The branch OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable has been updated
via 7ebbb293e1d68c014e50dc49944aba0b72f35074 (commit)
from a8e129a0923b17751655f2e98d5d4c2ae144e3fe (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 7ebbb293e1d68c014e50dc49944aba0b72f35074
Author: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlin...@hotmail.de>
Date: Thu Feb 28 10:08:18 2019 +0100
Fix memory overrun in rsa padding check functions
Fixes #8364 and #8357
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <k...@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8365)
(cherry picked from commit d7f5e5ae6d53f1387a42d210806cf5e9ed0882d6)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++----------------
3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 4958212..8c2bab4 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to,
int tlen,
* |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
* encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
* decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
- * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
+ * |num| >= 2 * |mdlen| + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
* the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
* This does not leak any side-channel information.
*/
@@ -185,17 +185,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to,
int tlen,
from -= 1 & mask;
*--em = *from & mask;
}
- from = em;
/*
* The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
* true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA
* Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
*/
- good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
- maskedseed = from + 1;
- maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen;
+ maskedseed = em + 1;
+ maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen;
if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
goto cleanup;
@@ -236,7 +235,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to,
int tlen,
mlen = dblen - msg_index;
/*
- * For good measure, do this check in constant tine as well.
+ * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
*/
good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
@@ -250,15 +249,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to,
int tlen,
* should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
* operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
*/
- tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen, tlen), dblen,
tlen);
+ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen),
+ dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen);
msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, dblen - tlen);
mlen = dblen - msg_index;
- for (from = db + msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
- unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+ for (mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+ unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(msg_index, dblen);
- from -= dblen & equals; /* if (i == dblen) rewind */
- mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == dblen) mask = 0 */
- to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
+ msg_index -= tlen & equals; /* rewind at EOF */
+ mask &= ~equals; /* mask = 0 at EOF */
+ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[msg_index++], to[i]);
}
/*
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
index 3f2dc6b..f63c65b 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -192,15 +192,14 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int
tlen,
from -= 1 & mask;
*--em = *from & mask;
}
- from = em;
- good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
- good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+ good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
/* scan over padding data */
found_zero_byte = 0;
for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
- unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
+ unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
i, zero_index);
@@ -208,7 +207,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int
tlen,
}
/*
- * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
+ * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
* also fails.
*/
@@ -236,15 +235,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int
tlen,
* should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
* operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
*/
- tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
+ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen),
+ num - 11, tlen);
msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
mlen = num - msg_index;
- for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
- unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+ for (mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+ unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(msg_index, num);
- from -= tlen & equals; /* if (i == mlen) rewind */
- mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
- to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
+ msg_index -= tlen & equals; /* rewind at EOF */
+ mask &= ~equals; /* mask = 0 at EOF */
+ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[msg_index++], to[i]);
}
OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
index 8d25e0d..85c56a9 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
/*
* Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
- * if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
+ * if nul delimiter is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
* preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility.
*/
int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
@@ -67,7 +67,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;
- if (flen < 10) {
+ if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (flen > num || num < 11) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
return (-1);
}
@@ -89,10 +92,9 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
from -= 1 & mask;
*--em = *from & mask;
}
- from = em;
- good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
- good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+ good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
mask = ~good;
@@ -100,18 +102,18 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
found_zero_byte = 0;
threes_in_row = 0;
for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
- unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
+ unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
i, zero_index);
found_zero_byte |= equals0;
threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
- threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(from[i], 3);
+ threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(em[i], 3);
}
/*
- * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
+ * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
* also fails.
*/
@@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
mask = ~good;
- good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8);
+ good &= constant_time_ge(threes_in_row, 8);
err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
mask = ~good;
@@ -148,15 +150,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
* operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
*/
- tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
+ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen),
+ num - 11, tlen);
msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
mlen = num - msg_index;
- for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
- unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+ for (mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+ unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(msg_index, num);
- from -= tlen & equals; /* if (i == mlen) rewind */
- mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
- to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
+ msg_index -= tlen & equals; /* rewind at EOF */
+ mask &= ~equals; /* mask = 0 at EOF */
+ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[msg_index++], to[i]);
}
OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
