OPENSSL_FIPS=1 causes openssl to invoke FIPS_mode_set(1).  Once that occurs, 
MD5 is a prohibited algorithm unless it's explicitly limited to the TLSv1 PRF 
(and that only because SHA is also used).  If an MD5 operation completes 
successfully, it's not a FIPS canister that's running the cryptography.

In other words: If it's FIPS, it will refuse to do it.  If it doesn't refuse to 
do it, it's not FIPS.

I agree that a differentiated string would be nice, but that's not something 
that's going to really help the underlying problem of people (like those 
companies) lying. Looking at it pragmatically: as a client, one can either base 
the decision on declaration or on demonstrable, observable, and well-defined 
behavior.  If one is worried about trusting the former, the only thing that one 
can really do is rely on the latter.

-Kyle H

On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 1:40 PM, Jeffrey Walton <[email protected]> wrote:
On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 3:35 PM,  <[email protected]> wrote:
Export the environment variable OPENSSL_FIPS=1, and then try openssl md5?

I am aware of two companies which are (were?) claiming a FIPS
validated module via OpenSSL sources, but not building the canister.
For completeness, the companies may have fixed the issues with their
internal build and compliance processes.

I believe something stronger is needed to audit vendor provided binaries.

Jeff


On Tue, Dec 21, 2010 at 1:04 PM, Zamora, Robert <[email protected]>
wrote:

Is there a way to determine if OpenSSL binaries were compiled with the
FIPS "certified" module v1.2.x ?  Compiling OpenSSL FIPS test module gives
me the same results using fips_test_suite.

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