On Mon, Feb 19, 2007 at 02:19:27PM -0500, Victor Duchovni wrote:
> This is not quite right IMHO. I think the anonymous ciphers MUST be
> first, because:
>
> 1. Most applications use "DEFAULT" and don't see them at all.
>
> 2. Applications that want anonymous ciphers, typically don't disable
> the non-anonymous ones for interoperability reasons, so won't get to
> use them if they are not first.
>
> 3. Applications that are happy with anonymous ciphers don't check
> certs, so there is no reason to prefer ciphers with with certs, which
> just waste cycles.
>
> If the anonymous ciphers are last, perhaps:
>
> ALL+aNULL:ALL:@STRENGTH
>
> produces the desired order for applications that don't check certs, but I
> think it is cleaner to put the anonymous kEECDH and kEDH ciphers first,
> they use the strongest key-exchange mechanisms available, and best meed
> the authentication needs of apps that ignore authentication.
Well, I have tested the "ALL+aNULL:ALL:+RC4:@STRENGTH" form against the
new 0.9.9 code and current 0.9.7 and 0.9.8. And it behaves as I had hoped,
so while I still think that aNULL should be first, if the consensus is
that it should not, I have a work-around.
As far as the 0.9.9 patch is concerned, is it possible to cache the
initial sorted order? Some applications process cipherlists for every
connection (destination dependent cipher lists), and it would be nice to
keep this efficient, provided that there is negligbible or no additional
cost for applications that set the cipherlist only once.
--
Viktor.
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