On 11/19/2014 10:03 AM, Philip Bellino wrote: > Hello, > I am currently using openssl-fips-2.0.7 and I noticed that 2.0.8 is available > on the website. > Neither distribution contain a changelog, so I was wondering what changes > were made to 2.0.8. > Thanks, > Phil
The relevant differences cam be found in the "Modification History" section of the Security Policy document. The only relevant difference between 2.0.8 and 2.0.7 source code is the re-removal of Dual EC DRBG. I say "re-removal" and not removal because Dual EC DRBG was originally removed with revision 2.0.6. However, the 2.0.6 submission languished at the CMVP for six months during which time we added additional platforms to revision 2.0.7, using code which still included Dual EC DRBG as that removal had not yet been approved. As it turns out both 2.0.6 and 2.0.7 were approved in the same week. We had to wait for 2.0.8 to remove Dual EC DRBG again, hopefully permanently this time. If you don't care about the presence of Dual EC DRBG -- which you shouldn't be using and which isn't usable anyway due to a bug discovered by Steve Checkoway et. al. in their analysis of Dual EC DRBG implementations (http://dualec.org/) -- then there is no reason to upgrade to 2.0.8 if 2.0.7 is currently working for you. As a general rule you should use the latest available revision of the OpenSSL FIPS Object module for all new development, as that revision will support all tested platforms. But, there is no need to upgrade already deployed FIPS module instances. Since we are generally not allowed to introduce bugfixes or performance enhancements to already validated FIPS modules, the latest revision is generally not "better" in any significant sense than earlier revisions. In particular we are generally unable to address vulnerabilities that we know are present in or with the FIPS module (e.g. "Lucky 13"), so we don't. The revision increment usually only represents the addition of specific new platforms. The exception to that rule is the removal of Dual EC DRBG, which can be considered a bugfix and/or enhancement. Even there the presence of unused Dual EC DRBG code in the older revisions does not *directly* represent a security vulnerability. I say "directly" because there is an argument, forcefully expressed to me by several stakeholders and interested parties, that the mere presence of latent Dual EC DRBG code is a potential problem. I have discussed that issue in a personal blog entry: http://veridicalsystems.com/blog/immutability-of-fips/ for those who care to stare into that abyss. -Steve M. -- Steve Marquess OpenSSL Software Foundation, Inc. 1829 Mount Ephraim Road Adamstown, MD 21710 USA +1 877 673 6775 s/b +1 301 874 2571 direct marqu...@opensslfoundation.com marqu...@openssl.com gpg/pgp key: http://openssl.com/docs/0x6D1892F5.asc ______________________________________________________________________ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List openssl-users@openssl.org Automated List Manager majord...@openssl.org