So according to you, knowing just the secret key of the server wouldn't be
sufficient to decrypt the data without using brute force?
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bodo Moeller [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Tuesday, June 15, 1999 5:46 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: advice needed
>
> On Tue, Jun 15, 1999 at 04:54:40PM +0200, Pierre De Boeck wrote:
>
> > I think your concept of SSL/TLS sniffer is not realistic
> > in a general way, for the following reasons:
> >
> > - the packets transmitted between a client and a server have
> submitted
> > a set of "transformations" (fragmentation, compression(optional)+
> > encryption(optional)+"MACed")
> > - to recover the original payload, you must, among other things,
> know
> > - the compression alg/param used if any
> > - the cipher alg.param used (e.g. RC2-CBC-40 with a specific
> IV)+
> > the secret key
> >
> > That information is shared by the two parties but obviously not
> transported
> > in the packets.
>
> Of course it's not trivial to read the encrypted payload data, but the
> algorithm identifiers are transmitted in clear; so the attacker can
> tell which connections use only 40-bit encryption keys, and -- if
> enough computing power can be put into this -- can do key-searches for
> those and then decrypt them.
> ______________________________________________________________________
> OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
> Development Mailing List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
______________________________________________________________________
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
Development Mailing List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
