Hello All, In reviewing source code in directory 'openssl-1.0.2g/crypto/evp', in file 'openbsd_hw.c', there are a few instances where OPENSSL_malloc() is called, but immediately afterwards a call to memcpy() is made with the return value from the call to OPENSSL_malloc(), but no check for a return value of NULL is made after OPENSSL_malloc() returns.
However, if the 1st argument to memcpy() is NULL, a segmentation fault/
violation will occur. The patch file below should address/correct this
issue:
--- openbsd_hw.c.orig 2016-03-02 15:36:57.236927351 -0800
+++ openbsd_hw.c 2016-03-02 15:40:29.525908189 -0800
@@ -133,6 +133,10 @@
return 0;
CDATA(ctx)->key = OPENSSL_malloc(MAX_HW_KEY);
+ if (CDATA(ctx)->key == NULL {
+ err("CDATA(ctx)->key memory allocation failed");
+ return 0;
+ }
assert(ctx->cipher->iv_len <= MAX_HW_IV);
@@ -186,6 +190,11 @@
if (((unsigned long)in & 3) || cinl != inl) {
cin = OPENSSL_malloc(cinl);
+ if (cin == NULL) {
+ err("cin - memory allocation failed");
+ abort();
+ return 0;
+ }
memcpy(cin, in, inl);
cryp.src = cin;
}
@@ -334,6 +343,11 @@
char *dcopy;
dcopy = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (dcopy == NULL) {
+ err("dcopy - memory allocation failed");
+ abort();
+ return 0;
+ }
memcpy(dcopy, data, len);
cryp.src = dcopy;
cryp.dst = cryp.src; // FIXME!!!
@@ -397,6 +411,10 @@
assert(from->digest->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT);
to_md->data = OPENSSL_malloc(from_md->len);
+ if (to_md->data == NULL) {
+ err("DEV_CRYPTO_MD5_COPY: unable to allocate memory");
+ return 0;
+ }
memcpy(to_md->data, from_md->data, from_md->len);
return 1;
=======================================================================
Hello All,
In reviewing source code in directory 'engines/ccgost', in file
'gost_ameth.c', there are a few instances where OPENSSL_malloc()
is called, but no check for a return value of NULL is made. However,
immediately afterwards statments which access the allocated memory
are used (array access/memset(), etc) which will result in a segmentation
fault/violation occuring if NULL is returned from the OPENSSL_malloc()
call.
The patch file below should address/correct this issue:
--- gost_ameth.c.orig 2016-03-02 16:43:36.014151374 -0800
+++ gost_ameth.c 2016-03-02 16:45:59.978448496 -0800
@@ -617,6 +617,10 @@
return 0;
}
databuf = OPENSSL_malloc(octet->length);
+ if (!databuf) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PUB_DECODE_GOST94, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
for (i = 0, j = octet->length - 1; i < octet->length; i++, j--) {
databuf[j] = octet->data[i];
}
@@ -646,6 +650,8 @@
}
data_len = BN_num_bytes(dsa->pub_key);
databuf = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len);
+ if (!databuf)
+ return 0;
BN_bn2bin(dsa->pub_key, databuf);
octet = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_STRING_set(octet, NULL, data_len);
@@ -686,6 +692,10 @@
return 0;
}
databuf = OPENSSL_malloc(octet->length);
+ if (!databuf) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PUB_DECODE_GOST01, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
for (i = 0, j = octet->length - 1; i < octet->length; i++, j--) {
databuf[j] = octet->data[i];
}
@@ -760,6 +770,10 @@
data_len = 2 * BN_num_bytes(order);
BN_free(order);
databuf = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len);
+ if (!databuf) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_PUB_DECODE_GOST01, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
memset(databuf, 0, data_len);
store_bignum(X, databuf + data_len / 2, data_len / 2);
=======================================================================
Hello All,
In reviewing source code in directory 'engines/ccgost', in file
'gost_pmeth.c', there are a few instances where OPENSSL_malloc()
is called, but no check for a return value of NULL is made. However,
immediately afterwards statments which access the allocated memory
are used (memcpy()/memset(), etc) which will result in a segmentation
fault/violation occuring if NULL is returned from the OPENSSL_malloc()
call.
