19:53 -0000 1.105
+@@ -1684,7 +1684,7 @@
+ if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+-
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
++ /*
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
+ }
+
+ if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] ==
(s->client_version & 0xff))))
+@@ -1700,30 +1700,29 @@
+ (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version &
0xff))))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+-
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+- goto f_err;
++ /*
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
++
++ /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
Bleichenbacher's attack
++ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the
version
++ * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert
would
++ * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some
ciphertext
++ * made up by the adversary is properly formatted
except
++ * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such
attacks,
++ * we should treat this just like any other decryption
error. */
++ p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-20";
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (al != -1)
+ {
+-#if 0
+- goto f_err;
+-#else
+ /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as
countermeasure
+ * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
+- * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
+- * But note that due to length and protocol version checking,
the
+- * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D.
Bleichenbacher:
+- * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the
RSA
+- * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp.
1-12).
+- */
++ * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we
cannot work around a failure */
+-#endif
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
@@ .
patch -p0 <<'@@ .'
Index: openpkg-src/openssl/openssl.spec
============================================================================
$ cvs diff -u -r1.37.2.1.2.4 -r1.37.2.1.2.5 openssl.spec
--- openpkg-src/openssl/openssl.spec 17 Mar 2003 14:54:13 -0000 1.37.2.1.2.4
+++ openpkg-src/openssl/openssl.spec 20 Mar 2003 20:09:39 -0000 1.37.2.1.2.5
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
Group: Cryptography
License: BSD-style
Version: 0.9.7
-Release: 1.2.2
+Release: 1.2.3
# list of sources
Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/openssl-%{version}.tar.gz
@@ .
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