> 3. QE and man in the middle
>
> NOW we are in a position to see how the combination of QE and
> key mixing can actually buy us something! Consider the plight
> of the man in the middle when both are being used. She cannot
> passively eavesdrop and record for further analysis because of
> the nature of the quantum transmission. She cannot actively
> eavesdrop (by doing the above and recording the raw data for
> further analysis) because she does not currently have the shared
> key so she cannot mix out and mix in the link key information as
> described above.
>
> Pretty subtle, eh?
So long as they don't have the key, they can neither passively nor
actively
eavesdrop a quantum encryption link. So what does the mixing buy you?
> It's interesting that it is the only-one-listener nature of
> the quantum encryption process that forces the distinction
> between "passive eavesdropping" (just listening to the wire)
> and "passive man-in-the-middle" which involves copying the
> data from A to B and from B to A without trying to understand
> what it all means until a later analysis time.
True. But so long as you can't passively eavesdrop, you can't actively
eavesdrop. So what does the mixing buy you that you didn't already have?
DS
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