David Schwartz wrote:
>>Dr. Stephen Henson wrote:
> 
>>A determined and knowledgable attacker can subvert anything that's
>>not in hardware.
>
>       I think this is a very strange thing to say. If he has access to the
> hardware, he can subvert it too. If he doesn't have access to the hardware,
> how can he subvert the software?

Software is exploited or subverted all of the time without access
to the physical hardware.  You don't even need a shell account on
the system if there's a remote exploit.

Most, but not all, hardware can be compromised if you have
physical access.  Hardened equipment is not cheap.

>>Pulling a cert from a server isn't that much
>>harder to break given that it's trivial to set up a local DNS
>>server that will redirect queries to the attacker's own server.
>  
>       So sign the cert. No hardware needed.

How do you verify it's ultimately signed by the right certificate?
     You need to get the root certificate from somewhere.

>>(Or to simply use the same editor to replace your URL with their
>>own.)
> 
>       Sure, if you have access to the software. If you have access to any
> security scheme, you can simply disable the scheme.

The original context was Dr. Henson's well-grounded observation
that anyone with a hex editor could easily change an embedded
certificate.  Once you have access to the software then anything
in it, or its environment, can be changed at will.

>       If you have that level of control over the process, you can make the
> process do anything you want, but you could just do what you wanted anyway
> with that level of control over the system. So what do you need the process
> for?
>
>       If someone wants to alter the certificate that secures their own 
> machine,
> why should I care? You can certainly break things that you are allowed
> access to.

Reread what you just wrote - what if the certificate is used to
verify credentials provided by others to gain access?  (BTW don't
assume it's only protecting a machine.  Maybe this is part of an
application that controls access to extremely expensive or
sensitive material.)  Give me the ability to reset the root
certificate and I have an unlimited pass throughout your system.
Potentially worse I can deny access to your legitimate users.

Another example of a certificate as a credential - license keys.
Maybe we're talking about software that normally sells for $10k,
but also has a $100 student version with limited functionality.
Same software, but I think most of us can see how the company will
make a distinction between the guy who paid nothing, the student
who got an educational version, and the company that bought a full
license.
______________________________________________________________________
OpenSSL Project                                 http://www.openssl.org
User Support Mailing List                    openssl-users@openssl.org
Automated List Manager                           [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Reply via email to