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Guang -----Original Message----- From: Henry Nash [mailto:hen...@linux.vnet.ibm.com] Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2013 8:48 AM To: OpenStack Development Mailing List Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone] Inherited domain roles Hi So I don't doubt there are many ways of articulating the targeted objects - and a more comprehensive solution might involve the mapping you mention (although that's definitely not a Havana discussion!). We do, however, have an existing serious hole in our current apis & policy protection that limits the ability of a cloud provider to delegate admin responsibility for a domain to a customer, while still ensuring they maintain certain roles over all projects created in that customer domain (without the ability of the customer admin removing them!). This is the use case I am trying to solve first and foremost. This is a subset of the general problem, and using the domain as the container to specify applying to all current and future projects (which I call inheritance) is, I believe, the most appropriate. However, as we agreed, this should be an extension, since we are likely to settle on a more comprehensive re-write of these APIs for IceHouse. As per the keystone IRC meeting, I have now done the following: 1) Removed all mention of multiple target objects (and hence inheritance) from the newly proposed GET /role-assignment API (that replaces the various broken ones we have removed from the spec). This updated API is now available for review at: https://review.openstack.org/#/c/32394/8 2) Moved the "inherit roles from parent domain" extension to role assignment setting to an extension. This API is available for review at: https://review.openstack.org/#/c/29781/15 I think this is a good way to proceed, unless anyone has significant objections. Henry On 19 Jun 2013, at 15:36, Adam Young wrote: > The more I think about it, the more I think that tying the inheritance to the domain assignment is the wrong solution. > > David/Kristy originally had the Mapping blueprint and patch. It contained the ability to provide arbitrary rules for mapping from the identity attributes to the roles. I think that it is time to implement that. > > It would be more correct to say that all users in a specific group (fetched out of Identity/LDAP) would get a specific role in a project than to say that a user with a domain role should therefore inherit a role in all projects. > > When creating a scoped token, we need to query a subset of the users identity information. I think that the right direction for this query to flow would be: > > project->roles->role-mappings->groups > > as opposed to what we do now, which is to do a global query: give me all groups for this user and select which ones apply. For LDAP/SQL Identity backends we want to trigger the miniaml query which is "let me know if the user is in groups G1, G2, G3..." as those are the groups that potentially apply to role assignments for this project. > > > So I'd like to redefine the problem definition here: > > "Provide a mechanism by which role assignments can be specified for more than one project." One such rule would obviously be "all projects in domain D1" > > But it should be based on groups, not on domain role assignments. > > > > > On 06/10/2013 11:41 AM, David Chadwick wrote: >> >> >> On 10/06/2013 16:02, Henry Nash wrote: >>> Hi David, >>> >>> I wasn't suggesting that we encode "inhertitness" in the name, just >>> that if you want to have a role that is non-inherited and one that is >>> inherited that relate to the same type of permission, then since role >>> name must be globally unique, then the two roles must have different >>> names....hence potentially leading to the complication in the policy >>> file. >> >> I dont see why different role names would lead to complications in the policy file, since policies are there to assign different permissions to different roles. >> >> What can happen is that policy files can get very large and complex, but that can happen regardless of whether roles are inherited or not, and mistakes can be made by assigning the wrong roles to users or the wrong permissions to roles, but again this is independent of the role definition. >> >> regards >> >> David >>> >>> Henry On 10 Jun 2013, at 15:57, David Chadwick wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Henry >>>> >>>> on the definition of inherited roles, I dont think this should be >>>> part of the role name, but rather, each role should have meta >>>> information attached to it, in its role table definition, that >>>> indicates the properties of the role