Hello community,
here is the log from the commit of package openssh for openSUSE:Factory checked
in at 2014-04-26 17:02:02
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/openssh (Old)
and /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.openssh.new (New)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Package is "openssh"
Changes:
--------
--- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/openssh/openssh.changes 2014-04-17
14:43:48.000000000 +0200
+++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.openssh.new/openssh.changes 2014-04-26
17:02:04.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,0 +2,7 @@
+Thu Apr 24 01:33:45 UTC 2014 - pce...@suse.com
+
+- curve25519 key exchange fix (-curve25519-6.6.1p1.patch)
+- patch re-ordering (-audit3-key_auth_usage-fips.patch,
+ -audit4-kex_results-fips.patch)
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
Old:
----
openssh-6.6p1-audit3_fips-key_auth_usage.patch
openssh-6.6p1-audit4_fips-kex_results.patch
New:
----
openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage-fips.patch
openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results-fips.patch
openssh-6.6p1-curve25519-6.6.1p1.patch
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Other differences:
------------------
++++++ openssh.spec ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_old 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_new 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@
Source8: sysconfig.ssh
Source9: sshd-gen-keys-start
Source10: sshd.service
+Patch0: openssh-6.6p1-curve25519-6.6.1p1.patch
Patch1: openssh-6.6p1-key-converter.patch
Patch2: openssh-6.6p1-X11-forwarding.patch
Patch3: openssh-6.6p1-lastlog.patch
@@ -128,9 +129,9 @@
Patch18: openssh-6.6p1-audit1-remove_duplicit_audit.patch
Patch19: openssh-6.6p1-audit2-better_audit_of_user_actions.patch
Patch20: openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage.patch
-Patch21: openssh-6.6p1-audit3_fips-key_auth_usage.patch
+Patch21: openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage-fips.patch
Patch22: openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results.patch
-Patch23: openssh-6.6p1-audit4_fips-kex_results.patch
+Patch23: openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results-fips.patch
Patch24: openssh-6.6p1-audit5-session_key_destruction.patch
Patch25: openssh-6.6p1-audit6-server_key_destruction.patch
Patch26: openssh-6.6p1-audit7-libaudit_compat.patch
@@ -180,6 +181,7 @@
%prep
%setup -q
+%patch0 -p2
#patch1 -p2
%patch2 -p2
%patch3 -p2
++++++ openssh-6.6p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_old 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_new 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
# HG changeset patch
-# Parent 73eb63cbbd603bf8c13995c478333c1b5a2a020a
+# Parent 1055b218140c3cc19228c47878a68740363d80dd
Do not throw away already open sockets for X11 forwarding if another socket
family is not available for bind()
++++++ openssh-6.6p1-audit2-better_audit_of_user_actions.patch ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_old 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_new 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
@@ -849,7 +849,7 @@
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
-@@ -2529,13 +2529,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
+@@ -2532,13 +2532,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
errno != ESRCH)
error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
++++++ openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage-fips.patch ++++++
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 5482d21e8bd06309af51dea77a5f3668859fb2a0
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
@@ -94,16 +94,20 @@ int
auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge,
u_char response[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH])
{
u_char buf[2 * SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], mdbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
int len;
int dgst;
size_t dgst_len;
+ int rv;
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ char *fp;
+#endif
/* don't allow short keys */
if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
__func__,
BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
return (0);
}
@@ -121,22 +125,28 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU
if ((md = ssh_digest_start(dgst)) == NULL ||
ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 2 * dgst_len) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, dgst_len) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0)
fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__);
ssh_digest_free(md);
/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
- if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, dgst_len) != 0) {
- /* Wrong answer. */
- return (0);
+ rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, dgst_len) == 0;
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, key_fp_type_select(), SSH_FP_HEX);
+ if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0)
{
+ debug("unsuccessful audit");
+ rv = 0;
}
- /* Correct answer. */
- return (1);
+ free(fp);
+#endif
+
+ return rv;
}
/*
* Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
* and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
* our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
*/
++++++ openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results-fips.patch ++++++
# HG changeset patch
# Parent 274a545b591567f1378c1086ad3ba40c911a8bd6
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in
@@ -72,17 +72,18 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o
atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o \
sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
- fips.o
+ fips.o \
+ auditstub.o
SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
roaming_common.o roaming_client.o
SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c b/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c
@@ -54,30 +54,16 @@
/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
-struct Cipher {
- char *name;
- int number; /* for ssh1 only */
- u_int block_size;
- u_int key_len;
- u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
- u_int auth_len;
- u_int discard_len;
- u_int flags;
-#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
-#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
- const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
-};
-
static const struct Cipher ciphers_all[] = {
{ "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
{ "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
{ "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
{ "blowfish", SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf },
{ "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
{ "blowfish-cbc",
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -119,16 +119,18 @@
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "roaming.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "fips.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+
#ifdef LIBWRAP
#include <tcpd.h>
#include <syslog.h>
int allow_severity;
int deny_severity;
#endif /* LIBWRAP */
#ifndef O_NOCTTY
++++++ openssh-6.6p1-audit5-session_key_destruction.patch ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_old 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_new 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@
verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
#ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -2523,26 +2532,38 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+@@ -2526,26 +2535,38 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
#endif
debug("KEX done");
}
++++++ openssh-6.6p1-audit6-server_key_destruction.patch ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_old 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_new 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@
BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
/* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be
encrypted. */
-@@ -2553,16 +2603,18 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
+@@ -2556,16 +2606,18 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
errno != ESRCH)
