I've updated the pull to do a much more substantial cleanup. On Thu, Mar 3, 2016 at 6:16 PM Emilia Käsper <emi...@openssl.org> wrote:
> Hm, I think that I actually agree. But David's done enough, so I'll have a > look myself. > > On Thu, Mar 3, 2016 at 5:33 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL < > u...@ll.mit.edu> wrote: > >> On 3/3/16, 11:30 , "openssl-dev on behalf of Hanno Böck" >> <openssl-dev-boun...@openssl.org on behalf of ha...@hboeck.de> wrote: >> >> >On Thu, 03 Mar 2016 16:18:57 +0000 Emilia Käsper <emi...@openssl.org> >> >wrote: >> >>https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/783 >> > >> >This is different from what I had in mind. >> >... >> >I would argue that cbc/hmac is so fragile that it's always preferrable >> >to have aead before cbc/hmac. The security difference between 128 and >> >256 bit aes is imho mostly irrelevant in practice. >> >> Again, +1 >> >> Perhaps David can do his magic again? :-) >> -- >> openssl-dev mailing list >> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev >> >
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