definition. In this way, you >>>> can make the role definition extensible by adding new columns to >>>> the table as and when needed e.g. if in future you want to have >>>> global roles inherited by domains, you add a new column, say >>>> GlobalToDomain, which could be a boolean with a default value of >>>> false, and with a value true indicating that it is inherited from >>>> global to domain. All pre-existing roles would not be of this type, >>>> and therefore all pre-existing code would work without this new >>>> inheritance. >>>> >>>> I would not alter the role-user assignment API as this should >>>> simply specify the role and user and project. The code may need >>>> enhancing in the future, if new types of inheritance are added, in >>>> order to cater for cases where the role is wrongly specified by the >>>> administrator i.e. it does not apply to the project in question >>>> through lack of inheritance. >>>> >>>> regards >>>> >>>> David >>>> >>>> On 08/06/2013 11:38, Henry Nash wrote: >>>>> So on the idea of using the role def for inheritance definition, >>>>> there were a couple of things that concerned me about it: >>>>> >>>>> 1) While it definitely can simply the api changes required for >>>>> the current requirements, I worry that we are passing the >>>>> complexity on to the creation of the policy file. Since the role >>>>> names of an inherited and non-inherited role will obviously have >>>>> to be different, is there a danger that policy files end up with >>>>> lots of rules that have "role: xxxx and role: xxxx_inherited"? I >>>>> guess we can make the argument that since (with today's >>>>> requirements at least) the only objects that will end of >>>>> inheriting an assignment will be projects, the likelihood is that >>>>> the api lines in the policy file that contains inherited and >>>>> non-inherited will be different, hence avoiding the problem. >>>>> However, if, in the future, we were to expand inheritance to >>>>> support all domains, or all projects in all domains, then this >>>>> problem would arise for domain-relevant apis lines in the policy >>>>> file. >>>>> >>>>> 2) If, again, in the future we support inheritance across all >>>>> domains/projects - would we need to more fine grained control of >>>>> the inheritance? For instance, we want a role that was inherited >>>>> by all domains, but not the projects in each domain? Perhaps, >>>>> one could imagine expanding the role-def to somehow indicate this >>>>> (maybe rather than just having a simple "inherited" boolean, we >>>>> specify "project_inherited", to which we could, in the future, >>>>> add "domain_inherited"?). We also have the problem of how you >>>>> assign such a role? I guess you would still need some kind of >>>>> modification to the assignment APIs to indicate "all domains" >>>>> (perhaps the "domains/*" that was suggested)? >>>>> >>>>> I'd be interested in views on the above - I'm Ok fi we decide >>>>> that role-def is the right way to go, but want to make sure we >>>>> clearly understand how we would expand this in the future. >>>>> >>>>> Henry On 7 Jun 2013, at 18:12, Dolph Mathews wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Jun 6, 2013 at 5:48 AM, David Chadwick >>>>>> <d.w.chadw...@kent.ac.uk <mailto:d.w.chadw...@kent.ac.uk>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> My take on this is that whether a role is automatically >>>>>> inheritable or not should be an attribute of the role itself, >>>>>> and should be independent of who the role is assigned to. >>>>>> Therefore when the role is initially defined, it should be >>>>>> stated by the Keystone admin whether it is an inherited role or >>>>>> not. >>>>>> >>>>>> Role assignment is a separate issue and should not be confused >>>>>> with the basic definition of the role. Role assignment should >>>>>> simply be a matter of naming the subject (domain, project or >>>>>> user) and the role. If you dont want the role to be inherited >>>>>> then use a non-inheritable role. >>>>>> >>>>>> The problem with all the APIs below is that they conflate role >>>>>> definition and role assignment together in the same API call. >>>>>> There should be no need to have user_ids in the definition of >>>>>> a role. Similarly there should be no mention of inherited in >>>>>> the assignment of a role to a user. >>>>>> >>>>>> regards >>>>>> >>>>>> David >>>>>> >>>>>> +1; I really like the simplicity of this approach, and it >>>>>> sounds like something we can migrate to easily (e.g. default >>>>>> inheritable=False for existing roles). Then global role >>>>>> assignments would follow an API like: >>>>>> >>>>>> GET /users/{user_id}/roles # list global roles HEAD >>>>>> /users/{user_id}/roles/{inheritable_role_id} # check if a >>>>>> global role is assigned PUT >>>>>> /users/{user_id}/roles/{inheritable_role_id} # assign a global >>>>>> role DELETE /users/{user_id}/roles/{inheritable_role_id} # >>>>>> revoke a global role >>>>>> >>>>>> where a non-inheritable role assigned a user without a domain >>>>>> or project for context wouldn't make any sense. In fact, >>>>>> assigning an inheritable role to a user on a project wouldn't >>>>>> be very useful (as it wouldn't inherit to anything in the core >>>>>> API), but I don't see a reason to deny it. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 05/06/2013 15:31, Henry Nash wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi >>>>>> >>>>>> As per the discussion during the keystone IRC meeting >>>>>> yesterday, I have been reviewing the proposals for this >>>>>> functionality. There have been two objections to the current >>>>>> proposal (which can be found here: >>>>>> https://review.openstack.org/#__/c/29781/10 >>>>>> <https://review.openstack.org/#/c/29781/10>), which are: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1) The api changes should allow for a logical, generic future >>>>>> extension for support of inherited roles across all domains >>>>>> etc., should we chose to go that route 2) The use of a single >>>>>> api to list the various grants, filtered by a query string if >>>>>> necessary. >>>>>> >>>>>> My proposal for handling these two objections is as follows: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1) API extensions. >>>>>> >>>>>> There are several aspects of inherited roles that we are trying >>>>>> to cement, which are: >>>>>> >>>>>> a) The are dynamic - i.e. this isn't a case of a short hand for >>>>>> saying add this role to all the current projects in the domain >>>>>> - rather it is a role assignment that is attached to the domain >>>>>> but is added to the effective roles of any project (now and in >>>>>> the future) that exists in this domain b) The are separate from >>>>>> a role that is on the domain itself - i.e. we need to ensure >>>>>> that we keep separate inherited and non-inherited roles. c) >>>>>> Maintain the philosophy that If you can create a role >>>>>> assignment with a given API, there should be an equivalent to >>>>>> read it back and delete it (i.e. you mustn't have the case >>>>>> where, for instance you can list a grant, but can't delete it >>>>>> at the conceptual level) >>>>>> >>>>>> The current proposal had been to do this by adding an >>>>>> "inherited" component of the url for create, check and delete >>>>>> grants to a domain, e.g. >>>>>> >>>>>> PUT /domains/{domain_id}/users/{__user_id}/roles/{role_id} PUT >>>>>> /domains/{domain_id}/users/{__user_id}/roles/{role_id}/__inherited >>>>>> >>>>>> >> GET /domains/{domain_id}/users/{__user_id}/roles/{role_id} >>>>>> GET >>>>>> /domains/{domain_id}/users/{__user_id}/roles/{role_id}/__inherited >>>>>> >>>>>> >> DELETE /domains/{domain_id}/users/{__user_id}/roles/{role_id} >>>>>> DELETE >>>>>> /domains/{domain_id}/users/{__user_id}/roles/{role_id}/__inherited >>>>>> >>>>>> >> etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> A counter proposal has been made to expand this, along this >>>>>> lines of: >>>>>> >>>>>> Role applicable to all projects within a domain PUT >>>>>> /domains/{domain_id}/users/{__user_id}/roles/{role_id}/__projects >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Roles inherited by all projects in all domains >>>>>> PUT /usrs/{user_id}/roles/{role___id}/projects >>>>>> >>>>>> Roles inherited by all domains, at the domain level PUT >>>>>> /usrs/{user_id}/roles/{role___id}/domains >>>>>> >>>>>> While I understand the desire to have extensibility if we wish >>>>>> to provide more "global-ness" of roles, I think the above >>>>>> proposal is less clear about whether these assignments are >>>>>> dynamic (see item a) above). How about this as a counter >>>>>> proposal: >>>>>> >>>>>> Role applicable inherited by all projects within a domain (this >>>>>> is the same as the current proposal) PUT >>>>>> /domains/{domain_id}/users/{__user_id}/roles/{role_id}/__inherited >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Roles inherited by all projects in all domains - if we were to >>>>>> ever support this (not part of the current proposal) PUT >>>>>> /domains/users/{user_id}/__roles/{role_id}/inherited >>>>>> >>>>>> Roles inherited by all domains, at the domain level - if we >>>>>> were to ever support this (not part of the current proposal) >>>>>> PUT /domains/users/{user_id}/__roles/{role_id}/inherited >>>>>> >>>>>> To go along with the above, you would have the respective GET, >>>>>> CHECK & DELETE versions of those apis. >>>>>> >>>>>> 2) Single vs multiple apis I think this comment is actually >>>>>> misplaced in the gerrit review, and is intended to directed at >>>>>> the api extensions I proposed to allow the list of a users >>>>>> "effective" roles on a project (i.e. directly assigned, those >>>>>> by virtue of group membership and inheritance from the parent >>>>>> domain). For this, I proposed adding an optional "effective" >>>>>> query parameter to each of: >>>>>> >>>>>> List user's roles on project: `GET >>>>>> /projects/{project_id}/users/{__user_id}/roles List group's >>>>>> roles on project: `GET >>>>>> /projects/{project_id}/groups/__{group_id}/roles Check user's >>>>>> role on project: `GET >>>>>> /projects/{project_id}/users/{__user_id}/role/{role_id} Check >>>>>> group's roles on project: `GET >>>>>> /projects/{project_id}/groups/__{group_id}/role/{role_id} >>>>>> >>>>>> e.g. GET >>>>>> /projects/{project_id}/users/{__user_id}/roles?effective >>>>>> ...would get you the effective roles the user has on that >>>>>> project, as opposed to only the directly assigned ones if you >>>>>> issue the call without the "effective" query parameter. >>>>>> >>>>>> Dolph and I had already been discussing that the existing v3 >>>>>> api of: >>>>>> >>>>>> GET /users/{user_id}/roles >>>>>> >>>>>> ...which is meant to return all the role assignments for a >>>>>> user, but is in fact broken in the current Grizzly code (it >>>>>> always returns an error). So I agree with the proposal that we >>>>>> should scrap the "effective" query parameter for the specific >>>>>> list/check calls for the project - and instead properly >>>>>> implement the "get all assignments for a user" call. I propose >>>>>> the amended spec for this call is: >>>>>> >>>>>> #### List a user's effective role assignments: `GET >>>>>> /users/{user_id}/role-__assignments` >>>>>> >>>>>> query_string: page (optional) query_string: per_page (optional, >>>>>> default 30) query_string: id, project_id, domain_id >>>>>> >>>>>> Response: >>>>>> >>>>>> Status: 200 OK >>>>>> >>>>>> [ { "id": "--role-id--", "name": "--role-name--", "project_id": >>>>>> "--project-id--", "source": { "direct": true, (optional) >>>>>> "domain_inherited: "--domain-id--", (optional) >>>>>> "group_membership: "--group-id--" (optional) } }, { >>>>>> "domain_id": "--domain-id--", "id": "--role-id--", "name": >>>>>> "--role-name--", "source": { "direct": true, (optional) >>>>>> "group_membership: "--group-id--" (optional) } } ] >>>>>> >>>>>> The "source" structure must have at least one of the values >>>>>> given above (and could have more than one, e.g. both >>>>>> domain_inherited and global_membership for a project where the >>>>>> role is due to a group role that is inherited from the domain). >>>>>> If were even to support global roles across all domains, then >>>>>> we would extend the "source structure" accordingly. I'm open >>>>>> to other options for the above format. however, so comments >>>>>> welcome. >>>>>> >>>>>> Does this sounds like a reasonable plan overall? >>>>>> >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _________________________________________________ OpenStack-dev >>>>>> mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.__org >>>>>> <mailto:OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org> >>>>>> http://lists.openstack.org/__cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/__openstack-dev >>>>>> >>>>>> >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _________________________________________________ OpenStack-dev >>>>>> mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.__org >>>>>> <mailto:OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org> >>>>>> http://lists.openstack.org/__cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/__openstack-dev >>>>>> >>>>>> >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ OpenStack-dev >>>>>> mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org >>>>>> <mailto:OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org> >>>>>> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >> _______________________________________________ >>>>> OpenStack-dev mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org >>>>> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OpenStack-dev mailing list >> OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org >> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > OpenStack-dev mailing list > OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev > _______________________________________________ OpenStack-dev mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
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