[openssl.org #2339] NULL pointer deference in 0.9.8o fips_rsa_sign() error handling code

[David O'Brien via RT]

In fips_rsa_sign(), if the malloc for 'sbuf' fails, 'sbuf' should not be
cleansed.

-- 
-- David  (obr...@freebsd.org)


Index: fips/rsa/fips_rsa_sign.c
===================================================================
--- fips/rsa/fips_rsa_sign.c	(revision 397418)
+++ fips/rsa/fips_rsa_sign.c	(working copy)
@@ -250,33 +250,34 @@ static int fips_rsa_sign(int type, const
 		sbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
 		saltlen = M_EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_PSS_SALT(sv->mctx);
 		if (saltlen == EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_PSS_MDLEN)
 			saltlen = -1;
 		else if (saltlen == EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_PSS_MREC)
 			saltlen = -2;
 		if (!sbuf)
 			{
 			RSAerr(RSA_F_FIPS_RSA_SIGN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto psserr;
+			goto psserr0;
 			}
 		if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(rsa, sbuf, md,
 					M_EVP_MD_CTX_md(sv->mctx), saltlen))
 			goto psserr;
 		j=rsa->meth->rsa_priv_enc(i,sbuf,sigret,rsa,RSA_NO_PADDING);
 		if (j > 0)
 			{
 			ret=1;
 			*siglen=j;
 			}
 		psserr:
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(md,m_len);
 		OPENSSL_cleanse(sbuf, i);
 		OPENSSL_free(sbuf);
+		psserr0:
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(md,m_len);
 		return ret;
 		}
 
 	j=RSA_size(rsa);
 	if (i > (j-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE))
 		{
 		RSAerr(RSA_F_FIPS_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
 		goto done;
 		}