So I think that GroupID's are actually unique and safe....since in the multi LDAP case we provide an indirection already in Keystone and issue a "Public ID" (this is true for BOTH users and groups), that we map to the underlying local ID in the particular LDAP backend.
Henry > On 5 Jun 2015, at 15:37, Dolph Mathews <dolph.math...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 10:17 PM, John Wood <john.w...@rackspace.com > <mailto:john.w...@rackspace.com>> wrote: > Hello folks, > > Regarding option C, if group IDs are unique within a given cloud/context, and > these are discoverable by clients that can then set the ACL on a secret in > Barbican, then that seems like a viable option to me. As it is now, the user > information provided to the ACL is the user ID information as found in > X-User-Ids now, not user names. > > To Kevin’s point though, are these group IDs unique across domains now, or in > the future? If not the more complex tuples suggested could be used, but seem > more error prone to configure on an ACL. > > Well, that's a good question, because that depends on the backend, and our > backend architecture has recently gotten very complicated in this area. > > If groups are backed by SQL, then they're going to be globally unique UUIDs, > so the answer is always yes. > > If they're backed by LDAP, then actually it depends on LDAP, but the answer > should be yes. > > But the nightmare scenario we now support is domain-specific identity > drivers, where each domain can actually be configured to talk to a different > LDAP server. In that case, I don't think you can make any guarantees about > group ID uniqueness :( Instead, each domain could provide whatever IDs it > wants, and those might conflict with those of other domains. We have a > workaround for a similar issue with user IDs, but it hasn't been applied to > groups, leaving them quite broken in this scenario. I'd consider this to be > an issue we need to solve in Keystone, though, not something other projects > need to worry about. I'm hoping Henry Nash can chime in and correct me! > > > Thanks, > John > > From: <Fox>, Kevin M <kevin....@pnnl.gov <mailto:kevin....@pnnl.gov>> > Reply-To: "OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)" > <openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org <mailto:openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>> > Date: Thursday, June 4, 2015 at 6:01 PM > To: "OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)" > <openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org <mailto:openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>> > > Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing > X-Group-xxxx in token validation > > In Juno I tried adding a user in Domain A to group in Domain B. That > currently is not supported. Would be very handy though. > > We're getting a ways from the original part of the thread, so I may have lost > some context, but I think the original question was, if barbarian can add > group names to their resource acls. > > Since two administrative domains can issue the same group name, its not safe > I believe. > > Simply ensuring the group name is associated with a user and the domain for > the user matches the domain for the group wouldn't work because someone with > control of their own domain can just make a > user and give them the group with the name they want and come take your > credentials. > > What may be safe is for the barbican ACL to contain the group_id if they are > uniqueue across all domains, or take a domain_id & group_name pair for the > acl. > > Thanks, > Kevin > > From: Dolph Mathews [dolph.math...@gmail.com <mailto:dolph.math...@gmail.com>] > Sent: Thursday, June 04, 2015 1:41 PM > To: OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing > X-Group-xxxx in token validation > > Problem! In writing a spec for this ( > https://review.openstack.org/#/c/188564/ > <https://review.openstack.org/#/c/188564/> ), I remembered that groups are > domain-specific entities, which complicates the problem of providing > X-Group-Names via middleware. > > The problem is that we can't simply expose X-Group-Names to underlying > services without either A) making a well-documented assumption about the ONE > owning domain scope of ALL included groups, B) passing significantly more > data to underlying services than just a list of names (a domain scope for > every group), C) passing only globally-unique group IDs (services would then > have to retrieve additional details about each from from keystone if they so > cared). > > Option A) More specifically, keystone could opt to enumerate the groups that > belong to the same domain as the user. In this case, it'd probably make more > sense from an API perspective if the "groups" enumeration were part of the > "user" resources in the token response body (the "user" object already has a > containing domain ID. That means that IF a user were to be assigned a group > membership in another domain (assuming we didn't move to disallowing that > behavior at some point), then it would have to be excluded from this list. If > that were true, then I'd also follow that X-Group-Names become > X-User-Group-Names, so that it might be more clear that they belong to the > X-User-Domain-*. > > Option B) This is probably the most complex solution, but also the most > explicit. I have no idea how this interface would look in terms of headers > using current conventions. If we're going to break conventions, then I'd want > to pass