Olaf Gellert: > I would not say so. If I found a CRL which contains the > self signed root certificate I would stop to trust it > immediately.
Why? What do you think that CRL means? Specifically, do you think it means the public key was compromised? Do you think it means the issuer of the original certificate no longer wants you to trust it? > Why should I not trust a CRL issued by a > root CA that I trust? You should trust a CRL when it revokes certificates that you trust specifically because they're not on that CRL. > Remember: The trust has to be > established before, but when you already trust the CA, > you can trust CRLs issued by it. Even if the root CAs > key was compromised, I would not care if the CRL was > issued by the attacker or the CA itself. Right, but you have to know what the CRL means. In some alternate universe where that means "no longer trust the public key that this certificate signs" or "no longer trust the root certificate that's in this CRL", then you might choose to stop trusting the trust anchor. But in this universe, it doesn't mean any of those things. > I agree that > it makes sense to have higher level protocols that take > care of root CA revocation and trust anchor management, > but in my opinion not evaluating a CRL which revokes the > root is missing a chance of good CA practise and taking > an unnecessary risk... The problem is that it doesn't mean anything. A certificate being in a CRL does not mean the certificate's public key has been compromised. The mechanism you are describing simply doesn't exist. Maybe it could exist, maybe it should, but it doesn't. DS ______________________________________________________________________ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List openssl-users@openssl.org Automated List Manager majord...@openssl.org
