On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 05:56:41PM +0100, Michael Str?der wrote: > > http://vdukhovni.github.io/ietf/draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-05.html#rfc.section.1.2 > > > > This is why I am working to implement and standardize SMTP with DANE TLS. > > DANE itself does not help. It just shifts the trust anchor problem. > > DNSSEC secures the MX lookups.
For the record: While indeed SMTP with DANE TLS relies on DNSSEC to secure the MX lookup, it also critically relies on DANE for two additional pieces of information: - Downgrade resistant STARTTLS support signalling. Without this MITM attackers simply suppress STARTTLS and the sender proceeds in cleartext. - TLS support signalling is combined with signalling that the peer can be authenticated and all the key material needed to perform authentication. Sending MTAs run unattended with no user to "click OK". They must not routinely fail due to Goedel's theorem for CA bundles (any set of trusted CAs is either insecure or incomplete). - Since it is already agreed that DNSSEC must be trusted to protect the MX records, eliminating the CA bundle from the picture reduces risk AND improves reliability to the point where peer authentication with SMTP becomes usable. It is NOT usable with CA bundles. There are more good reasons why DANE is required as part secure SMTP TLS, but I am not obligated to provide a comprehensive justification in response to every trollish one liner, the above will have to do. -- Viktor. ______________________________________________________________________ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List openssl-users@openssl.org Automated List Manager majord...@openssl.org