On Wed, 2015-07-22 at 14:52 +0000, Tim Hollebeek wrote: > The way this is supposed to work is by using a timestamp from a > trusted timestamp server to show the certificate was valid at the > time the code was signed.
That would be great. Unfortunately, if the UEFI firmware were suddenly to start insisting upon that then a lot of operating systems would no longer boot. I don't think it's practical to add this requirement for secure boot at this stage; the UEFI firmware will probably continue to just disable the time check — even if it's a local patch as it is at the moment. But I'm *trying* to eliminate those local patches, to make it easier to keep OpenSSL up to date. It occurs to me that UEFI firmware might be the *largest* deployment of OpenSSL, so it's unfortunate that the patches it needs are out-of-tree :) FWIW the Linux kernel also specifically avoids checking timestamps altogether when validating signed modules. -- David Woodhouse Open Source Technology Centre david.woodho...@intel.com Intel Corporation
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