I just spotted it via twitter, https://raccoon-attack.com/
Mark On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:08 PM Dmitry Belyavsky <beld...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Could you please let me know when it is available? > > On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 3:51 PM Mark J Cox <m...@openssl.org> wrote: >> >> They should be releasing their paper very soon (today). >> >> Regards, Mark >> >> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 1:45 PM Dmitry Belyavsky <beld...@gmail.com> wrote: >> > >> > Is the description of the attack publicly available? >> > >> > On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 3:39 PM OpenSSL <open...@openssl.org> wrote: >> >> >> >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> >> Hash: SHA512 >> >> >> >> OpenSSL Security Advisory [09 September 2020] >> >> ============================================= >> >> >> >> Raccoon Attack (CVE-2020-1968) >> >> ============================== >> >> >> >> Severity: Low >> >> >> >> The Raccoon attack exploits a flaw in the TLS specification which can >> >> lead to >> >> an attacker being able to compute the pre-master secret in connections >> >> which >> >> have used a Diffie-Hellman (DH) based ciphersuite. In such a case this >> >> would >> >> result in the attacker being able to eavesdrop on all encrypted >> >> communications >> >> sent over that TLS connection. The attack can only be exploited if an >> >> implementation re-uses a DH secret across multiple TLS connections. Note >> >> that >> >> this issue only impacts DH ciphersuites and not ECDH ciphersuites. >> >> >> >> OpenSSL 1.1.1 is not vulnerable to this issue: it never reuses a DH >> >> secret and >> >> does not implement any "static" DH ciphersuites. >> >> >> >> OpenSSL 1.0.2f and above will only reuse a DH secret if a "static" DH >> >> ciphersuite is used. These static "DH" ciphersuites are ones that start >> >> with the >> >> text "DH-" (for example "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA"). The standard IANA names for >> >> these >> >> ciphersuites all start with "TLS_DH_" but excludes those that start with >> >> "TLS_DH_anon_". >> >> >> >> OpenSSL 1.0.2e and below would reuse the DH secret across multiple TLS >> >> connections in server processes unless the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option was >> >> explicitly configured. Therefore all ciphersuites that use DH in servers >> >> (including ephemeral DH) are vulnerable in these versions. In OpenSSL >> >> 1.0.2f >> >> SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE was made the default and it could not be turned off >> >> as a >> >> response to CVE-2016-0701. >> >> >> >> Since the vulnerability lies in the TLS specification, fixing the affected >> >> ciphersuites is not viable. For this reason 1.0.2w moves the affected >> >> ciphersuites into the "weak-ssl-ciphers" list. Support for the >> >> "weak-ssl-ciphers" is not compiled in by default. This is unlikely to >> >> cause >> >> interoperability problems in most cases since use of these ciphersuites >> >> is rare. >> >> Support for the "weak-ssl-ciphers" can be added back by configuring >> >> OpenSSL at >> >> compile time with the "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" option. This is not >> >> recommended. >> >> >> >> OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. >> >> >> >> Premium support customers of OpenSSL 1.0.2 should upgrade to 1.0.2w. If >> >> upgrading is not viable then users of OpenSSL 1.0.2v or below should >> >> ensure >> >> that affected ciphersuites are disabled through runtime configuration. >> >> Also >> >> note that the affected ciphersuites are only available on the server side >> >> if a >> >> DH certificate has been configured. These certificates are very rarely >> >> used and >> >> for this reason this issue has been classified as LOW severity. >> >> >> >> This issue was found by Robert Merget, Marcus Brinkmann, Nimrod Aviram >> >> and Juraj >> >> Somorovsky and reported to OpenSSL on 28th May 2020 under embargo in >> >> order to >> >> allow co-ordinated disclosure with other implementations. >> >> >> >> Note >> >> ==== >> >> >> >> OpenSSL 1.0.2 is out of support and no longer receiving public updates. >> >> Extended >> >> support is available for premium support customers: >> >> https://www.openssl.org/support/contracts.html >> >> >> >> OpenSSL 1.1.0 is out of support and no longer receiving updates of any >> >> kind. >> >> The impact of this issue on OpenSSL 1.1.0 has not been analysed. >> >> >> >> Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1. >> >> >> >> References >> >> ========== >> >> >> >> URL for this Security Advisory: >> >> https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20200909.txt >> >> >> >> Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional >> >> details >> >> over time. >> >> >> >> For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see: >> >> https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html >> >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >> >> >> >> iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEeVOsH7w9yLOykjk+1enkP3357owFAl9YzBsACgkQ1enkP335 >> >> 7oyIxg/9FWuca3/s/lY6g6a5VTPIekZMOLRUnDyzS3YePQu/sEd1w81mKoTqU+6F >> >> KQmliGqdRDk+KN8HDVd14kcLBukto8UKmkp9FpB5J4d2KK1I/Fg/DofJs6xUQYKb >> >> 5rHRLB3DDoyHEBzEEIjcqYTTThXW9ZSByVK9SKpC78IRM/B2dfd0+j4hIB/kDC/E >> >> G+wieFzexHQVdleVYT/VaJ6qS8AwvohBbt8h7yK0P6v/4vEm0spDbUmjWJBVUlUu >> >> QZyELjj8XZR3YFxt3axSuJg3JSGYlaMzkt2+DVq4qEzeJLIydLK9J8p6RNwPhsJk >> >> Rx0ez8P4N+5O7XmA0nHv3HyompdMgHlvykj8Ks4lNHVS02KKLi1jDtmOxl3Fm/hb >> >> ZNOmjn7lulV1342pw4rWL3Nge3x0s0Q5zgBCm1mqLzzu/V1ksx8FJwGA1w2cH280 >> >> dU9VedkC2wvFQije8pFrWH9l6N9Bh41DIEOnlBl0AL7IrbPdO6yMcD6vpR7hWjr3 >> >> fx4hNJSAGzJ3i/NXlSj4eR/47zkjfJyEc8Drc2QgewyqXFrK20X/LOj8MqJlc+ry >> >> pXZseh+XC8WaYDMV1ltrKvE2Ld9/0f3Ydc04AcDeu5SXPJG79ogzVnchZok7+XCj >> >> RT+a3/ES45+CTfL5v27t5QJxJcxg4siLVsILfi0rIUv0IYgH2fU= >> >> =U7OO >> >> -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >> > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > SY, Dmitry Belyavsky > > > > -- > SY, Dmitry Belyavsky