I can live with it.
The only solution without some type of change was :
RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL);
/* other stuff done, such as calculating d */
n_new = BN_dup(n);
e_new = BN_dup(e);
RSA_set0_key(rsa, n_new, e_new, d);
It is really gross, and is not intuitive.
Since you all appear to not want to support individual calls to set0 and get0
for each BIGNUM,
a developer of other code is faced with a major rewrite of existing code just
to work with OpenSSL-1.1.0-pre5.
Using #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER everywhere leads to unreadable code. So to
maintain a code base that can be compiled
with OpenSSL version 0.9.7 through 1.1.0 with only a few #if
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER we are taking an approach to convert
the code to the 1.1.0 API and create defines and macros for the older versions
of OpenSSL in a header file
The introduction of these *_get0_* *_set0_* have complicated the process even
more, requiring us to inline versions
of them for the older versions of OpenSSL.
I suspect other developers are facing the same issues.
On 4/26/2016 6:46 AM, Richard Levitte wrote:
In message <571f2941.4040...@openssl.org> on Tue, 26 Apr 2016 09:39:29 +0100, Matt
Caswell <m...@openssl.org> said:
matt>
matt>
matt> On 26/04/16 08:26, Richard Levitte wrote:
matt> > [temporarly taking this thread away from RT]
matt> >
matt> > Basically, I can see two solutions:
matt> >
matt> > - Allow calls like RSA_set0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, d);
matt> >
matt> > That's what's implemented in GH#995, except it doesn't check if the
matt> > input parameters are NULL before setting the corresponding fields,
matt> > so that call ends up clearing n and e.
matt> >
matt> > GH#995 could be changed so that any input parameter can be NULL, and
matt> > that the corresponding RSA structure fields are left untouched. The
matt> > consequence is that can never be made NULL. I can live with that,
matt> > as I can't imagine a reason to reset the fields to NULL.
matt>
matt> IMO this is the way to go. As long as we can't set private key values
matt> without first having set the public key, i.e. we should not be able to
matt> get into an inconsistent state.
I've seen no other opinion, so I went with it. Would you mind having
a look at GH#995? I did a bit of change in the docs, but could need
some help expressing it in a better manner.
Also, I'd like to hear from Douglas and Tomas if these changes found
in said pull request would fit your bill better... basically, it
allows (or should allow, unless I've goofed something up) a call set
like this:
RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL);
/* other stuff done, such as calculatig d */
RSA_set0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, d);
Cheers,
Richard
--
Douglas E. Engert <deeng...@gmail.com>
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