> On Jul 25, 2018, at 10:05 AM, Ken Goldman <kgold...@us.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> I have a certificate with a non-standard public key algorithm -rsaesOaep.
> See snippet #2.
>
> With openssl 1.0, I can validate the certificate chain. With openssl 1.1 it
> fails with the error X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL. See dump #1.
>
> I believe that this is due to new 1.1 code x509_vfy.c:check_key_level()
> calling X509_get0_pubkey(). That call will fail for the non-standard
> algorithm.
>
> The certificate is for old vendor hardware that cannot be updated. What are
> my choices?
>
> - Remain on 1.0
> - Some configuration option?
> - Something else?
The immediate cause is the order of the checks in check_key_level().
It first checks for a supported key, and only then short-circuits
the logic at level <= 0 (my fault). Perhaps level 0 should not be
strict in this way, in which case we might reverse the order of
then (pkey == NULL) and (level <= 0) tests:
static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
/* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
if (pkey == NULL)
return 0;
if (level <= 0)
return 1;
if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
}
--
Viktor.
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