Are you guys +1 ing the original Idea, my suggestion to make it
optional, the fact that I think we should call these sloppy tokens?
On 10/22/2012 03:40 PM, Jorge Williams wrote:
+1 here too.
At the end of the day, we'd like the identity API to be flexible
enough to allow the token to be scoped in a manner that the deployer
sees fit. What the keystone implementation does by default is a
different matter -- and disabling multiple tenant scope by default
would be fine by me.
-jOrGe W.
On Oct 21, 2012, at 11:10 AM, Joe Savak wrote:
+1. ;)
So the issue is that the v2 API contract allows a token to be scoped
to multiple tenants. For v3, I'd like to have the same flexibility. I
don't see security issues, as if a token were to be sniffed you can
change the password of the account using it and use those creds to
scope tokens to any tenant you wish.
Scope should always be kept as limited as possible. Personally, I don't
feel like limiting the tenant list makes much difference. THe more I
think about it, the real benefit comes from limiting the endpoints.
On Oct 20, 2012, at 21:07, "Adam Young" <ayo...@redhat.com
<mailto:ayo...@redhat.com>> wrote:
On 10/20/2012 01:50 PM, heckj wrote:
I sent this to the openstack-dev list, and thought I'd double post
this onto the openstack list at Launchpad for additional feedback.
-joe
Begin forwarded message:
*From: *heckj <he...@mac.com <mailto:he...@mac.com>>
*Subject: **[openstack-dev] [keystone] Tokens representing
authorization to projects/tenants in the Keystone V3 API*
*Date: *October 19, 2012 1:51:16 PM PDT
*To: *OpenStack Development Mailing List
<openstack-...@lists.openstack.org
<mailto:openstack-...@lists.openstack.org>>
*Reply-To: *OpenStack Development Mailing List
<openstack-...@lists.openstack.org
<mailto:openstack-...@lists.openstack.org>>
The topic of what a token can or can't represent for the upcoming
V3 Keystone API came up - and I wanted to share the conversation
a bit more broadly to get feedback.
A bit of history:
In the V2 API, when you authenticated with just a username and
password, the token that was provided wasn't entirely clearly
defined. The reference implementation that Keystone used was to
create what's been called an 'unscoped' token - which was
generally limited to only being able to get a list of possible
tenants/projects and the capability of getting a token specific to
a user & tenant/project (what's been called a "scoped" token)
Likewise, the reference implementation of the rest of the
OpenStack projects all require a tenant information to be included
within the token as that token was the identity refernce
inforoamtion - and most OpenStack services were wanting to know
the tenant associated with the token for authorization/ownership
purposes.
Apparently Rackspace's internal implementation provided a token
that was immediately valid for all possible tenants to which the
user was associated, and presumably their internal implementations
of openstack do whatever work is appropriate to discern and
provide that information to the various openstack services.
The quandary:
In the V3 API, we started off with, and currently define the token
as being specifically mandated to a single tenant, with a new
requirement that if you authorize with just a username and
password, a "default tenant" is used. If for some reason you have
no tenant associated with the userid, the authorization is to be
refused. If the user is associated with more than one
tenant/project, it's possible to use the token to get a list of
other tenants/projects and request a new token specific to one of
those other tenant/projects, but the implementation is expected to
respect and provide a default.
I would like to make "default tenant" a configuration option, and
have it disabled by default. Unscoped tokens are a very useful
construct. In the case where the user has many roles across a
multitude of projects, it is possible to create huge tokens. I
would prefer unscoped tokens to remain, and to be associated with no
tenant. The only operation Keystone should provide with them is the
ability to enumerate tenants, so something like Horizon can then
request an appropriately scoped token.
I am also in favor of limiting the scope of a token to an endpoint.
Even more-so than tenants, scoping a token to an end point increases
security. Once a token has been scoped to an endpoint, it can only
be used on that endpoint. If an endpoint gets compromised, the
damage is limited to resources that endpoint already has access to.
This, in conjunction with pre-auths, could allow a user to perform
an action with a minimum of risk in a public cloud environment.
A few folks from Rackspace touched on this at the very tail end of
the V3 API review session on Thursday, bringing up that they had
an issue with the token being scoped to a single tenant. Since
this has significant implications to both security and a potential
user experience flow, I wanted to bring the issue up across the
broader community for discussion.
The request outstanding:
Rackspace folks are requesting that the token not be limited to a
single tenant/project, but instead provides a list of potential
tenants against which the token should be considered valid.
I would like the world to know that we are affectionately calling
such tokens "sloppy tokens" and Joe Savak has adopted the nickname
of "Sloppy Joe" for championing them. Allowing it as an option is
fine, but I would not recommend that this become the norm, or that
we enable this feature by default.
Brief (maybe shoddy) analysis:
This would potentially imply changes to what gets passed as a part
of the authentication reference in the context passed using
auth_token middleware - multiple tenants possible instead of the
currently expected single value - so using that as information for
create() style mechanisms would need to provide some alternative
means of clearly defining what tenant/project should be owner. It
would provide anyone compromising that particular token with a
broader spectrum of impact on a replay style attack. Likewise, the
impact of tenant enable/disable or role changes would necessarily
mean a broader invalidation of all tokens associated with the user.
On the flip side, it has the potential to remove the
token-reissuance that currently exists when switching contexts
from one project to another (primarily through horizon or other
client/UI/dashboard mechanisms that cache the token).
Feedback and Input desired!
-joe
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