On 16 November 2015 at 19:05, Hubert Kario <hka...@redhat.com> wrote:
> Example: CAdES V1.2.2 was published in late 2000, the first serious > attacks on MD2 were not published until 2004. I think it is not > unreasonable for CAdES-A documents to exist today which were originally > signed with MD2 while it was still considered secure and that are still > relevant today, just 15 years later. > > This doesn't explain why the code needs to exist in future versions of openssl. The previous ones aren't going to vanish and can be compiled and used to rescue data in theoretical edge cases like this. You're making it sound like this is making the data totally inaccessible which is not the case. Cheers Rich.
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