Hi Kirk,

> I'm pretty sure that the weakness of all the mechanism is the key-length and
> I'd like to avoid the brute force attack or the worst birthday attack...so
> here's my questions.
There's no need to find collisions on the hash. The key is the weak
point. Your attacker will factor N, change your message, then sign the
altered message (using SHA-256).

> 1. For how many days can I use a 512-bit key?
0

> RSA-512 bit key and the SHA-256. The reason is that I need some
> speed and I don't wanna add too many bytes in my frame
> (with this set-up i'm only adding 64 bytes).
Try an elliptic curve. It will be about  8-12 times faster than RSA,
with a smaller signature. Since your using SHA-256, use P-256 or
B-233.

> Supposing that I'm sending 1000 messages every day
:)

Jeff

On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 6:42 PM, Kirk81 <rigo_...@yahoo.it> wrote:
>
> Hello people,
>
> since all of you seem quite familiary with criptography and its tools I
> would like to ask u something.
>
> I'm implementing a server/client application: the client has to collect data
> and send them to the server in a frame format (unidirectional connection).
> In any frame, I added a special field for digital signature (I'm not
> considering a PKI). Actually, I'm using the RSA signature mechanism (hash
> and sign paradigm) with a RSA-512 bit key and the SHA-256. The reason is
> that I need some speed and I don't wanna add too many bytes in my frame
> (with this set-up i'm only adding 64 bytes).
> Supposing that I'm sending 1000 messages every day
>
> The frame also presents a time field which represents when the frame was
> formatted and a sample count field which is repeated any second: this should
> be avoid a replay-attack.
>
> The man-in-the-middle attack, the integry and the non-repudation mechanism
> should be countered by the digital signature.
>
> I'm pretty sure that the weakness of all the mechanism is the key-length and
> I'd like to avoid the brute force attack or the worst birthday attack...so
> here's my questions.
>
> 1. For how many days can I use a 512-bit key? Should I worry first about the
> factorization problem or the fact that my adversary can recover the key from
> the messages I sent? Can someone explain them with any numerical examples?
>
> 2. Are there other attacks (or troubles) I should consider?
>
> Thanks in advance,
>
> Kirk
>
> [SNIP]
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