a id+domain_id+name for each group reference. So, rather than > including a list of names AND a list of IDs, we'd have some terribly encoded > list of group objects (I'm not sure what the HTTP convention is on this sort > of use case, and hoping someone can illustrate a better solution given the > representation below): > > X-Groups: > id%3D123%2Cdomain_id%3D456%2Cname%3Dabc,id%3D789%2Cdomain_id%3D357%2Cname%3Ddef > > Option C) Federated tokens would actually require solution (C) today because > they only include group IDs, not names. But the group enumeration in > federated tokens was also only intended to be consumed by keystone, so that's > not really an issue for that one use case. But option (C) would mean there > are no X-Group-Names passed to services, just X-Group-Ids. I'm guessing this > won't provide the user experience that Barbican is looking for? > > > I'm leaning towards solution (A), but curious if that'll work for Barbican > and/or if anyone has an idea that I'm overlooking. > > > On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 8:18 AM, Dolph Mathews <dolph.math...@gmail.com > <mailto:dolph.math...@gmail.com>> wrote: > To clarify: we already have to include the groups produced as a result of > federation mapping **in the payload** of Fernet tokens so that scoped tokens > can be created later: > > > https://github.com/openstack/keystone/blob/a637ebcbc4a92687d3e80a50cbe88df3b13c79e6/keystone/token/providers/fernet/token_formatters.py#L523 > > <https://github.com/openstack/keystone/blob/a637ebcbc4a92687d3e80a50cbe88df3b13c79e6/keystone/token/providers/fernet/token_formatters.py#L523> > > These are OpenStack group IDs, so it's up to the deployer to keep those under > control to keep Fernet token sizes down. It's the only place in the current > Fernet implementation that's (somewhat alarmingly) unbounded in the real > world. > > But we do **not** have a use case to add groups to *all* Fernet payloads: > only to token creation & validation responses. > > > On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 2:36 AM, Morgan Fainberg <morgan.fainb...@gmail.com > <mailto:morgan.fainb...@gmail.com>> wrote: > For Fernet, the groups would only be populated on validate as Dolph outlined. > They would not be added to the core payload. We do not want to expand the > payload in this manner. > > --Morgan > > Sent via mobile > > On Jun 3, 2015, at 21:51, Lance Bragstad <lbrags...@gmail.com > <mailto:lbrags...@gmail.com>> wrote: > >> I feel if we allowed group ids to be an attribute of the Fernet's core >> payload, we continue to open up the possibility for tokens to be greater >> than the initial "acceptable" size limit for a Fernet token (which I believe >> was 255 bytes?). With this, I think we need to provide guidance on the >> number of group ids allowed within the token before that size limit is >> compromised. >> >> We've landed patches recently that allow for id strings to be included in >> the Fernet payload [0], regardless of being uuid format (which can be >> converted to bytes before packing to save space, this is harder for us to do >> with non-uuid format id strings). This can also cause the Fernet token size >> to grow. If we plan to include more information in the Fernet token payload >> I think we should determine if the original acceptable size limit still >> applies and regardless of what that size limit is provide some sort of "best >> practices" for helping deployments keep their token size as small as >> possible. >> >> >> Keeping the tokens user (and developer) friendly was a big plus in the >> design of Fernet, and providing resource for deployments to maintain that >> would be helpful. >> >> >> [0] >> https://review.openstack.org/#/q/status:merged+project:openstack/keystone+branch:master+topic:bug/1459382,n,z >> >> <https://review.openstack.org/#/q/status:merged+project:openstack/keystone+branch:master+topic:bug/1459382,n,z> >> >> On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 10:19 PM, Steve Martinelli <steve...@ca.ibm.com >> <mailto:steve...@ca.ibm.com>> wrote: >> Dozens to hundreds of roles or endpoints could cause an issue now :) >> >> But yeah, groups are much more likely to number in the dozens than roles or >> endpoints. But I think the Fernet token size is so small that it could >> probably handle this (since it does so now for the federated workflow). >> >> Thanks, >> >> Steve Martinelli >> OpenStack Keystone Core >> >> >> >> From: "Fox, Kevin M" <kevin....@pnnl.gov <mailto:kevin....@pnnl.gov>> >> To: "OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions)" >> <openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org >> <mailto:openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org>> >> Date: 06/03/2015 11:14 PM >> Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding >> exposing X-Group-xxxx in token validation >> >> >> >> Will dozens to a hundred groups or so on one user cause issues? :) >> >> Thanks, >> Kevin >> >> From: Morgan Fainberg >> Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2015 7:23:22 PM >> To: OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [keystone][barbican] Regarding exposing >> X-Group-xxxx in token validation >> >> In general I am of the opinion with the move to Fernet there is no good >> reason we should avoid adding the group information into the token. >> >> --Morgan >> >> Sent via mobile >> >> On Jun 3, 2015, at 18:44, Dolph Mathews <dolph.math...@gmail.com >> <mailto:dolph.math...