-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Older versions of noVNC allow session theft - ---
### Summary ### Commonly packaged versions of noVNC allow an attacker to hijack user sessions even when TLS is enabled. noVNC fails to set the secure flag when setting cookies containing an authentication token. ### Affected Services / Software ### Nova, when embedding noVNC prior to v0.5 ### Discussion ### Versions of noVNC prior to October 28, 2013 do not properly set the secure flag on cookies for pages served over TLS. Since noVNC stores authentication tokens in these cookies, an attacker who can modify user traffic can steal these tokens and connect to the VNC session. Affected deployments can be identified by looking for the "secure" flag on the token cookie set by noVNC on TLS-enabled installations. If the secure flag is missing, the installation is vulnerable. At the time of writing, Debian, Ubuntu and Fedora do not provide versions of this package with the appropriate patch. ### Recommended Actions ### noVNC should be updated to version 0.5 or later. If this is not possible, the upstream patch should be applied individually. Upstream patch: https://github.com/kanaka/noVNC/commit/ad941faddead705cd611921730054767a0b32dcd ### Contacts / References ### This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0044 Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1420942 OpenStack Security ML : openstack-secur...@lists.openstack.org OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg CVE: in progress-http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/02/17/1 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJU9NF0AAoJEJa+6E7Ri+EVa9UH/0wuLY2PEG4yupSYbLehupZ2 wVb6wjfnpGdewgTseOjjlS/VCaCOm2cC2rFIILIde/zhlq3Q7v5XZM1Ge4HSyAh0 c0gk2sDUep8HKV7HnkCPJhng7X2nnE/3nLrPWqhKkHDA1IClfG6qgOENV5lmr0jx Oz2aJZ2vgHx/Yc5AZbntIeKG1Su/gPNOLxXxk5bNIB44F2T4YeQON7VQKotpqAPA PmStS6vmuu2r2FwNJ8QvRM/uT6zyJbEjO/9pIIRN5ryZexgGn0Jii4P7s5y16fxb ja+hlEdwnmeedBoyfeC5U6dYT4ug5DJgtL3G1ew6LdeZvvfLAwlQP0lvBHfMULg= =Qfj1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Mailing list: http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack Post to : openstack@lists.openstack.org Unsubscribe : http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack