The branch master has been updated via f1d1903dd3dd1d68a5eae190b8c2a88bfe0a68ac (commit) from 19cfe7847c17fb4d73c8b7267da841ec1a639dd3 (commit)
- Log ----------------------------------------------------------------- commit f1d1903dd3dd1d68a5eae190b8c2a88bfe0a68ac Author: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <matthias.st.pie...@ncp-e.com> Date: Thu Oct 3 14:20:52 2019 +0200 rsa: replace magic number '11' by RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE Suggested by Matt Hart Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <m...@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10084) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary of changes: crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c index da984f522f..0c77422404 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * D - data. */ - if (num < 11) + if (num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) return -1; /* Accept inputs with and without the leading 0-byte. */ @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, int i, j; unsigned char *p; - if (flen > (tlen - 11)) { + if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return 0; @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * section 7.2.2. */ - if (flen > num || num < 11) { + if (flen > num || num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR); return -1; @@ -226,8 +226,8 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen); /* - * Move the result in-place by |num|-11-|mlen| bytes to the left. - * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+11 to |to|. + * Move the result in-place by |num|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left. + * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to |to|. * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged. * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying @@ -235,16 +235,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern. * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)). */ - tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen), - num - 11, tlen); - for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - 11; msg_index <<= 1) { - mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - 11 - mlen), 0); - for (i = 11; i < num - msg_index; i++) + tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen), + num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen); + for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) { + mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0); + for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < num - msg_index; i++) em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]); } for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen); - to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + 11], to[i]); + to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], to[i]); } OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num); diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c index d57031e5af..99e541881d 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, int i, j; unsigned char *p; - if (flen > (tlen - 11)) { + if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return 0; @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) return -1; - if (flen > num || num < 11) { + if (flen > num || num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL); return -1; } @@ -141,8 +141,8 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); /* - * Move the result in-place by |num|-11-|mlen| bytes to the left. - * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+11 to |to|. + * Move the result in-place by |num|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left. + * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to |to|. * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged. * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying @@ -150,16 +150,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern. * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)). */ - tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen), - num - 11, tlen); - for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - 11; msg_index <<= 1) { - mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - 11 - mlen), 0); - for (i = 11; i < num - msg_index; i++) + tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen), + num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen); + for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) { + mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0); + for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < num - msg_index; i++) em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]); } for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen); - to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + 11], to[i]); + to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], to[i]); } OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);