I checked the RSA web site and could not find the paper you are referencing. Could you please forward me a link?
Thanks, Rick -----Original Message----- From: Charles B Cranston [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, June 03, 2003 10:04 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: testing for primality With the advent of elliptically-based factoring methods, there ARE no strong primes. That is a technologically obsolete concept. There is a paper at RSA Labs that explains this. Synopsis: the concept of "strong" primes was with respect to the best performing factoring algorithm at the time. If this algorithm failed, it was called "strong". The analagous method can be used but using an elliptical curve. For any given pair of primes, an attack with a particular elliptical curve can succeed or fail, but there are an unlimited number of elliptical curves, and at the time the paper was written there was no known "strong set" of prime pairs that were strong with respect to ALL elliptical curves. Therefore, you try to factor with one elliptical curve, if it fails, you can try another elliptical curve, etc, and there is no set of prime pairs that is any more or less vulnerable to this technique, that could be called "strong". Hope I got that right -- it has been more than a year since I read the paper. Robinson, Richard L (Rick) wrote: > When OpenSSL creates a public/private RSA key pair, does it test to > see if the keys were created using strong primes (or primes at all)? > If so, how? -- Charles B (Ben) Cranston mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.wam.umd.edu/~zben ______________________________________________________________________ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED] ______________________________________________________________________ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
