On Wed, Feb 6, 2019 at 1:01 PM Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-us...@dukhovni.org> wrote: > On Tue, Feb 05, 2019 at 02:43:03PM -0800, Sam Roberts wrote: > Your ticket rotation approach looks a bit fragile.
I agree, though perhaps I should not have described what was happening as rotation. The test that was failing with TLS1.3 was one in which clearing the ticket keys was supposed to invalidate previously issued keys, but it wasn't (at least, not in the same way as it did for 1.2). > Postfix keeps two session ticket keys in memory, one that's used > to both encrypt new tickets and decrypt freshly issued tickets, and > other that's used only decrypt unexpired tickets that were isssued > just before the new key was introduced. This maintains session > ticket continuity across a single key change. The key change interval > is either equal to or is twice the maximum ticket lifetime, ensuring > that tickets are only invalidated by expiration, not key rotation. This seems a very reasonable approach, I may propose it as the default after we have 1.3 support, thanks. Cheers, Sam -- openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