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> >> On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 5:58 PM, John Wood <john.w...@rackspace.com >> <mailto:john.w...@rackspace.com>> wrote: >> Hello folks, >> >> There has been discussion about adding user group support to the per-secret >> access control list (ACL) feature in Barbican. Hence secrets could be marked >> as accessible by a group on the ACL rather than an individual user as >> implemented now. >> >> Our understanding is that Keystone does not pass along a user’s group >> information during token validation however (such as in the form of >> X-Group-Ids/X-Group-Names headers passed along via Keystone middleware). >> >> The pre-requisite for including that information in the form of headers >> would be adding group information to the token validation response. In the >> case of UUID, it would be pre-computed and stored in the DB at token >> creation time. In the case of PKI, it would be encoded into the PKI token >> and further bloat PKI tokens. And in the case of Fernet, it would be >> included at token validation time. >> >> Including group information, however, would also let us efficient revoke >> tokens using token revocation events when group membership is affected in >> any way (user being removed from a group, a group being deleted, or a >> group-based role assignment being revoked). The OS-FEDERATION extension is >> actually already including groups in tokens today, as a required part of the >> federated workflow. We'd effectively be introducing that same behavior into >> the core Identity API (see the federated token example): >> >> >> https://github.com/openstack/keystone-specs/blob/master/api/v3/identity-api-v3-os-federation-ext.rst#request-an-unscoped-os-federation-token >> >> <https://github.com/openstack/keystone-specs/blob/master/api/v3/identity-api-v3-os-federation-ext.rst#request-an-unscoped-os-federation-token> >> >> This would allow us to address bugs such as: >> >> https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1268751 >> <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1268751> >> >> In the past, we shied away from including groups if only to avoid bloating >> the size of PKI tokens any further (but now we have Fernet tokens providing >> a viable alternative). Are there any other reasons not to add group >> information to the token validation response? >> >> >> Would the community consider this a useful feature? Would the community >> consider adding this support to Liberty? >> >> Thank you, >> John >> >> >> __________________________________________________________________________ >> OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> Unsubscribe: openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe >> <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org/?subject:unsubscribe> >> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> >> >> >> __________________________________________________________________________ >> OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> Unsubscribe: openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org >> <mailto:openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org>?subject:unsubscribe >> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev>__________________________________________________________________________ >> OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> Unsubscribe: openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe >> <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org/?subject:unsubscribe> >> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> >> >> >> __________________________________________________________________________ >> OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> Unsubscribe: openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe >> <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org/?subject:unsubscribe> >> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> >> >> >> __________________________________________________________________________ >> OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) >> Unsubscribe: openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org >> <mailto:openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org>?subject:unsubscribe >> http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev >> <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> > > __________________________________________________________________________ > OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Unsubscribe: openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe > <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org/?subject:unsubscribe> > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev > <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> > > > > > __________________________________________________________________________ > OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Unsubscribe: openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe > <http://openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org/?subject:unsubscribe> > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev > <http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev> > > > __________________________________________________________________________ > OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Unsubscribe: openstack-dev-requ...@lists.openstack.org?subject:unsubscribe > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
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