I would assume that its 'full proofness' could only be assured by
having a built in piece of hardware as to stop the circumventing of
this process - TCPA comes to mind, for example.
On 5/7/06, Martin Schaffstall <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
I just had an idea: Would it be useful/feasible to sign all
executabley in Solaris with a cryptographic key and only allow
execution of signed binaries then? Would this help to improve system
security?
--
// Martin Schaffstall
// EMail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
\\ //
\X/
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