On 4/13/17, 5:18 PM, "Richard Levitte" <levi...@openssl.org> wrote:
uri> . . . . .
uri> libp11 does not know how to deal with OAEP padding, so it returns an
error.
uri>
uri> Desired solution: in case of “-oaep” pass “RSA_NO_PADDING” to the
engine (aka to libp11), and strip the padding using OpenSSL mechanisms.
uri>
uri> I’d like to see that fixed in both 1.1 and 1.0.2 branches.
Wouldn't it be muuuuuch easier to add the following lines [to
libp11/src/p11_rsa.c]:
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
mechanism->mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP;
break;
I’m afraid not – because currently OpenSSL does have full support for OAEP, and
OpenSC has none. This is what causes the problem: OpenSSL expects the engine
(libp11 and OpenSC) to handle OAEP, which they cannot do.
What you propose for OpenSSL is quite a lot harder to implement well,
I agree that it’s harder to implement *well*, but it is a lot simpler and
shorter to implement in rsautl.c (a few lines of code), as compared to adding
the whole support for OAEP to OpenSC (which – I agree – would be great to have,
but let’s be realistic: it’s not there now).
and one might also wonder why the OAEP padding should have that
special treatment and no other?
I’d say the same treatment is applicable to any padding that is supported by
OpenSSL but not by (the majority of) PKCS#11 devices (and OpenSC).
What OpenSSL does programmatically with this is (IMHO) perfect. This code works
correctly with the token that only does raw RSA (the original had a lot more of
error checking stuff ():
privkey = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, KeyManPrivKey, NULL, &cb_data);
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(privkey, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_free(privkey);
rv = EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx);
if (rv <= 0) goto end;
rv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, PADDING);
*olen = 0;
rv = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, olen, in, inlen);
*out = OPENSSL_malloc(*olen);
rv = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, *out, olen, in, inlen);
end:
Perhaps rsautl.c could do the same? Instead of what it’s doing now (aka calling
RSA_private_decrypt())?
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