Hello Steve,

Thus wrote Dr. Stephen Henson (st...@openssl.org):

> Sorry for not replying to your private mail. I'd been considering how to do
> this and several other things got in the way.

No problem. It's good that we get the discussion started now.

> I don't think hard coding NIDs into the verify routines is the way to go. The
> new EVP_PKEY API in 1.0.0 is intended to remove as much of that stuff as
> possible.

Ok, understood.

> The best approach IMHO is to have a new "pss" public key algorithm to handle
> the case of PSS only keys and pass the ASN1 structures down to the specific
> method API via the ctrl mechanism.

Hm, not sure if I understand this. Do you suggest having a new value for
EPV_PKEY's type field to indicate pss? (Can't figure out quickly if type
contains a NID_... value) PSS parameters would then be added to rsa_st?

A while ago, I tried a new THIS_IS_PSS flag for EVP_PKEY's rsa_st. It
worked but I'm not sure if it was a good approach.

Probably, the EVP_PKEY_CTX was introduced to store such information...

> The existing RSA methods could also then switch to pss if the appropriate
> structures are present.

> I realise that's a bit vague at present, I'll have a think about it a bit
> more.

Another thought:
Yesterday, I looked at EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. This has a pub_decode
funktion (rsa_pub_decode() for RSA) that prepares an EVP_PKEY from the
ASN1 infos about an X.509 public key. The resulting EVP_PKEY is later
passed to ASN1_item_verify().

Could we change this to prepare an EVP_PKEY_CTX instead?

Best regards,

   Martin
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