++++++ openssh-6.6p1-curve25519-6.6.1p1.patch ++++++
# Date: Sun, 20 Apr 2014 17:14:08 +1000 (EST)
# From: Damien Miller <d...@mindrot.org>
# To: openssh-unix-...@mindrot.org
# Subject: bad bignum encoding for curve25519-sha...@libssh.org
# Message-ID: <alpine.bso.2.11.1404201713390.26...@natsu.mindrot.org>
#
# Hi,
#
# So I screwed up when writing the support for the curve25519 KEX method
# that doesn't depend on OpenSSL's BIGNUM type - a bug in my code left
# leading zero bytes where they should have been skipped. The impact of
# this is that OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 will fail during key exchange with a
# peer that implements curve25519-sha...@libssh.org properly about 0.2%
# of the time (one in every 512ish connections).
#
# We've fixed this for OpenSSH 6.7 by avoiding the curve25519-sha256
# key exchange for previous versions, but I'd recommend distributors
# of OpenSSH apply this patch so the affected code doesn't become
# too entrenched in LTS releases.
#
# The patch fixes the bug and makes OpenSSH identify itself as 6.6.1 so as
# to distinguish itself from the incorrect versions so the compatibility
# code to disable the affected KEX isn't activated.
#
# I've committed this on the 6.6 branch too.
#
# Apologies for the hassle.
#
# -d
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/bufaux.c b/openssh-6.6p1/bufaux.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/bufaux.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/bufaux.c
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.56 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.57 2014/04/16 23:22:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <y...@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from
* Buffers.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
@@ -367,16 +367,19 @@ buffer_get_bignum2_as_string(Buffer *buf
void
buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *buffer, const u_char *s, u_int l)
{
u_char *buf, *p;
int pad = 0;
if (l > 8 * 1024)
fatal("%s: length %u too long", __func__, l);
+ /* Skip leading zero bytes */
+ for (; l > 0 && *s == 0; l--, s++)
+ ;
p = buf = xmalloc(l + 1);
/*
* If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to
* avoid interpretation as a negative number.
*/
if (l > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0) {
*p++ = '\0';
pad = 1;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/compat.c b/openssh-6.6p1/compat.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/compat.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/compat.c
@@ -90,16 +90,19 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
{ "OpenSSH_2.*,"
"OpenSSH_3.0*,"
"OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR},
{ "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR },
{ "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
{ "OpenSSH_4*", 0 },
{ "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT},
+ { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH},
+ { "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
+ "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD},
{ "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH },
{ "*MindTerm*", 0 },
{ "2.1.0*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|
SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
{ "2.1 *", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
@@ -246,22 +249,34 @@ compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop
debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
cipher_prop = filter_proposal(cipher_prop, "aes*");
debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop);
if (*cipher_prop == '\0')
fatal("No supported ciphers found");
return cipher_prop;
}
-
char *
compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
{
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
return pkalg_prop;
debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
pkalg_prop = filter_proposal(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa");
debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop);
if (*pkalg_prop == '\0')
fatal("No supported PK algorithms found");
return pkalg_prop;
}
+char *
+compat_kex_proposal(char *kex_prop)
+{
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD))
+ return kex_prop;
+ debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop);
+ kex_prop = filter_proposal(kex_prop, "curve25519-sha...@libssh.org");
+ debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop);
+ if (*kex_prop == '\0')
+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
+ return kex_prop;
+}
+
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/compat.h b/openssh-6.6p1/compat.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/compat.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/compat.h
@@ -54,20 +54,22 @@
#define SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN 0x00100000
#define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000
#define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00400000
#define SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX 0x00800000
#define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR 0x01000000
#define SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR 0x02000000
#define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000
#define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000
+#define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000
void enable_compat13(void);
void enable_compat20(void);
void compat_datafellows(const char *);
int proto_spec(const char *);
char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *);
char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *);
+char *compat_kex_proposal(char *);
extern int compat13;
extern int compat20;
extern int datafellows;
#endif
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
@@ -190,16 +190,18 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
else {
/* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
compat_pkalg_proposal(
order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
}
if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
/* start key exchange */
kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
@@ -2457,16 +2457,19 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
} else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,z...@openssh.com";
}
if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
list_hostkey_types());
/* start key exchange */
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/version.h b/openssh-6.6p1/version.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/version.h
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/version.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.70 2014/02/27 22:57:40 djm Exp $ */
-#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.6"
+#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.6.1"
#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
++++++ openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint_hash.patch ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_old 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_new 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
# HG changeset patch
-# Parent a3a898b117b0f726e6cc923f18463de8e45e74f5
+# Parent 8b2615db484b7061edd15f3bee36958f790f790e
# select fingerprint hash algorithms based on the environment variable
# SSH_FP_TYPE_ENVVAR and append it to hex and randomart fingerprints
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -577,17 +577,17 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t
+@@ -579,17 +579,17 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@
* moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by
* duplicate keys
*/
-@@ -988,17 +988,17 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt,
+@@ -990,17 +990,17 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt,
Buffer b;
u_char *blob, *signature;
u_int bloblen, slen;
++++++ openssh-6.6p1-fips-checks.patch ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_old 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_new 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,5 +1,17 @@
# HG changeset patch
-# Parent 12ad7b6077ef9c6b3a3a53b4f0084c3eb2f80fe7
+# Parent 717873621cf4991164c61caafd9ac07473231f10
+# Simple implementation of FIPS 140-2 selfchecks. Use OpenSSL to generate and
+# verify checksums of binaries. Any hash iused in OpenSSH can be used (MD5
would
+# obviously be a poor choice, since OpenSSL would barf and abort immediately in
+# FIPS mode). SHA-2 seems to be a reasonable choice.
