Yes, I am aware that this is the expected behavior, at least from the
developer point of view.
Still, some functionality to confine plugin actions within the
environment where it is supposed to run would be an useful option, what
do you think?
On 07.12.2015 20:19, Andrew Woodward wrote:
I'd have to say that this is expected behavior. I'm not sure what you
would hope to prohibit when these kinds of things are necessary for
the deployment. We also can't prohibit this from being done in a
plugin, this is what the plugin verification is supposed to help
combat. If you just go download a random puppet manifest // script //
etc... from the internet, how do you ensure that it didn't install a
root-kit.
On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 9:14 AM Eugene Korekin <ekore...@mirantis.com
<mailto:ekore...@mirantis.com>> wrote:
As far as I know this feature is planned for the next releases.
But I think the main problem is: it's not obvious that just by
installing a plugin, even without enabling the plugin in Fuel user
could break or somehow alter already existing environments. It
could be done by malicious attacker who could compromise plugin or
just unintentionally with some bug in the plugin code.
Unfortunately, by installing some plugin a user jeopardizes his
existing environments. And I think we should at least document
these risks.
On 07.12.2015 19:52, Javeria Khan wrote:
My two cents. It would be useful to have a role that could
execute on the Fuel Master host itself rather than a container.
--
Javeria
On Dec 7, 2015 9:49 PM, "Roman Prykhodchenko" <m...@romcheg.me
<mailto:m...@romcheg.me>> wrote:
Alexey,
thank you for bringing this up. IMO discussing security
problems is better to be done in a special kind of Launchpad
bugs.
- romcheg
> 7 груд. 2015 р. о 17:36 Alexey Elagin <aela...@mirantis.com
<mailto:aela...@mirantis.com>> написав(ла):
>
> Hello all,
>
> We have a security problem in Fuel 7.0. It's related to plugin
> development and allows to execute code in mcollective
docker container
> on Fuel master node. Any fuel plugin may contains a yaml
file with
> deployment tasks (tasks.yaml, deployment_tasks.yaml etc)
and there is
> an ability to run some code on node with role "master".
It's also
> possible to connect to any target node via ssh without a
password from
> within the container.
>
> As i understood, it was made to simplify some deployment
cases. I see
> some steps for resolving this situation:
> 1. Fuel team should disallow
> execution of any puppet manifests or bash code on nodes
with master
> role.
> 2. Append the Fuel documentation. Notify users about this
> security issue.
>
> What do you think about it? What deployment cases which require
> execution of code on role "master" do you know?
>
> --
> Best regards,
> Alexey
> Deployment Engineer
> Mirantis, Inc
> Cell: +7 (968) 880 2288 <tel:%2B7%20%28968%29%20880%202288>
> Skype: shikelbober
> Slack: aelagin
> mailto:aela...@mirantis.com <mailto:aela...@mirantis.com>
>
>
>
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Fuel Community Ambassador
Ceph Community
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