Hello, Thank you Matt and Jordan. So, it seems that it's possible to modify my client to accept/reject the DH group key length. But i have one more issue to be clarified.
Is it possible that if a client does not accept the DH group key length used by the server, then, a different possible cipher (for e.g., RSA) is tried to be negotiated. It seems that the connection is rejected, instead of falling back to a different possible cipher. At least, i tested this quickly using s_client and s_server, and the behavior is as stated above, i.e., no fallback and connection was terminated. Is this the default OpenSSL behavior or this behaviour could be modified somehow by applications ? Regards, Sanjaya On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 8:43 PM, Matt Caswell <m...@openssl.org> wrote: > > > On 07/06/18 16:02, Jordan Brown wrote: > > I do not understand, however, how the 80 relates to a 1024-bit limit. > > It's a measure of the "security bits" of an algorithm according to table > 2 in this doc: > https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/ > nist.sp.800-57pt1r4.pdf > > Matt > -- > openssl-users mailing list > To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users >
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