1) I’m really not sure how that will solve the original issue (Token table size increase). Of course we can have a job to remove the expired token.
2) We really have to think how the other services are using keystone. Keystone “createToken” volume is going to increase. Fixing one issue going to create another one. 1. If I understood correctly swift is using memcache to increase the validateToken performance. What will happen to it? Obviously load to “validateToken” will also increase. 2. In few cases I have seen VM creation taking more than 5 min. ( download image from glance and create vm). Short lived token ( 5 min) will be a real fun in this case. Thanks Haneef From: Ravi Chunduru [mailto:ravi...@gmail.com] Sent: Thursday, June 20, 2013 11:49 AM To: OpenStack Development Mailing List Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] FW: [Keystone][Folsom] Token re-use +1 On Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at 11:37 AM, Dolph Mathews <dolph.math...@gmail.com<mailto:dolph.math...@gmail.com>> wrote: On Wed, Jun 19, 2013 at 2:20 PM, Adam Young <ayo...@redhat.com<mailto:ayo...@redhat.com>> wrote: I really want to go the other way on this: I want token to be very short lived, ideally something like 1 minute, but probably 5 minutes to account for clock skew. I want to get rid of token revocation list checking. I'd like to get away from revocation altogether: tokens are not stored in the backend. If they are ephemeral, we can just check that the token has a valid signature and that the time has not expired. +10 On 06/19/2013 12:59 PM, Ravi Chunduru wrote: Thats still an open item in this thread. Let me summarize once again 1) Use case for keystone not to re-issue same token for same credentials 2) Ratelimit cons and service unavailability 3) Further information on python keyring if not going by keystone re-issue of the tokens. On Wed, Jun 19, 2013 at 9:16 AM, Yee, Guang <guang....@hp.com<mailto:guang....@hp.com>> wrote: Just out of curiosity, is there really a use case where user need to request multiple tokens of the same scope, where the only difference are the expiration dates? Guang From: Dolph Mathews [mailto:dolph.math...@gmail.com<mailto:dolph.math...@gmail.com>] Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2013 7:27 AM To: OpenStack Development Mailing List Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] FW: [Keystone][Folsom] Token re-use On Wed, Jun 19, 2013 at 1:42 AM, Ali, Haneef <haneef....@hp.com<mailto:haneef....@hp.com>> wrote: 1) Token Caching is not always going to help. It depends on the application. E.g A user writes a cron job to check the health of swift by listing a predefined container every 1 minute. This will obviously create a token every minute. 2) Also I like to understand how rate limiting is done for v3 tokens. Rate limiting involves source ip + request pattern. In V3 there are so many ways to get the token and the rate limiting becomes too complex Rate limit the number of requests to POST /v2.0/tokens and POST /v3/auth/tokens Just for unscoped token, all the following are equivalent requests. In case of scoped tokens we have even more combinations. Rouge clients can easily mess with rate limiting by mixing request patterns. Also rate limiting across regions may not be possible. a. UserId/Password b. UserName/Password/domainId c. UserName/Password/DomainName Thanks Haneef From: Ravi Chunduru [mailto:ravi...@gmail.com<mailto:ravi...@gmail.com>] Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2013 11:02 PM To: OpenStack Development Mailing List Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] FW: [Keystone][Folsom] Token re-use I agree we need a way to overcome these rogue clients but by rate limiting genuine requests will get effected. Then one would need retries and some times critical operations gets failed. It beats the whole logic of being available. About the keyrings, How do we tackle if a service is using JSON API calls and not python clients? Thanks, -Ravi. On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 6:37 PM, Adam Young <ayo...@redhat.com<mailto:ayo...@redhat.com>> wrote: On 06/18/2013 09:13 PM, Kant, Arun wrote: The issue with having un-managed number of tokens for same credential is that it can be easily exploited. Getting a token is one of initial step (gateway) to get access to services. A rogue client can keep creating unlimited number of tokens and possibly create denial of service attack on services. If there are somewhat limited number of tokens, then cloud provider can possibly use tokenId based rate-limiting approach. Better here to rate limit, then. Extending the expiry to some fixed interval might be okay as that can be considered as continuing user session similar to what is seen when a user keeps browsing an application while logged in. Tokens are resources created by Keystone. No reason to ask to create something new if it is not needed. The caching needs to be done client side. We have ongoing work using python-keyring to support that. -Arun From: Adam Young <ayo...@redhat.com<mailto:ayo...@redhat.com>> Reply-To: OpenStack Development Mailing List <openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org<mailto:openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>> Date: Friday, June 14, 2013 3:33 PM To: "openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org<mailto:openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>" <openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org<mailto:openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>> Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [Keystone][Folsom] Token re-use On 06/13/2013 07:58 PM, Ravi Chunduru wrote: Hi, We are having Folsom setup and we find that our token table increases a lot. I understand client can re-use the token but why doesnt keystone reuse the token if client asks it with same credentials.. I would like to know if there is any reason for not doing so. Thanks in advance, -- Ravi _______________________________________________ OpenStack-dev mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org<mailto:OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org>http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev You can cache the token on the client side and reuse. Tokens have a an expiry, so if you request a new token, you extend the expiry. _______________________________________________ OpenStack-dev mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org<mailto:OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev _______________________________________________ OpenStack-dev mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org<mailto:OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev -- Ravi _______________________________________________ OpenStack-dev mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org<mailto:OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev _______________________________________________ OpenStack-dev mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org<mailto:OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev -- Ravi _______________________________________________ OpenStack-dev mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org<mailto:OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev _______________________________________________ OpenStack-dev mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org<mailto:OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev _______________________________________________ OpenStack-dev mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org<mailto:OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev -- Ravi
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