Joerg Schilling wrote: > "Richard L. Hamilton" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Is there a way to disallow further kernel module load/unload operations >> (including automatic >> loading of modules) pending (a) reboot (for security too), or in a less dire >> form (b) pending >> an explicit unlock request? (not sure the latter is actually needed) >> >> While this could function like part of BSD securelevels I suppose (at least >> one other >> minimal part being disabling writes to /dev/*mem), my main interest is if >> that would make it possible to install more kernel and driver patches safely >> in multi-user mode, >> without having to worry about an inconsistent set of modules getting loaded >> prior to reboot. > > I tought that the way Solaris goes is to only allow to load signed modules.
Today that only applies to crypto modules even though all kernel modules are signed. Hopefully soon we will see a proposal for the signed execution project (sponsored by the security community) which is what you are referring to. This will be an *admin* policy. However I believe this is quite different to the problem space that Richard is talking about which is more about making the system safe to update. -- Darren J Moffat _______________________________________________ opensolaris-code mailing list [email protected] http://mail.opensolaris.org/mailman/listinfo/opensolaris-code
