Richard Levitte - VMS Whacker wrote:
>
>
> Oh, what a beautiful mixup I did there between server and client
> certs! Even got myself confused :-). However, the fact still
> remains, there's no trust path of value to me, the value of certer
> certs in themselves is more or less none, except to give the server
> and my browser a chance to start an encrypted session, which is
> probably fine for most people. And from that point of view you're
> absolutely right, the warning about an unknown CA is just an
> annoyance. But hey, it would be possible for someone to get a
> perfectly legal CA cert signed by, Thawte, and then use it to sign a
> cert presumably for, oh say, Amazon, and thereby fool a whole bunch of
> people. And in that case, a *silent* browser is a bit more scary to
> me. Setting up a secure channel is nice enough, but authentication is
> a different matter, and depending on your level of paranoia, quite a
> difficult one at that.
>
> People just don't have that clue yet... Or maybe I'm just overly
> paranoid...
>
Paranoia is essential for crypto work :-)
I reckon this kind of issue is likely to become more important as more
CAs get added to browsers.
A corrupt CA or one which can be forcibly persuaded (e.g. by government
security agencies) to issue bogus certificates can reak havoc with
typical browser or S/MIME client behaviour.
For example if some country wants to monitor all traffic to a certain
secure site it issues a bogus certificate from its trusted CA and then
performs a man in the middle attack on its gateways.
S/MIME can be handled because many pieces of software will silently
replace a certificate with a new one. So sending a signed message with
the fake ID to the 'victim' allows all traffic from then on to be read.
Steve.
--
Dr Stephen N. Henson. http://www.drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk/
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Senior crypto engineer, Celo Communications: http://www.celocom.com/
Core developer of the OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
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