On 05/12/2016 09:07 AM, Edmund Rhudy (BLOOMBERG/ 120 PARK) wrote:
+1 on desiring OAuth-style tokens in Keystone. The use cases that come
up here are people wanting to be able to execute jobs that use the
APIs (Jenkins, Terraform, Vagrant, etc.) without having to save their
personal credentials in plaintext somewhere, and also wanting to be
able to associate credentials with a project instead of a specific
person, so that if a person leaves or rotates their password it
doesn't blow up their team's carefully crafted automation.
We can sort of work around it with LDAP service accounts as mentioned
previously, but the concern around those is the lack of speedy
revocability in the event of a compromise, and the service accounts
could possibly be used to get to non-OpenStack places until they get
shut down. One thought I had to try to keep the auth domain
constrained to only OpenStack was using the EC2 API because at least
that means you're not saving LDAP passwords on disk and the access
keys are useless beyond that particular Keystone installation, but you
run into impedance mismatches between the Nova API and AWS EC2 API,
and we'd like people to use the native OpenStack APIs. (Turns out the
notion of using AWS's EC2 API to talk to a private cloud is strange to
people not steeped in cloudy things.)
So Service accounts and OAuth consumers are two different names for the
same abstract construct. IN both cases, the important thing is limiting
the access each one has.
Horizon is for the interactive use case, though, and should not be using
either, except as a front to define workflows, and in that case, the
same work should be possible from the command line.
ECP should make that possible, assuming your IdP supports ECP (EIEIO!).
From: openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [horizon][keystone] Getting Auth Token
from Horizon when using Federation
Hi Dolph, On Mon, 2016-04-18 at 17:50 -0500, Dolph Mathews wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 18, 2016 at 11:34 AM, Martin Millnert
<mar...@millnert.se <mailto:mar...@millnert.se>> > wrote: > Hi, >
> we're deploying Liberty (soon Mitaka) with heavy reliance on >
the SAML2 > Federation system by Keystone where we're a Service
Provider > (SP). > > The problem in this situation is getting a
token for direct > API > access.(*) > > There are conceptually two
methods to use the CLI: > 1) Modify ones (each customer -- in our
case O(100)) IdP to > add support > for a feature called ECP(**),
and then use keystoneauth with > SAML2 > plugin, > 2) Go to (for
example) "Access & Security / API Access / View > Credentials" in
Horizon, and check out a token from there. > > > With a default
configuration, this token would only last a short > period of
time, so this would be incredibly repetitive (and thus > tedious).
Assuming all that is setup, the user should be unaware of the re-init to
the SAML IdP to get a new assertion for a new token. Why is this a problem?
Indeed. > So, I assume you mean some sort of long-lived API
tokens? Right. > API tokens, including keystone's UUID, PKI, PKIZ,
and Fernet tokens > are all bearer tokens, so we force a short
lifetime by default, > because there are always multiple parties
capable of compromising the > integrity of a token. OAuth would be
a counter example, where OAuth > access tokens can (theoretically)
live forever.
Still think that is a security violation.
This does sound very interesting. As long as the end user gets
something useful to plug into the openstack auth libraries/APIs,
we're home free (modulo security considerations, etc). > 2) isn't
implemented. 1) is a complete blocker for many > customers. > >
Are there any principal and fundamental reasons why 2 is not >
doable? > What I imagine needs to happen: > A) User is
authenticated (see *) in Horizon, > B) User uses said
authentication (token) to request another > token from > Keystone,
which is displayed under the "API Access" tab on > "Access & >
Security". > > > The (token) here could be an OAuth access token.
Will look into this (also as per our discussion in Austin). The
one issue that has appeared in our continued discussions at home,
is the contrast against "service user accounts", that seems a
relatively prevalent/common among deployers today, which basically
use username/password as the api key credentials, e.g. the authZ
of the issued token: If AdminNameless is Domain Admin in their
domain, won't their OAuth access token yield keystone tokens with
the same authZ as they otherwise have? My presumptive answer being
'yes', brought me to the realization that, if one wants to avoid
going the way of "service user accounts" but still reduce authZ,
one would like to be able to get OAuth access tokens for a
specific project, with a specific role (e.g. "user", or
[project-]admin) and the authZ this entails. This would keep the
traceability, which is one of the main issues with non-personal
accounts.
I don't think end users should be able to do this themselves. If I lose
my access to the IdP due to getting fired, my OAuth tokens should no
longer be valid, either. But there is no consistent way to communicate
this information.
How feasible is this last bit? In general, the primary use case
is: - I as a user of openstack on my personal computer retrieve a
token to manage openstack client operations without the need of
storing my Federation-username/password in local config (nor
typing the password in on the keyboard). An extended use case
definition of this being: - I as a user of openstack can provision
an automated system with these credentials, that can continue to
operate as an openstack client for a very long time without
maintenance (i.e., either token renewal or VeryLongLifetime).
You can build all sorts of things that look like secure authentication
without actually being secure authentication. Federation assumes that
the IdP is the true voice of authority. OAuth and service users both
assume they are getting authority delegated to them fomr the end users.
So, without SAML assertions confirming that authority, you will end up
with no way to either confirm or deny. Are you OK with that restriction?
Best, Martin
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