>> Norm, > >> 4) Conclusion on privs/uids. >> Nit: the exec_attr entry s/suser/solaris/ >> Is it really the euid that matters, or is it that euid=0 gives >> privs=all? I don't know how to answer the tiocsti question. >> I'm not sure that's this case (though it would be nice if >> the policy was revisited and this case dependent on that revisit), >> but I'm not suggesting that be the a case requirement. >> >> Perhaps an offline email if I've not been clear. > > Talking to Nico off line about something else, he said he'd looked > some at tiocsti and felt it was a bug that you couldn't control > the tty/pty that you own. I don't find TIOCSTI adequately > documented by Sun. But google did it.
The reason behind this is the owner doesn't really tell everything. If a user has run su in one terminal, any other terminal can be used to control "su"; this includes any form of malware. I wdon't want to change it because it still allows privilege escalation. Casper