The patch file below should address/correct this issue:
--- gost_pmeth.c.orig 2016-03-02 17:24:49.503519153 -0800
+++ gost_pmeth.c 2016-03-02 17:27:27.179558967 -0800
@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV:
pctx->shared_ukm = OPENSSL_malloc((int)p1);
+ if (!pctx->shared_ukm)
+ return 0;
memcpy(pctx->shared_ukm, p2, (int)p1);
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
@@ -533,6 +535,8 @@
return 0;
}
keydata = OPENSSL_malloc(32);
+ if (!keydata)
+ return 0;
memcpy(keydata, data->key, 32);
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC, keydata);
return 1;
=======================================================================
Hello All,
In reviewing source code in directory 'ssl', in file 'd1_both.c',
there are a few instances where OPENSSL_malloc() is called, but no
check for a return value of NULL is made. However, immediately
afterwards statments which access the allocated memory
are used (memcpy()/memset(), etc) which will result in a segmentation
fault/violation occuring if NULL is returned from the OPENSSL_malloc()
call.
The patch file below should address/correct this issue:
--- d1_both.c.orig 2016-03-02 17:31:30.838526769 -0800
+++ d1_both.c 2016-03-02 17:33:49.002086647 -0800
@@ -1459,6 +1459,8 @@
* plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
*/
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
+ if (buffer == NULL)
+ return -1; /* what should be returned here??? */
bp = buffer;
/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
@@ -1544,6 +1546,8 @@
* - Padding
*/
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ if (!buf)
+ goto err;
p = buf;
/* Message Type */
*p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
=======================================================================
Hello All,
In reviewing source code in directory 'ssl', in file 'd1_both.c',
there is a instance where OPENSSL_malloc() is called, but no
check for a return value of NULL is made. However, immediately
afterwards a call to memcpy() is made, but if the return value
from OPENSSL_malloc() is NULL, a segmentation fault/violation will
occur.
The patch file below should address/correct this issue:
--- s3_clnt.c.orig 2016-03-02 17:43:33.256342358 -0800
+++ s3_clnt.c 2016-03-02 17:44:48.744936571 -0800
@@ -2111,6 +2111,10 @@
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
/* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
+ if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
=======================================================================
Hello All,
In reviewing source code in directory 'ssl', in file 'ssl_sess.c',
there is a instance where OPENSSL_malloc() is called, but no
check for a return value of NULL is made. However, immediately
afterwards a call to memcpy() is made, but if the return value
from OPENSSL_malloc() is NULL, a segmentation fault/violation will
occur.
The patch file below should address/correct this issue:
--- ssl_sess.c.orig 2016-03-02 17:48:47.180240472 -0800
+++ ssl_sess.c 2016-03-02 17:50:20.204063321 -0800
@@ -919,6 +919,10 @@
session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0) {
s->kssl_ctx->client_princ =
(char *)OPENSSL_malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
+ if (!s->kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ, session->krb5_client_princ,
session->krb5_client_princ_len);
s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] =
'\0';
=======================================================================
Hello All,
In reviewing source code in directory 'ssl', in file 's3_enc.c',
there is a instance where OPENSSL_malloc() is called, but no
check for a return value of NULL is made. However, immediately
afterwards a call to memset() is made, but if the return value
from OPENSSL_malloc() is NULL, a segmentation fault/violation will
occur.
The patch file below should address/correct this issue:
--- s3_enc.c.orig 2016-03-02 17:53:14.248183434 -0800
+++ s3_enc.c 2016-03-02 17:55:05.883371692 -0800
@@ -607,6 +607,10 @@
ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
s->s3->handshake_dgst =
OPENSSL_malloc(SSL_MAX_DIGEST * sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
memset(s->s3->handshake_dgst, 0, SSL_MAX_DIGEST * sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX
*));
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
========================================================================
Bill Parker (wp02855 at gmail dot com)
--
Ticket here: http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=4374
Please log in as guest with password guest if prompted
openbsd_hw.c.patch
Description: Binary data
gost_ameth.c.patch
Description: Binary data
gost_pmeth.c.patch
Description: Binary data
d1_both.c.patch
Description: Binary data
s3_clnt.c.patch
Description: Binary data
ssl_sess.c.patch
Description: Binary data
s3_enc.c.patch
Description: Binary data
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