On Wed, Dec 09, 2009 at 09:45:20AM +0000, Darren Moffat wrote:
>  Will Fiveash wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 07, 2009 at 12:38:30PM -0600, Will Fiveash wrote:
> >> On Mon, Dec 07, 2009 at 05:59:25PM +0000, Darren Moffat wrote:
> >>>  I believe we are still waiting on a final spec for this case.
> >>>
> >>>  Specifically is the intent to add a 'pkinit' module option to the 
> >>> existing  pam_krb5 module or add a pam_krb5_pkinit module.
> >> Right, sorry for the delay (was on vacation).  I'll update the spec
> >> taking the "pkinit" module option approach which is preferable over the
> >> pam_krb5_pkinit approach of creating a new PAM module to do PKINIT for
> >> the reasons mentioned earlier in this discussion.
> > One question; should pam_krb5 doing PKINIT ever try using the password
> > acquired via pam_authtok_get as the PIN if pam_krb5 is stacked below
> > pam_authtok_get like so:
> >        login auth required           pam_unix_cred.so.1
> >        login auth sufficient         pam_krb5.so.1 pkinit
> >        login auth requisite          pam_authtok_get.so.1
> >        login auth required           pam_dhkeys.so.1
> >        login auth required           pam_unix_auth.so.1
> 
>  That is above authtok_get.

Yeah, I need to take a bit more time before hitting send.  8^)
I meant to modify that stack so pam_krb5 was below pam_authtok_get.

> > I was thinking that pam_krb5 could try doing PKINIT preauth with the
> > user's password and if that failed would try PKINIT preauth again, this
> > time prompting for the user's PIN.  If that is a bad idea then pam_krb5
> > doing PKINIT would ignore the user's password and always prompt for the
> > PIN  regardless of where it was in the auth stack.
> 
>  I can see a use case for either case.  Wither it is a bad idea or not 
>  depends on wither or not it would cause the PKCS#11 token to record a failed 
>  login attempt or if it would cause a Kerberos failed login attempt.
> 
>  So I'd say be on the safe side and if pkinit is specified don't use 
>  PAM_AUTHTOK at all for authenticating to the PKCS#11 token.

I see that several people have that concern however Gary and Wyllys have
stated that pam_krb5 pkinit should use PAM_AUTHTOK if set and not prompt
so that's how things will work (as described in other e-mails on this
thread).  I'll send the updated materials out tomorrow.

-- 
Will Fiveash
Sun Microsystems Inc.
http://opensolaris.org/os/project/kerberos/
Sent from mutt, a sweet ASCII MUA

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