+#
+# The logic of the checks is as follows: decide whether FIPS mode is mandated
+# (either by checking /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled or envoroinment variable
+# SSH_FORCE_FIPS. In FIPS mode, checksums are required to match (inability to
+# retrieve pre-calculated hash is a fatal error). In non-FIPS mode the checks
+# still must be performed, unless the hashes are not installed. Thus if the
hash
+# file is not found (or the hash matches), proceed in non-FIPS mode and abort
+# otherwise.
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/fips-check.c b/openssh-6.6p1/fips-check.c
new file mode 100644
++++++ openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_old 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_new 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# when OpenSSL is detected to be running in FIPS mode
#
# HG changeset patch
-# Parent ff04a9a96b7c41e99445c68d91911a9a1474ffa2
+# Parent 844066cb9c0ec2b10eb1ace7134f7bced7cc802d
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
+ u_char buf[2 * SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], mdbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
int len;
-+ int dgst;
++ int dgst;
+ size_t dgst_len;
/* don't allow short keys */
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
}
- /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
-+ dgst = fips_correct_dgst(SSH_DIGEST_MD5);
++ dgst = fips_correct_dgst(SSH_DIGEST_MD5);
+ dgst_len = ssh_digest_bytes(dgst);
+
+ /* The response is a hash of decrypted challenge plus session id.
++++++ openssh-6.6p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_old 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_new 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
# HG changeset patch
-# Parent b50b01e06558d268ae59e8be8c1a41fde44fc70d
+# Parent 0b2761bdc8c2071a11ca24387c3f58be2fdbaa5e
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/ChangeLog.gssapi b/openssh-6.6p1/ChangeLog.gssapi
new file mode 100644
@@ -3239,14 +3239,14 @@
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
} else if (fips_mode()) {
-@@ -203,32 +228,63 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- /* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+@@ -205,32 +230,63 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
compat_pkalg_proposal(
order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
}
if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
@@ -3291,7 +3291,7 @@
+ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
+ } else {
+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
-+ }
++ }
+ }
+#endif
+
@@ -3303,7 +3303,7 @@
debug("Roaming not allowed by server");
options.use_roaming = 0;
}
-@@ -308,31 +364,37 @@ int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *);
+@@ -310,31 +366,37 @@ int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *);
#ifdef GSSAPI
int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt);
@@ -3341,7 +3341,7 @@
{"gssapi",
userauth_gssapi,
NULL,
-@@ -624,29 +686,41 @@ done:
+@@ -626,29 +688,41 @@ done:
int
userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
@@ -3385,7 +3385,7 @@
if (!ok)
return 0;
-@@ -735,18 +809,18 @@ process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buf
+@@ -737,18 +811,18 @@ process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buf
}
/* ARGSUSED */
@@ -3406,7 +3406,7 @@
/* Setup our OID */
oidv = packet_get_string(&oidlen);
-@@ -845,16 +919,58 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p
+@@ -847,16 +921,58 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p
lang=packet_get_string(NULL);
packet_check_eom();
@@ -3655,7 +3655,7 @@
* mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
* are about to discover the bug.
*/
-@@ -2559,24 +2674,73 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+@@ -2562,24 +2677,73 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
++++++ openssh-6.6p1-gssapimitm.patch ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_old 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_new 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
--- a/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -316,16 +316,21 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+@@ -318,16 +318,21 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
Authmethod authmethods[] = {
#ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@
NULL},
{"publickey",
userauth_pubkey,
-@@ -683,17 +688,19 @@ process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buf
+@@ -685,17 +690,19 @@ process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buf
packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
packet_send();
++++++ openssh-6.6p1-seccomp_getuid.patch ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_old 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.5tvv9G/_new 2014-04-26 17:02:05.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
# HG changeset patch
-# Parent 47040f4641d43b039f19c8c902b0259729bb88e2
+# Parent bde6f1a808f345e141a976ebc3e37903c81a09cb
add 'getuid' syscall to list of allowed ones to prevent the sanboxed thread
from being killed by the seccomp filter
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