Hello community, here is the log from the commit of package xen for openSUSE:Factory checked in at 2014-07-26 11:27:52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/xen (Old) and /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.xen.new (New) ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Package is "xen" Changes: -------- --- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/xen/xen.changes 2014-07-08 16:59:04.000000000 +0200 +++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.xen.new/xen.changes 2014-07-26 11:27:56.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,0 +2,55 @@ +Thu Jul 24 07:54:34 MDT 2014 - carn...@suse.com + +- Upstream patches from Jan + 5347b524-evtchn-eliminate-64k-ports-limitation.patch + 53aac342-x86-HVM-consolidate-and-sanitize-CR4-guest-reserved-bit-determination.patch + 53b16cd4-VT-d-ATS-correct-and-clean-up-dev_invalidate_iotlb.patch + 53b56de1-properly-reference-count-DOMCTL_-un-pausedomain-hypercalls.patch + 53cfdcc7-avoid-crash-when-doing-shutdown-with-active-cpupools.patch + 53cfddaf-x86-mem_event-validate-the-response-vcpu_id-before-acting-on-it.patch + 53cfdde4-x86-mem_event-prevent-underflow-of-vcpu-pause-counts.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Jul 21 03:05:48 UTC 2014 - cy...@suse.com + +- bnc#886801 - xl vncviewer: The first domu can be accessed by any id + 53c9151b-Fix-xl-vncviewer-accesses-port-0-by-any-invalid-domid.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Jul 14 11:14:38 MDT 2014 - carn...@suse.com + +- Upstream pygrub bug fix + 5370e03b-pygrub-fix-error-handling-if-no-valid-partitions-are-found.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Jul 9 16:45:58 MDT 2014 - carn...@suse.com + +- Fix pygrub to handle old 32 bit VMs + pygrub-boot-legacy-sles.patch (Mike Latimer) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Jul 7 17:54:58 MDT 2014 - jfeh...@suse.com + +- Remove xen-vmresync utility. It is an old Platespin Orchestrate + utility that should have never been included in the Xen package. + Updated xen.spec + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Jul 7 17:01:59 MDT 2014 - jfeh...@suse.com + +- Rework xen-destroy utility included in xen-utils + bnc#885292 and bnc#886063 + Updated xen-utils-0.1.tar.bz2 + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Jul 07 11:40:32 MDT 2014 - carn...@suse.com + +- bnc#886063 - Xen monitor fails (xl list --long output different + from xm list --long output) +- bnc#885292 - VirtualDomain: pid_status does not know how to check + status on SLE12 + Re-enable building xen-utils for sle12 and include xen-list and + xen-destroy in the xen-tools package for HA. + xen.spec + +------------------------------------------------------------------- New: ---- 5347b524-evtchn-eliminate-64k-ports-limitation.patch 5370e03b-pygrub-fix-error-handling-if-no-valid-partitions-are-found.patch 53aac342-x86-HVM-consolidate-and-sanitize-CR4-guest-reserved-bit-determination.patch 53b16cd4-VT-d-ATS-correct-and-clean-up-dev_invalidate_iotlb.patch 53b56de1-properly-reference-count-DOMCTL_-un-pausedomain-hypercalls.patch 53c9151b-Fix-xl-vncviewer-accesses-port-0-by-any-invalid-domid.patch 53cfdcc7-avoid-crash-when-doing-shutdown-with-active-cpupools.patch 53cfddaf-x86-mem_event-validate-the-response-vcpu_id-before-acting-on-it.patch 53cfdde4-x86-mem_event-prevent-underflow-of-vcpu-pause-counts.patch ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Other differences: ------------------ ++++++ xen.spec ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_old 2014-07-26 11:27:59.000000000 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_new 2014-07-26 11:27:59.000000000 +0200 @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ # Please submit bugfixes or comments via http://bugs.opensuse.org/ # - # needssslcertforbuild Name: xen @@ -154,7 +153,7 @@ %endif %endif -Version: 4.4.0_24 +Version: 4.4.0_26 Release: 0 PreReq: %insserv_prereq %fillup_prereq Summary: Xen Virtualization: Hypervisor (aka VMM aka Microkernel) @@ -239,42 +238,51 @@ Patch24: 533d413b-x86-mm-fix-checks-against-max_mapped_pfn.patch Patch25: 53455585-x86-AMD-feature-masking-is-unavailable-on-Fam11.patch Patch26: 5346a7a0-x86-AMD-support-further-feature-masking-MSRs.patch -Patch27: 534bbd90-x86-nested-HAP-don-t-BUG-on-legitimate-error.patch -Patch28: 534bdf47-x86-HAP-also-flush-TLB-when-altering-a-present-1G-or-intermediate-entry.patch -Patch29: 53563ea4-x86-MSI-drop-workaround-for-insecure-Dom0-kernels.patch -Patch30: 5357baff-x86-add-missing-break-in-dom0_pit_access.patch -Patch31: 535a34eb-VT-d-suppress-UR-signaling-for-server-chipsets.patch -Patch32: 535a3516-VT-d-suppress-UR-signaling-for-desktop-chipsets.patch -Patch33: 535a354b-passthrough-allow-to-suppress-SERR-and-PERR-signaling.patch -Patch34: 535e31bc-x86-HVM-correct-the-SMEP-logic-for-HVM_CR0_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS.patch -Patch35: 535fa503-x86-HVM-restrict-HVMOP_set_mem_type.patch -Patch36: 53636978-hvm_set_ioreq_page-releases-wrong-page-in-error-path.patch -Patch37: 53636ebf-x86-fix-guest-CPUID-handling.patch -Patch38: 53709b77-Nested-VMX-load-current_vmcs-only-when-it-exists.patch -Patch39: 53732f4f-x86-MCE-bypass-uninitialized-vcpu-in-vMCE-injection.patch -Patch40: 537b5e50-VT-d-apply-quirks-at-device-setup-time-rather-than-only-at-boot.patch -Patch41: 537b5e79-VT-d-extend-error-report-masking-workaround-to-newer-chipsets.patch -Patch42: 537b5ede-move-domain-to-cpupool0-before-destroying-it.patch -Patch43: 537cd0b0-hvmloader-also-cover-PCI-MMIO-ranges-above-4G-with-UC-MTRR-ranges.patch -Patch44: 537cd0cc-hvmloader-PA-range-0xfc000000-0xffffffff-should-be-UC.patch -Patch45: 5383167d-ACPI-ERST-fix-table-mapping.patch -Patch46: 5383175e-VT-d-fix-mask-applied-to-DMIBAR-in-desktop-chipset-XSA-59-workaround.patch -Patch47: 53859549-AMD-IOMMU-don-t-free-page-table-prematurely.patch -Patch48: 5385956b-x86-don-t-use-VA-for-cache-flush-when-also-flushing-TLB.patch -Patch49: 53859956-timers-set-the-deadline-more-accurately.patch -Patch50: 538c338f-x86-amd_ucode-flip-revision-numbers-in-printk.patch -Patch51: 538dcada-x86-HVM-eliminate-vulnerabilities-from-hvm_inject_msi.patch -Patch52: 538ee637-ACPI-Prevent-acpi_table_entries-from-falling-into-a-infinite-loop.patch -Patch53: 5390917a-VT-d-honor-APEI-firmware-first-mode-in-XSA-59-workaround-code.patch -Patch54: 53909259-x86-domctl-two-functional-fixes-to-XEN_DOMCTL_-gs-etvcpuextstate.patch -Patch55: 5390927f-x86-fix-reboot-shutdown-with-running-HVM-guests.patch -Patch56: 5396d818-avoid-crash-on-HVM-domain-destroy-with-PCI-passthrough.patch -Patch57: 5396e805-x86-HVM-refine-SMEP-test-in-HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS.patch -Patch58: 539ebe62-x86-EFI-improve-boot-time-diagnostics.patch -Patch59: 539ec004-x86-mce-don-t-spam-the-console-with-CPUx-Temperature-z.patch -Patch60: 53a040c6-page-alloc-scrub-pages-used-by-hypervisor-upon-freeing.patch -Patch61: 53a1990a-IOMMU-prevent-VT-d-device-IOTLB-operations-on-wrong-IOMMU.patch -Patch62: 53a199d7-x86-EFI-allow-FPU-XMM-use-in-runtime-service-functions.patch +Patch27: 5347b524-evtchn-eliminate-64k-ports-limitation.patch +Patch28: 534bbd90-x86-nested-HAP-don-t-BUG-on-legitimate-error.patch +Patch29: 534bdf47-x86-HAP-also-flush-TLB-when-altering-a-present-1G-or-intermediate-entry.patch +Patch30: 53563ea4-x86-MSI-drop-workaround-for-insecure-Dom0-kernels.patch +Patch31: 5357baff-x86-add-missing-break-in-dom0_pit_access.patch +Patch32: 535a34eb-VT-d-suppress-UR-signaling-for-server-chipsets.patch +Patch33: 535a3516-VT-d-suppress-UR-signaling-for-desktop-chipsets.patch +Patch34: 535a354b-passthrough-allow-to-suppress-SERR-and-PERR-signaling.patch +Patch35: 535e31bc-x86-HVM-correct-the-SMEP-logic-for-HVM_CR0_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS.patch +Patch36: 535fa503-x86-HVM-restrict-HVMOP_set_mem_type.patch +Patch37: 53636978-hvm_set_ioreq_page-releases-wrong-page-in-error-path.patch +Patch38: 53636ebf-x86-fix-guest-CPUID-handling.patch +Patch39: 53709b77-Nested-VMX-load-current_vmcs-only-when-it-exists.patch +Patch40: 5370e03b-pygrub-fix-error-handling-if-no-valid-partitions-are-found.patch +Patch41: 53732f4f-x86-MCE-bypass-uninitialized-vcpu-in-vMCE-injection.patch +Patch42: 537b5e50-VT-d-apply-quirks-at-device-setup-time-rather-than-only-at-boot.patch +Patch43: 537b5e79-VT-d-extend-error-report-masking-workaround-to-newer-chipsets.patch +Patch44: 537b5ede-move-domain-to-cpupool0-before-destroying-it.patch +Patch45: 537cd0b0-hvmloader-also-cover-PCI-MMIO-ranges-above-4G-with-UC-MTRR-ranges.patch +Patch46: 537cd0cc-hvmloader-PA-range-0xfc000000-0xffffffff-should-be-UC.patch +Patch47: 5383167d-ACPI-ERST-fix-table-mapping.patch +Patch48: 5383175e-VT-d-fix-mask-applied-to-DMIBAR-in-desktop-chipset-XSA-59-workaround.patch +Patch49: 53859549-AMD-IOMMU-don-t-free-page-table-prematurely.patch +Patch50: 5385956b-x86-don-t-use-VA-for-cache-flush-when-also-flushing-TLB.patch +Patch51: 53859956-timers-set-the-deadline-more-accurately.patch +Patch52: 538c338f-x86-amd_ucode-flip-revision-numbers-in-printk.patch +Patch53: 538dcada-x86-HVM-eliminate-vulnerabilities-from-hvm_inject_msi.patch +Patch54: 538ee637-ACPI-Prevent-acpi_table_entries-from-falling-into-a-infinite-loop.patch +Patch55: 5390917a-VT-d-honor-APEI-firmware-first-mode-in-XSA-59-workaround-code.patch +Patch56: 53909259-x86-domctl-two-functional-fixes-to-XEN_DOMCTL_-gs-etvcpuextstate.patch +Patch57: 5390927f-x86-fix-reboot-shutdown-with-running-HVM-guests.patch +Patch58: 5396d818-avoid-crash-on-HVM-domain-destroy-with-PCI-passthrough.patch +Patch59: 5396e805-x86-HVM-refine-SMEP-test-in-HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS.patch +Patch60: 539ebe62-x86-EFI-improve-boot-time-diagnostics.patch +Patch61: 539ec004-x86-mce-don-t-spam-the-console-with-CPUx-Temperature-z.patch +Patch62: 53a040c6-page-alloc-scrub-pages-used-by-hypervisor-upon-freeing.patch +Patch63: 53a1990a-IOMMU-prevent-VT-d-device-IOTLB-operations-on-wrong-IOMMU.patch +Patch64: 53a199d7-x86-EFI-allow-FPU-XMM-use-in-runtime-service-functions.patch +Patch65: 53aac342-x86-HVM-consolidate-and-sanitize-CR4-guest-reserved-bit-determination.patch +Patch66: 53b16cd4-VT-d-ATS-correct-and-clean-up-dev_invalidate_iotlb.patch +Patch67: 53b56de1-properly-reference-count-DOMCTL_-un-pausedomain-hypercalls.patch +Patch68: 53c9151b-Fix-xl-vncviewer-accesses-port-0-by-any-invalid-domid.patch +Patch69: 53cfdcc7-avoid-crash-when-doing-shutdown-with-active-cpupools.patch +Patch70: 53cfddaf-x86-mem_event-validate-the-response-vcpu_id-before-acting-on-it.patch +Patch71: 53cfdde4-x86-mem_event-prevent-underflow-of-vcpu-pause-counts.patch # Upstream qemu Patch250: VNC-Support-for-ExtendedKeyEvent-client-message.patch Patch251: 0001-net-move-the-tap-buffer-into-TAPState.patch @@ -702,6 +710,15 @@ %patch60 -p1 %patch61 -p1 %patch62 -p1 +%patch63 -p1 +%patch64 -p1 +%patch65 -p1 +%patch66 -p1 +%patch67 -p1 +%patch68 -p1 +%patch69 -p1 +%patch70 -p1 +%patch71 -p1 # Upstream qemu patches %patch250 -p1 %patch251 -p1 @@ -889,9 +906,7 @@ %endif make -C tools/include/xen-foreign %{?_smp_mflags} make tools docs %{?_smp_mflags} -%if %{?with_xend}0 make -C tools/xen-utils-0.1 XEN_INTREE_BUILD=yes XEN_ROOT=$PWD -%endif %else make -C tools/include/xen-foreign %{?_smp_mflags} make tools docs %{?_smp_mflags} @@ -1041,7 +1056,6 @@ install -m755 %SOURCE51 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xen/scripts/ mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_fwdefdir} install -m 644 %{S:26} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_fwdefdir}/xend-relocation-server -make -C tools/xen-utils-0.1 install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT XEN_INTREE_BUILD=yes XEN_ROOT=$PWD install -m755 %SOURCE53 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/lib/xen/boot/ mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xen/xmexample* $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xen/examples install -m644 %SOURCE54 %SOURCE55 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xen/examples/ @@ -1051,6 +1065,7 @@ install -m 644 %{SOURCE56} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/xend.service %endif %endif +make -C tools/xen-utils-0.1 install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT XEN_INTREE_BUILD=yes XEN_ROOT=$PWD install -m755 %SOURCE37 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xen2libvirt # Example config @@ -1142,9 +1157,6 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xend rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xen-bugtool rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xen-python-path -rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xen-list -rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xen-destroy -rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/xen-vmresync rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/blktapctrl rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xen/scripts/xend-relocation.sh rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xen/scripts/domain-lock* @@ -1155,7 +1167,6 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/man/man1/xm* rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/man/man5/xmdomain.cfg* rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/man/man5/xend-config.sxp* -rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/man/man1/xen-list.1.gz %endif # Create symlinks for keymaps @@ -1266,6 +1277,8 @@ /usr/sbin/xen-lowmemd /usr/sbin/kdd %endif +/usr/sbin/xen-list +/usr/sbin/xen-destroy %dir %attr(700,root,root) /etc/xen %dir /etc/xen/scripts %if %{?with_qemu_traditional}0 @@ -1362,6 +1375,7 @@ %{_mandir}/man5/xl.conf.5.gz %{_mandir}/man5/xlcpupool.cfg.5.gz %{_mandir}/man8/*.8.gz +%{_mandir}/man1/xen-list.1.gz %if %{?with_xend}0 %if %{?with_xend_tools_pkg}0 @@ -1374,9 +1388,6 @@ /usr/sbin/xend /usr/sbin/xen-bugtool /usr/sbin/xen-python-path -/usr/sbin/xen-list -/usr/sbin/xen-destroy -/usr/sbin/xen-vmresync /usr/sbin/blktapctrl %dir /var/lib/xen/xend-db %dir /var/lib/xen/xend-db/domain @@ -1410,7 +1421,6 @@ %{_mandir}/man1/xm.1.gz %{_mandir}/man5/xmdomain.cfg.5.gz %{_mandir}/man5/xend-config.sxp.5.gz -%{_mandir}/man1/xen-list.1.gz %endif # with_dom0_support %endif ++++++ 5347b524-evtchn-eliminate-64k-ports-limitation.patch ++++++ # Commit 8f7f6ab879a9ad9d2bf66b8c6b46a0653086b79f # Date 2014-04-11 11:25:56 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> # Committer Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> evtchn: eliminate 64k ports limitation The introduction of FIFO event channels claimed to support over 100k ports, but failed to widen a number of 16-bit variables/operations. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vra...@citrix.com> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <k...@xen.org> --- a/xen/common/event_channel.c +++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c @@ -275,12 +275,12 @@ static long evtchn_bind_interdomain(evtc goto out; lchn->u.interdomain.remote_dom = rd; - lchn->u.interdomain.remote_port = (u16)rport; + lchn->u.interdomain.remote_port = rport; lchn->state = ECS_INTERDOMAIN; evtchn_port_init(ld, lchn); rchn->u.interdomain.remote_dom = ld; - rchn->u.interdomain.remote_port = (u16)lport; + rchn->u.interdomain.remote_port = lport; rchn->state = ECS_INTERDOMAIN; /* --- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h @@ -86,13 +86,13 @@ struct evtchn domid_t remote_domid; } unbound; /* state == ECS_UNBOUND */ struct { - u16 remote_port; + evtchn_port_t remote_port; struct domain *remote_dom; } interdomain; /* state == ECS_INTERDOMAIN */ struct { - u16 irq; - u16 next_port; - u16 prev_port; + u32 irq; + evtchn_port_t next_port; + evtchn_port_t prev_port; } pirq; /* state == ECS_PIRQ */ u16 virq; /* state == ECS_VIRQ */ } u; @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ struct vcpu atomic_t pause_count; /* IRQ-safe virq_lock protects against delivering VIRQ to stale evtchn. */ - u16 virq_to_evtchn[NR_VIRQS]; + evtchn_port_t virq_to_evtchn[NR_VIRQS]; spinlock_t virq_lock; /* Bitmask of CPUs on which this VCPU may run. */ ++++++ 5370e03b-pygrub-fix-error-handling-if-no-valid-partitions-are-found.patch ++++++ Subject: tools/pygrub: Fix error handling if no valid partitions are found From: Andrew Cooper andrew.coop...@citrix.com Sat May 10 02:18:33 2014 +0100 Date: Mon May 12 15:52:43 2014 +0100: Git: d75215805ce6ed20b3807955fab6a7f7a3368bee If no partitions at all are found, pygrub never creates the name 'fs', resulting in a NameError indicating the lack of fs, rather than a RuntimeError explaining that no partitions were found. Set fs to None right at the start, and use the pythonic idiom "if fs is None:" to protect against otherwise valid values for fs which compare equal to 0/False. Reported-by: Sven Köhler <sven.koeh...@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campb...@citrix.com> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jack...@eu.citrix.com> Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub =================================================================== --- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub +++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub @@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__": usage() sys.exit(1) file = args[0] - + fs = None output = None entry = None interactive = True @@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__": sys.exit(0) # Did looping through partitions find us a kernel? - if not fs: + if fs is None: raise RuntimeError, "Unable to find partition containing kernel" bootcfg["kernel"] = copy_from_image(fs, chosencfg["kernel"], "kernel", ++++++ 53aac342-x86-HVM-consolidate-and-sanitize-CR4-guest-reserved-bit-determination.patch ++++++ # Commit dab11417da4e21f43625f4ebbb68158f07003d04 # Date 2014-06-25 14:40:34 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> # Committer Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> x86/HVM: consolidate and sanitize CR4 guest reserved bit determination First of all, this is needed by just a single source file, so it gets moved there instead of getting fed to the compiler for most other source files too. With that it becomes sensible for this to no longer be a macro, allowing elimination of the mostly redundant helpers hvm_vcpu_has_{smep,smap}(). And finally, following the model SMEP and SMAP already used, tie the determination of reserved bits to the features the guest is shown rather than the host's. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -828,6 +828,73 @@ static bool_t hvm_efer_valid(struct doma ((value & (EFER_LME|EFER_LMA)) == EFER_LMA)); } +/* These reserved bits in lower 32 remain 0 after any load of CR0 */ +#define HVM_CR0_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS \ + (~((unsigned long) \ + (X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_MP | X86_CR0_EM | \ + X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_ET | X86_CR0_NE | \ + X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_AM | X86_CR0_NW | \ + X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_PG))) + +/* These bits in CR4 cannot be set by the guest. */ +static unsigned long hvm_cr4_guest_reserved_bits(const struct vcpu *v, + bool_t restore) +{ + unsigned int leaf1_ecx = 0, leaf1_edx = 0; + unsigned int leaf7_0_ebx = 0, leaf7_0_ecx = 0; + + if ( likely(!restore) ) + { + unsigned int level; + + ASSERT(v == current); + hvm_cpuid(0, &level, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if ( level >= 1 ) + hvm_cpuid(1, NULL, NULL, &leaf1_ecx, &leaf1_edx); + if ( level >= 7 ) + hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &leaf7_0_ebx, &leaf7_0_ecx, NULL); + } + else + { + leaf1_edx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_VME / 32]; + leaf1_ecx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_PCID / 32]; + leaf7_0_ebx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE / 32]; + } + + return ~(unsigned long) + ((leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VME) ? + X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PVI : 0) | + (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_TSC) ? + X86_CR4_TSD : 0) | + (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_DE) ? + X86_CR4_DE : 0) | + (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PSE) ? + X86_CR4_PSE : 0) | + (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PAE) ? + X86_CR4_PAE : 0) | + (leaf1_edx & (cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MCE) | + cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MCA)) ? + X86_CR4_MCE : 0) | + (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PGE) ? + X86_CR4_PGE : 0) | + X86_CR4_PCE | + (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FXSR) ? + X86_CR4_OSFXSR : 0) | + (leaf1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XMM) ? + X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT : 0) | + ((restore || nestedhvm_enabled(v->domain)) && + (leaf1_ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VMXE)) ? + X86_CR4_VMXE : 0) | + (leaf7_0_ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE) ? + X86_CR4_FSGSBASE : 0) | + (leaf1_ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PCID) ? + X86_CR4_PCIDE : 0) | + (leaf1_ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) ? + X86_CR4_OSXSAVE : 0) | + (leaf7_0_ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP) ? + X86_CR4_SMEP : 0)); +} + static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h) { int vcpuid; @@ -858,7 +925,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct doma return -EINVAL; } - if ( ctxt.cr4 & HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(v, 1) ) + if ( ctxt.cr4 & hvm_cr4_guest_reserved_bits(v, 1) ) { printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "HVM%d restore: bad CR4 %#" PRIx64 "\n", d->domain_id, ctxt.cr4); @@ -1977,7 +2044,7 @@ int hvm_set_cr4(unsigned long value) struct vcpu *v = current; unsigned long old_cr; - if ( value & HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(v, 0) ) + if ( value & hvm_cr4_guest_reserved_bits(v, 0) ) { HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_1, "Guest attempts to set reserved bit in CR4: %lx", --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h @@ -347,51 +347,10 @@ static inline int hvm_event_pending(stru return hvm_funcs.event_pending(v); } -static inline bool_t hvm_vcpu_has_smep(void) -{ - unsigned int eax, ebx; - - hvm_cpuid(0, &eax, NULL, NULL, NULL); - - if ( eax < 7 ) - return 0; - - hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, NULL, NULL); - return !!(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)); -} - -/* These reserved bits in lower 32 remain 0 after any load of CR0 */ -#define HVM_CR0_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS \ - (~((unsigned long) \ - (X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_MP | X86_CR0_EM | \ - X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_ET | X86_CR0_NE | \ - X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_AM | X86_CR0_NW | \ - X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_PG))) - /* These bits in CR4 are owned by the host. */ #define HVM_CR4_HOST_MASK (mmu_cr4_features & \ (X86_CR4_VMXE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_MCE)) -/* These bits in CR4 cannot be set by the guest. */ -#define HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(v, restore) ({ \ - const struct vcpu *_v = (v); \ - bool_t _restore = !!(restore); \ - ASSERT((_restore) || _v == current); \ - (~((unsigned long) \ - (X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PVI | X86_CR4_TSD | \ - X86_CR4_DE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE | \ - X86_CR4_MCE | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE | \ - X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | \ - (((_restore) ? cpu_has_smep : \ - hvm_vcpu_has_smep()) ? \ - X86_CR4_SMEP : 0) | \ - (cpu_has_fsgsbase ? X86_CR4_FSGSBASE : 0) | \ - ((nestedhvm_enabled(_v->domain) && cpu_has_vmx) \ - ? X86_CR4_VMXE : 0) | \ - (cpu_has_pcid ? X86_CR4_PCIDE : 0) | \ - (cpu_has_xsave ? X86_CR4_OSXSAVE : 0)))); \ -}) - /* These exceptions must always be intercepted. */ #define HVM_TRAP_MASK ((1U << TRAP_machine_check) | (1U << TRAP_invalid_op)) ++++++ 53b16cd4-VT-d-ATS-correct-and-clean-up-dev_invalidate_iotlb.patch ++++++ # Commit fd33987ba27607c3cc7da258cf1d86d21beeb735 # Date 2014-06-30 15:57:40 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> # Committer Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> VT-d/ATS: correct and clean up dev_invalidate_iotlb() While this was intended to only do cleanup (replace the two bogus "ret |= " constructs, and a simple formatting correction), this now also - fixes the bit manipulations for size_order > 0 a) correct an off-by-one in the use of size_order for shifting (till now double the requested size got invalidated) b) in fact setting bit 12 and up if necessary (without which too small a region might have got invalidated) c) making them capable of dealing with regions of 4Gb size and up - corrects the return value handling, such that a later iteration's success won't clear an earlier iteration's error indication - uses PCI_BDF2() instead of open coding it - bail immediately on bad passed in invalidation type, rather than repeatedly printing the same message for each ATS-capable device, at once also no longer hiding that failure from the caller Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> Acked-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zh...@intel.com> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/ats.c @@ -110,21 +110,23 @@ int dev_invalidate_iotlb(struct iommu *i u64 addr, unsigned int size_order, u64 type) { struct pci_ats_dev *pdev; - int sbit, ret = 0; - u16 sid; + int ret = 0; if ( !ecap_dev_iotlb(iommu->ecap) ) return ret; list_for_each_entry( pdev, &ats_devices, list ) { - sid = (pdev->bus << 8) | pdev->devfn; + u16 sid = PCI_BDF2(pdev->bus, pdev->devfn); + bool_t sbit; + int rc = 0; /* Only invalidate devices that belong to this IOMMU */ if ( pdev->iommu != iommu ) continue; - switch ( type ) { + switch ( type ) + { case DMA_TLB_DSI_FLUSH: if ( !device_in_domain(iommu, pdev, did) ) break; @@ -133,32 +135,37 @@ int dev_invalidate_iotlb(struct iommu *i /* invalidate all translations: sbit=1,bit_63=0,bit[62:12]=1 */ sbit = 1; addr = (~0 << PAGE_SHIFT_4K) & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF; - ret |= qinval_device_iotlb(iommu, pdev->ats_queue_depth, - sid, sbit, addr); + rc = qinval_device_iotlb(iommu, pdev->ats_queue_depth, + sid, sbit, addr); break; case DMA_TLB_PSI_FLUSH: if ( !device_in_domain(iommu, pdev, did) ) break; - addr &= ~0 << (PAGE_SHIFT + size_order); - /* if size <= 4K, set sbit = 0, else set sbit = 1 */ sbit = size_order ? 1 : 0; /* clear lower bits */ - addr &= (~0 << (PAGE_SHIFT + size_order)); + addr &= ~0 << PAGE_SHIFT_4K; /* if sbit == 1, zero out size_order bit and set lower bits to 1 */ if ( sbit ) - addr &= (~0 & ~(1 << (PAGE_SHIFT + size_order))); + { + addr &= ~((u64)PAGE_SIZE_4K << (size_order - 1)); + addr |= (((u64)1 << (size_order - 1)) - 1) << PAGE_SHIFT_4K; + } - ret |= qinval_device_iotlb(iommu, pdev->ats_queue_depth, - sid, sbit, addr); + rc = qinval_device_iotlb(iommu, pdev->ats_queue_depth, + sid, sbit, addr); break; default: dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX, "invalid vt-d flush type\n"); - break; + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } + + if ( !ret ) + ret = rc; } + return ret; } ++++++ 53b56de1-properly-reference-count-DOMCTL_-un-pausedomain-hypercalls.patch ++++++ # Commit 3eb1c708ab0fe1067a436498a684907afa14dacf # Date 2014-07-03 16:51:13 +0200 # Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> # Committer Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> properly reference count DOMCTL_{,un}pausedomain hypercalls For safety reasons, c/s 6ae2df93c27 "mem_access: Add helper API to setup ring and enable mem_access" has to pause the domain while it performs a set of operations. However without properly reference counted hypercalls, xc_mem_event_enable() now unconditionally unpauses a previously paused domain. To prevent toolstack software running wild, there is an arbitrary limit of 255 on the toolstack pause count. This is high enough for several components of the toolstack to safely use, but prevents over/underflow of d->pause_count. The previous domain_{,un}pause_by_systemcontroller() functions are updated to return an error code. domain_pause_by_systemcontroller() is modified to have a common stub and take a pause_fn pointer, allowing for both sync and nosync domain pauses. domain_pause_for_debugger() has a hand-rolled nosync pause replaced with the new domain_pause_by_systemcontroller_nosync(), and has its variables shuffled slightly to avoid rereading current multiple times. Suggested-by: Don Slutz <dsl...@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> With a couple of formatting adjustments: Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c @@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl( struct vcpu *v; ret = -EBUSY; - if ( !d->is_paused_by_controller ) + if ( !d->controller_pause_count ) break; ret = -EINVAL; if ( domctl->u.gdbsx_pauseunp_vcpu.vcpu >= MAX_VIRT_CPUS || @@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl( struct vcpu *v; ret = -EBUSY; - if ( !d->is_paused_by_controller ) + if ( !d->controller_pause_count ) break; ret = -EINVAL; if ( domctl->u.gdbsx_pauseunp_vcpu.vcpu >= MAX_VIRT_CPUS || @@ -1053,7 +1053,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl( struct vcpu *v; domctl->u.gdbsx_domstatus.vcpu_id = -1; - domctl->u.gdbsx_domstatus.paused = d->is_paused_by_controller; + domctl->u.gdbsx_domstatus.paused = d->controller_pause_count > 0; if ( domctl->u.gdbsx_domstatus.paused ) { for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) --- a/xen/common/domain.c +++ b/xen/common/domain.c @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ struct domain *domain_create( if ( (err = xsm_domain_create(XSM_HOOK, d, ssidref)) != 0 ) goto fail; - d->is_paused_by_controller = 1; + d->controller_pause_count = 1; atomic_inc(&d->pause_count); if ( domid ) @@ -680,18 +680,13 @@ void vcpu_end_shutdown_deferral(struct v #ifdef HAS_GDBSX void domain_pause_for_debugger(void) { - struct domain *d = current->domain; - struct vcpu *v; - - atomic_inc(&d->pause_count); - if ( test_and_set_bool(d->is_paused_by_controller) ) - domain_unpause(d); /* race-free atomic_dec(&d->pause_count) */ + struct vcpu *curr = current; + struct domain *d = curr->domain; - for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) - vcpu_sleep_nosync(v); + domain_pause_by_systemcontroller_nosync(d); /* if gdbsx active, we just need to pause the domain */ - if (current->arch.gdbsx_vcpu_event == 0) + if ( curr->arch.gdbsx_vcpu_event == 0 ) send_global_virq(VIRQ_DEBUGGER); } #endif @@ -839,17 +834,49 @@ void domain_unpause(struct domain *d) vcpu_wake(v); } -void domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d) +int __domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d, + void (*pause_fn)(struct domain *d)) { - domain_pause(d); - if ( test_and_set_bool(d->is_paused_by_controller) ) - domain_unpause(d); + int old, new, prev = d->controller_pause_count; + + do + { + old = prev; + new = old + 1; + + /* + * Limit the toolstack pause count to an arbitrary 255 to prevent the + * toolstack overflowing d->pause_count with many repeated hypercalls. + */ + if ( new > 255 ) + return -EUSERS; + + prev = cmpxchg(&d->controller_pause_count, old, new); + } while ( prev != old ); + + pause_fn(d); + + return 0; } -void domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d) +int domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d) { - if ( test_and_clear_bool(d->is_paused_by_controller) ) - domain_unpause(d); + int old, new, prev = d->controller_pause_count; + + do + { + old = prev; + new = old - 1; + + if ( new < 0 ) + return -EINVAL; + + prev = cmpxchg(&d->controller_pause_count, old, new); + } while ( prev != old ); + + domain_unpause(d); + + return 0; } int vcpu_reset(struct vcpu *v) --- a/xen/common/domctl.c +++ b/xen/common/domctl.c @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ void getdomaininfo(struct domain *d, str info->flags = (info->nr_online_vcpus ? flags : 0) | ((d->is_dying == DOMDYING_dead) ? XEN_DOMINF_dying : 0) | (d->is_shut_down ? XEN_DOMINF_shutdown : 0) | - (d->is_paused_by_controller ? XEN_DOMINF_paused : 0) | + (d->controller_pause_count > 0 ? XEN_DOMINF_paused : 0) | (d->debugger_attached ? XEN_DOMINF_debugged : 0) | d->shutdown_code << XEN_DOMINF_shutdownshift; @@ -384,22 +384,14 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe break; case XEN_DOMCTL_pausedomain: - { ret = -EINVAL; if ( d != current->domain ) - { - domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(d); - ret = 0; - } - } - break; + ret = domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(d); + break; case XEN_DOMCTL_unpausedomain: - { - domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(d); - ret = 0; - } - break; + ret = domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(d); + break; case XEN_DOMCTL_resumedomain: { --- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ struct domain /* Is this guest dying (i.e., a zombie)? */ enum { DOMDYING_alive, DOMDYING_dying, DOMDYING_dead } is_dying; /* Domain is paused by controller software? */ - bool_t is_paused_by_controller; + int controller_pause_count; /* Domain's VCPUs are pinned 1:1 to physical CPUs? */ bool_t is_pinned; @@ -742,8 +742,17 @@ void domain_pause(struct domain *d); void domain_pause_nosync(struct domain *d); void vcpu_unpause(struct vcpu *v); void domain_unpause(struct domain *d); -void domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d); -void domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d); +int domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d); +int __domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d, + void (*pause_fn)(struct domain *d)); +static inline int domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(struct domain *d) +{ + return __domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(d, domain_pause); +} +static inline int domain_pause_by_systemcontroller_nosync(struct domain *d) +{ + return __domain_pause_by_systemcontroller(d, domain_pause_nosync); +} void cpu_init(void); struct scheduler; ++++++ 53c9151b-Fix-xl-vncviewer-accesses-port-0-by-any-invalid-domid.patch ++++++ Subject: xl: 'xl vncviewer' accesses port 0 by any invalid domid From: Chunyan Liu cy...@suse.com Fri Jul 18 14:18:04 2014 +0800 Date: Fri Jul 18 13:37:47 2014 +0100: Git: 2a8cc1a55329ead252ed323ec4bbee534d5c0f23 Currently, with command: xl vncviewer invalid_domid it always brings user to the domU using vncport 5900. The invalid domid could be an non-existing one or Dom0. It's better to report error in this case. Correct libxl_vncviewer_exec: In existing code, when vncport is NULL, it still continues and will show vncport 5900. So, with 'xl vncviewer 0' it also wrongly shows domU using vncport 5900. Correct it to report error if vncport is NULL. Signed-off-by: Chunyan Liu <cy...@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campb...@citrix.com> Index: xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c +++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c @@ -1635,8 +1635,12 @@ int libxl_vncviewer_exec(libxl_ctx *ctx, vnc_port = libxl__xs_read(gc, XBT_NULL, libxl__sprintf(gc, "/local/domain/%d/console/vnc-port", domid)); - if ( vnc_port ) - port = atoi(vnc_port) - 5900; + if (!vnc_port) { + LOG(ERROR, "Cannot get vnc-port of domain %d", domid); + goto x_fail; + } + + port = atoi(vnc_port) - 5900; vnc_listen = libxl__xs_read(gc, XBT_NULL, libxl__sprintf(gc, ++++++ 53cfdcc7-avoid-crash-when-doing-shutdown-with-active-cpupools.patch ++++++ # Commit 05377dede434c746e6708f055858378d20f619db # Date 2014-07-23 18:03:19 +0200 # Author Juergen Gross <jgr...@suse.com> # Committer Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> avoid crash when doing shutdown with active cpupools When shutting down the machine while there are cpus in a cpupool other than Pool-0 a crash is triggered due to cpupool handling rejecting offlining the non-boot cpus in other cpupools. It is easy to detect this case and allow offlining those cpus. Reported-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.ba...@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgr...@suse.com> Tested-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.ba...@canonical.com> --- a/xen/common/cpupool.c +++ b/xen/common/cpupool.c @@ -471,12 +471,24 @@ static void cpupool_cpu_add(unsigned int */ static int cpupool_cpu_remove(unsigned int cpu) { - int ret = 0; + int ret = -EBUSY; + struct cpupool **c; spin_lock(&cpupool_lock); - if ( !cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpupool0->cpu_valid)) - ret = -EBUSY; + if ( cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpupool0->cpu_valid) ) + ret = 0; else + { + for_each_cpupool(c) + { + if ( cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, (*c)->cpu_suspended ) ) + { + ret = 0; + break; + } + } + } + if ( !ret ) cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &cpupool_locked_cpus); spin_unlock(&cpupool_lock); ++++++ 53cfddaf-x86-mem_event-validate-the-response-vcpu_id-before-acting-on-it.patch ++++++ # Commit ee75480b3c8856db9ef1aa45418f35ec0d78989d # Date 2014-07-23 18:07:11 +0200 # Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> # Committer Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> x86/mem_event: validate the response vcpu_id before acting on it Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <t...@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <and...@lagarcavilla.org> Tested-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojoc...@bitdefender.com> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c @@ -596,11 +596,20 @@ int mem_sharing_sharing_resume(struct do /* Get all requests off the ring */ while ( mem_event_get_response(d, &d->mem_event->share, &rsp) ) { + struct vcpu *v; + if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_DUMMY ) continue; + + /* Validate the vcpu_id in the response. */ + if ( (rsp.vcpu_id >= d->max_vcpus) || !d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id] ) + continue; + + v = d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id]; + /* Unpause domain/vcpu */ if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED ) - vcpu_unpause(d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id]); + vcpu_unpause(v); } return 0; --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c @@ -1228,8 +1228,17 @@ void p2m_mem_paging_resume(struct domain /* Pull all responses off the ring */ while( mem_event_get_response(d, &d->mem_event->paging, &rsp) ) { + struct vcpu *v; + if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_DUMMY ) continue; + + /* Validate the vcpu_id in the response. */ + if ( (rsp.vcpu_id >= d->max_vcpus) || !d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id] ) + continue; + + v = d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id]; + /* Fix p2m entry if the page was not dropped */ if ( !(rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_DROP_PAGE) ) { @@ -1248,7 +1257,7 @@ void p2m_mem_paging_resume(struct domain } /* Unpause domain */ if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED ) - vcpu_unpause(d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id]); + vcpu_unpause(v); } } @@ -1356,11 +1365,20 @@ void p2m_mem_access_resume(struct domain /* Pull all responses off the ring */ while( mem_event_get_response(d, &d->mem_event->access, &rsp) ) { + struct vcpu *v; + if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_DUMMY ) continue; + + /* Validate the vcpu_id in the response. */ + if ( (rsp.vcpu_id >= d->max_vcpus) || !d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id] ) + continue; + + v = d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id]; + /* Unpause domain */ if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED ) - vcpu_unpause(d->vcpu[rsp.vcpu_id]); + vcpu_unpause(v); } } ++++++ 53cfdde4-x86-mem_event-prevent-underflow-of-vcpu-pause-counts.patch ++++++ # Commit 868d9b99b39c53dc1f6ae9bfd7b148c206fd7240 # Date 2014-07-23 18:08:04 +0200 # Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> # Committer Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> x86/mem_event: prevent underflow of vcpu pause counts Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> Tested-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojoc...@bitdefender.com> Reviewed-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <and...@lagarcavilla.org> Tested-by: Aravindh Puthiyaparambil <aravi...@cisco.com> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -4762,7 +4762,7 @@ static int hvm_memory_event_traps(long p if ( (p & HVMPME_MODE_MASK) == HVMPME_mode_sync ) { req.flags |= MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED; - vcpu_pause_nosync(v); + mem_event_vcpu_pause(v); } req.gfn = value; --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_event.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_event.c @@ -655,6 +655,38 @@ int mem_event_domctl(struct domain *d, x return rc; } +void mem_event_vcpu_pause(struct vcpu *v) +{ + ASSERT(v == current); + + atomic_inc(&v->mem_event_pause_count); + vcpu_pause_nosync(v); +} + +void mem_event_vcpu_unpause(struct vcpu *v) +{ + int old, new, prev = v->mem_event_pause_count.counter; + + /* All unpause requests as a result of toolstack responses. Prevent + * underflow of the vcpu pause count. */ + do + { + old = prev; + new = old - 1; + + if ( new < 0 ) + { + printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING + "d%d:v%d mem_event: Too many unpause attempts\n", + v->domain->domain_id, v->vcpu_id); + return; + } + + prev = cmpxchg(&v->mem_event_pause_count.counter, old, new); + } while ( prev != old ); + + vcpu_unpause(v); +} /* * Local variables: --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c @@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ int mem_sharing_notify_enomem(struct dom if ( v->domain == d ) { req.flags = MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED; - vcpu_pause_nosync(v); + mem_event_vcpu_pause(v); } req.p2mt = p2m_ram_shared; @@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ int mem_sharing_sharing_resume(struct do /* Unpause domain/vcpu */ if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED ) - vcpu_unpause(v); + mem_event_vcpu_unpause(v); } return 0; --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c @@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ void p2m_mem_paging_populate(struct doma /* Pause domain if request came from guest and gfn has paging type */ if ( p2m_is_paging(p2mt) && v->domain == d ) { - vcpu_pause_nosync(v); + mem_event_vcpu_pause(v); req.flags |= MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED; } /* No need to inform pager if the gfn is not in the page-out path */ @@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ void p2m_mem_paging_resume(struct domain } /* Unpause domain */ if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED ) - vcpu_unpause(v); + mem_event_vcpu_unpause(v); } } @@ -1352,7 +1352,7 @@ bool_t p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, /* Pause the current VCPU */ if ( p2ma != p2m_access_n2rwx ) - vcpu_pause_nosync(v); + mem_event_vcpu_pause(v); /* VCPU may be paused, return whether we promoted automatically */ return (p2ma == p2m_access_n2rwx); @@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ void p2m_mem_access_resume(struct domain /* Unpause domain */ if ( rsp.flags & MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED ) - vcpu_unpause(v); + mem_event_vcpu_unpause(v); } } --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mem_event.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mem_event.h @@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ int do_mem_event_op(int op, uint32_t dom int mem_event_domctl(struct domain *d, xen_domctl_mem_event_op_t *mec, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) u_domctl); +void mem_event_vcpu_pause(struct vcpu *v); +void mem_event_vcpu_unpause(struct vcpu *v); + #endif /* __MEM_EVENT_H__ */ --- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h @@ -189,6 +189,9 @@ struct vcpu unsigned long pause_flags; atomic_t pause_count; + /* VCPU paused for mem_event replies. */ + atomic_t mem_event_pause_count; + /* IRQ-safe virq_lock protects against delivering VIRQ to stale evtchn. */ evtchn_port_t virq_to_evtchn[NR_VIRQS]; spinlock_t virq_lock; ++++++ libxl.add-option-for-discard-support-to-xl-disk-conf.patch ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_old 2014-07-26 11:28:00.000000000 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_new 2014-07-26 11:28:00.000000000 +0200 @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ =================================================================== --- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c +++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c -@@ -2480,6 +2480,8 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc * +@@ -2484,6 +2484,8 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc * flexarray_append(back, disk->readwrite ? "w" : "r"); flexarray_append(back, "device-type"); flexarray_append(back, disk->is_cdrom ? "cdrom" : "disk"); ++++++ libxl.add-option-to-disable-disk-cache-flushes-in-qdisk.patch ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_old 2014-07-26 11:28:00.000000000 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_new 2014-07-26 11:28:00.000000000 +0200 @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ =================================================================== --- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c +++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c -@@ -2484,6 +2484,8 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc * +@@ -2488,6 +2488,8 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc * flexarray_append_pair(back, "direct-io-safe", "1"); if ((disk->readwrite & ~LIBXL_HAVE_LIBXL_DEVICE_DISK_DISCARD_DISABLE_MASK) == LIBXL_HAVE_LIBXL_DEVICE_DISK_DISCARD_DISABLE_MAGIC) flexarray_append_pair(back, "discard-enable", "0"); ++++++ libxl.introduce-an-option-to-disable-the-non-O_DIRECT-workaround.patch ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_old 2014-07-26 11:28:00.000000000 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_new 2014-07-26 11:28:00.000000000 +0200 @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ =================================================================== --- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c +++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c -@@ -2480,6 +2480,8 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc * +@@ -2484,6 +2484,8 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc * flexarray_append(back, disk->readwrite ? "w" : "r"); flexarray_append(back, "device-type"); flexarray_append(back, disk->is_cdrom ? "cdrom" : "disk"); ++++++ libxl.pvscsi.patch ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_old 2014-07-26 11:28:00.000000000 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_new 2014-07-26 11:28:00.000000000 +0200 @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ =================================================================== --- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c +++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c -@@ -2017,6 +2017,273 @@ int libxl_devid_to_device_vtpm(libxl_ctx +@@ -2021,6 +2021,273 @@ int libxl_devid_to_device_vtpm(libxl_ctx return rc; } @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ /******************************************************************************/ -@@ -3485,6 +3752,8 @@ out: +@@ -3489,6 +3756,8 @@ out: * libxl_device_vkb_destroy * libxl_device_vfb_remove * libxl_device_vfb_destroy @@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ */ #define DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(type, removedestroy, f) \ int libxl_device_##type##_##removedestroy(libxl_ctx *ctx, \ -@@ -3536,6 +3805,10 @@ DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(vfb, destroy, 1) +@@ -3540,6 +3809,10 @@ DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(vfb, destroy, 1) DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(vtpm, remove, 0) DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(vtpm, destroy, 1) @@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ #undef DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE /******************************************************************************/ -@@ -3545,6 +3818,7 @@ DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(vtpm, destroy, 1) +@@ -3549,6 +3822,7 @@ DEFINE_DEVICE_REMOVE(vtpm, destroy, 1) * libxl_device_disk_add * libxl_device_nic_add * libxl_device_vtpm_add @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ */ #define DEFINE_DEVICE_ADD(type) \ -@@ -3574,6 +3848,9 @@ DEFINE_DEVICE_ADD(nic) +@@ -3578,6 +3852,9 @@ DEFINE_DEVICE_ADD(nic) /* vtpm */ DEFINE_DEVICE_ADD(vtpm) @@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ #undef DEFINE_DEVICE_ADD /******************************************************************************/ -@@ -5678,6 +5955,20 @@ int libxl_fd_set_cloexec(libxl_ctx *ctx, +@@ -5682,6 +5959,20 @@ int libxl_fd_set_cloexec(libxl_ctx *ctx, int libxl_fd_set_nonblock(libxl_ctx *ctx, int fd, int nonblock) { return fd_set_flags(ctx,fd, F_GETFL,F_SETFL,"FL", O_NONBLOCK, nonblock); } ++++++ local_attach_support_for_phy.patch ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_old 2014-07-26 11:28:00.000000000 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_new 2014-07-26 11:28:00.000000000 +0200 @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ =================================================================== --- xen-4.4.0-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c +++ xen-4.4.0-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c -@@ -2630,6 +2630,16 @@ void libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_a +@@ -2634,6 +2634,16 @@ void libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_a switch (disk->backend) { case LIBXL_DISK_BACKEND_PHY: @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_DEBUG, "locally attaching PHY disk %s", disk->pdev_path); dev = disk->pdev_path; -@@ -2709,7 +2719,7 @@ static void local_device_attach_cb(libxl +@@ -2713,7 +2723,7 @@ static void local_device_attach_cb(libxl } dev = GCSPRINTF("/dev/%s", disk->vdev); @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ rc = libxl__device_from_disk(gc, LIBXL_TOOLSTACK_DOMID, disk, &device); if (rc < 0) -@@ -2749,6 +2759,7 @@ void libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_d +@@ -2753,6 +2763,7 @@ void libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_d if (!dls->diskpath) goto out; switch (disk->backend) { @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ case LIBXL_DISK_BACKEND_QDISK: if (disk->vdev != NULL) { GCNEW(device); -@@ -2766,7 +2777,6 @@ void libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_d +@@ -2770,7 +2781,6 @@ void libxl__device_disk_local_initiate_d /* disk->vdev == NULL; fall through */ default: /* ++++++ pygrub-boot-legacy-sles.patch ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_old 2014-07-26 11:28:00.000000000 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.rZuEbq/_new 2014-07-26 11:28:00.000000000 +0200 @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ + # If missing config or grub has no menu entries to select, look for + # vmlinuz-xen and initrd-xen in /boot -+ if g.__dict__.get('cf', None) is None or len(g.cf.images) == 0: ++ if g.__dict__.get('cf', None) is None or len(g.cf.images) == 0 or re.search(r"xen(-pae)?\.gz",g.cf.images[0].kernel[1]): + if not list_entries: + chosencfg = { "kernel": None, "ramdisk": None, "args": "" } + chosencfg = sniff_xen_kernel(fs, incfg) @@ -32,22 +32,27 @@ if list_entries: for i in range(len(g.cf.images)): img = g.cf.images[i] -@@ -693,6 +707,14 @@ def sniff_netware(fs, cfg): +@@ -693,6 +707,19 @@ def sniff_netware(fs, cfg): return cfg +def sniff_xen_kernel(fs, cfg): -+ if not cfg["kernel"] and fs.file_exists('/boot/vmlinuz-xen'): -+ cfg["kernel"] = '/boot/vmlinuz-xen' ++ if not cfg["kernel"]: ++ if fs.file_exists('/boot/vmlinuz-xen'): ++ cfg["kernel"] = '/boot/vmlinuz-xen' ++ elif fs.file_exists('/boot/vmlinuz-xenpae'): ++ cfg["kernel"] = '/boot/vmlinuz-xenpae' + if cfg["kernel"] and not cfg["ramdisk"]: + if fs.file_exists('/boot/initrd-xen'): + cfg["ramdisk"] = '/boot/initrd-xen' ++ elif fs.file_exists('/boot/initrd-xenpae'): ++ cfg["ramdisk"] = '/boot/initrd-xenpae' + return cfg + def format_sxp(kernel, ramdisk, args): s = "linux (kernel %s)" % kernel if ramdisk: -@@ -773,7 +795,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__": +@@ -773,7 +800,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__": debug = False not_really = False output_format = "sxp" ++++++ xen-utils-0.1.tar.bz2 ++++++ diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tools/xen-utils-0.1/Makefile new/tools/xen-utils-0.1/Makefile --- old/tools/xen-utils-0.1/Makefile 2013-06-11 00:21:50.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tools/xen-utils-0.1/Makefile 2014-07-08 01:33:21.000000000 +0200 @@ -19,12 +19,14 @@ CFLAGS += -I $(XEN_XENSTORE) -I $(XEN_XENSTORE)/compat CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenctrl) CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenstore) +CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenlight) LIBS += $(LDFLAGS_libxenctrl) $(LDLIBS_libxenctrl) LIBS += $(LDFLAGS_libxenguest) $(LDLIBS_libxenguest) LIBS += $(LDFLAGS_libxenstore) $(LDLIBS_libxenstore) +LIBS += $(LDFLAGS_libxenlight) $(LDLIBS_libxenlight) else CFLAGS += -Werror -Wall -LIBS += -lxenstore -lxenctrl -lxenguest +LIBS += -lxenstore -lxenctrl -lxenguest -lxenlight endif @@ -32,7 +34,6 @@ SRCS = xen-list.c xen-destroy.c xen-utils.c OBJS = xen-utils.o AUX = Makefile README xen-utils.h -EXECS = xen-vmresync .PHONY: all @@ -54,14 +55,14 @@ .PHONY: install install: build - $(INSTALL_PROG) $(PROGRAMS) $(EXECS) $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR) + $(INSTALL_PROG) $(PROGRAMS) $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR) $(INSTALL_DATA) $(DOC_MAN1) $(DESTDIR)$(MAN1DIR) .PHONY: dist dist: $(SRCS) $(AUX) rm -rf $(NAME)-$(VERSION) mkdir $(NAME)-$(VERSION) - ln $(SRCS) $(AUX) $(EXECS) $(DOC_MAN1) $(NAME)-$(VERSION) + ln $(SRCS) $(AUX) $(DOC_MAN1) $(NAME)-$(VERSION) tar cvfj $(NAME)-$(VERSION).tar.bz2 $(NAME)-$(VERSION) rm -rf $(NAME)-$(VERSION) diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tools/xen-utils-0.1/README new/tools/xen-utils-0.1/README --- old/tools/xen-utils-0.1/README 2011-03-14 21:54:30.000000000 +0100 +++ new/tools/xen-utils-0.1/README 2014-07-08 01:33:21.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,10 +1,8 @@ /usr/sbin/xen-list is a C-based program that uses libxc directly to list running domains. It provides better performance than 'xm list' since -it runs natively and avoids xend locking. +it runs natively and avoids xend locking. xen-list also works with the +Xen's libxenlight toolstack. /usr/sbin/xen-destory is an alternative for 'xm destroy'. It will forcibly -destroy a domain even in cases where 'xm destroy' will not. xen-destroy is -useful for tools such as HAE Xen Agent. - -/usr/sbin/xen-vmresync is a executable python script. It can be used by PSO -to resync VM status. +destroy a domain even in cases where 'xm destroy' will not. xen-destroy +uses libxenlight, and hence works with the libxenlight toolstack as well. diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-destroy.c new/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-destroy.c --- old/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-destroy.c 2013-06-11 00:14:27.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-destroy.c 2014-07-08 01:33:19.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@ /* - * Copyright (C) 2010 Novell, Inc. + * xen-destroy: Destroys a domain using libxl. Domain will be + * destroyed regardless of which libxl application (xl, libvirt, etc.) + * created the domain. + * + * Copyright (C) 2014 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany. * * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public @@ -12,379 +16,91 @@ * Lesser General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public - * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software - * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + * License along with this library. If not, see + * <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. * - * Author: Wei Kong <wk...@novell.com> - * Contributor: Jim Fehlig <jfeh...@novell.com> - * Chunyan Liu <cy...@novell.com> */ -#include <xenctrl.h> -#include <xenstore.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> -#include <errno.h> -#include <unistd.h> -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/wait.h> -#include <signal.h> + +#include <xenstore.h> +#include <libxl.h> #include "xen-utils.h" -#ifdef _DEBUG -#define DEBUG(_f, _a...) \ - printf("Fun:%s," "Line %d:" _f, __FUNCTION__, __LINE__,##_a) -#else -#define DEBUG(_f, _a...) ((void)0) -#endif -//Shutdown a domain by signalling this via xenstored -void shutdown_domain(char *domname) +int main(int argc, char **argv) { - int domid; - char *vm_uuid = NULL; - char vmpath[64]; - struct xs_handle *xsh = NULL; - - domid = atoi(domname); - if (domid == 0) { - perror("Error, dom 0 could not be shutdown\n"); - return; + int ret = -1; + struct xs_handle *xsh; + FILE *log_file; + xentoollog_logger *logger; + libxl_ctx *ctx = NULL; + libxl_dominfo *dominfo = NULL; + int i, num_doms; + + if (argc != 2) { + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: xen-destroy <domain-name>\n"); + exit(1); } xsh = xs_daemon_open(); if (!xsh) { - perror("Couldn't get xsh handle."); - return; + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open xenstore connection\n"); + exit(1); } - //if self._stateGet() in (DOM_STATE_SHUTDOWN, DOM_STATE_HALTED,): - // raise XendError('Domain cannot be shutdown') - - vm_uuid = domid_to_vm_uuid(xsh, domid); - snprintf(vmpath, sizeof(vmpath), "%s/xend/previous_restart_time", vm_uuid); - free(vm_uuid); - - xs_rm(xsh, XBT_NULL, vmpath); - - memset(vmpath, '\0', 64); - snprintf(vmpath, sizeof(vmpath), "/local/domain/%u/control/shutdown", domid); - - xs_write(xsh, XBT_NULL, vmpath, "poweroff", 9); - - //TODO: How about HVM domain - //HVM domain shuts itself down only if it has PV drivers - //if self.info.is_hvm(): - // hvm_pvdrv = xc.hvm_get_param(self.domid, HVM_PARAM_CALLBACK_IRQ) - // if not hvm_pvdrv: - // code = REVERSE_DOMAIN_SHUTDOWN_REASONS[reason] - - free(xsh); - return; -} - -char * device_backend(struct xs_handle *xsh, char *buf, int domid) -{ - char *backend, *resu; - char path[256]; - char device[256]; - unsigned int len; - int i; - - if(buf == NULL || xsh == NULL) - return NULL; - backend = malloc(256); - if(backend == NULL) - { - DEBUG("error to alloc memory\n"); - return NULL; - } - for( i = 0; buf[i] != 0x20; i++) - { - device[i] = buf[i]; - } - device[i] = '\0'; - DEBUG(" device:%s \n", device); - sprintf(path, "/local/domain/%d/device/%s/0/backend",domid, device); - resu = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, path, &len); - if(!resu) - { - return NULL; + if ((log_file = fopen("/dev/null", "a")) == NULL) { + printf("Failed to create null logger\n"); + goto cleanup; } - strcpy(backend,&resu[11]); - free(resu); - backend[len-1] = '\0'; - DEBUG("dev:%s, backend :%s\n", device, backend); - return backend; -} - -int notify_backend(struct xs_handle *xsh, char *backend) -{ - char path[256]; - if( xsh == NULL || backend == NULL) - return -1; - sprintf(path, "%sonline",backend); - xs_write(xsh, XBT_NULL, path, "0", 1); - sprintf(path, "%sstatus",backend); - xs_write(xsh, XBT_NULL, path, "5", 1); //closing - return 0; -} -int getDomidByName(struct xs_handle *xsh, char *domname) -{ - int domid = 0, i; - int __attribute__((__unused__)) ret; - unsigned int len; - char path[256]; - char str[256]; - FILE *f; - char buf[256], *resu; - if( xsh == NULL || domname == NULL) - return domid; - sprintf(path, "xenstore-ls /local/domain > /var/tmp/xdestroy_dom_info.%s", domname); - ret = system(path); - sprintf(path, "/var/tmp/xdestroy_dom_info.%s", domname); - f = fopen(path, "r"); - if (f == NULL) - { - DEBUG(" error to open dom info file\n"); - return -1; - } - while(1) - { - if(fgets(buf, 256, f) == NULL) - break; - else - { - if(buf[0] != 0x20) - { - for( i = 0; buf[i] != 0x20; i++) - { - str[i] = buf[i]; - } - str[i] = '\0'; - sprintf(path,"/local/domain/%s/name", str); - resu = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, path, &len); - if(resu != NULL && !strcmp(resu, domname)) - { - domid = atoi(str); - free(resu); - break; - } - } - } + logger = (xentoollog_logger *)xtl_createlogger_stdiostream(log_file, + XTL_DEBUG, 0); + if (!logger) { + printf("Failed to create null logger\n"); + goto cleanup; } - fclose(f); - sprintf(path, "rm /var/tmp/xdestroy_dom_info.%s", domname); - ret = system(path); - DEBUG("domid:%d\n", domid); - return domid; -} -int extra_call(char *domname, int DeviceModel_id) -{ - char logpath[256], buf[256],cmd[256]; - FILE *f; - int path_len, exec_len, i; - int __attribute__((__unused__)) ret; - - f = fopen("/etc/xen/xend-config.sxp", "r"); - if (f == NULL) - { - DEBUG(" error to open xend-config.sxp file\n"); - return -1; - } - path_len = strlen("xend-guest-logpath"); - exec_len = strlen("xend-guest-logexec"); - while(1) - { - if(fgets(buf, 256, f) == NULL) - break; - if(buf[0] == 10 || buf[0] == '#' ) - continue; - if( strlen(buf) > path_len && !strncmp(buf, "(xend-guest-logpath", path_len)) - { - strcpy(logpath, (char*)(buf + path_len + 1)); // plus '1' here due to "(" - logpath[strlen(logpath)-2] = '\0'; //subtract '1' due to ")" - for(i = 0; i < strlen(logpath); i++) - if(logpath[i] != 32) //space - break; - if(i < strlen(logpath)) - { - sprintf(cmd, "echo %s stop %d `hostname` `date` >> %s", - domname, DeviceModel_id, (char *)(logpath + i)); - DEBUG("%s\n",cmd); - ret = system(cmd); - } - continue; - } - if(strlen(buf) > exec_len && !strncmp((char *)(buf+1), "xend-guest-logexec", exec_len)) - { - strcpy(logpath,(char *)(buf + exec_len + 1)); // plus '1' here due to "(" - logpath[strlen(logpath)-2] = '\0'; //subtract '2' due to ")" - for(i = 0; i < strlen(logpath); i++) - if(logpath[i] != 32) //space - break; - if(i < strlen(logpath)) - { - sprintf(cmd, "%s %s stop %d `hostname` `date`", - (char *)(logpath + i), domname, DeviceModel_id); - DEBUG("--cmd:%s\n",cmd); - ret = system(cmd); - } - - continue; - } + if (libxl_ctx_alloc(&ctx, LIBXL_VERSION, 0, logger)) { + printf("Failed to create libxl context\n"); + goto cleanup; } - fclose(f); - return 0; -} - -int destroy_domain(char *domname) -{ - int domid, rcode, i, DMid, status; - int __attribute__((__unused__)) ret; -#ifdef XENCTRL_HAS_XC_INTERFACE - xc_interface *xc_handle = NULL; -#else - int xc_handle = 0; -#endif - unsigned int len; - char *s; - char path[256]; - struct xs_handle *xsh = NULL; - FILE *f; - char buf[256]; - char *backend; - - xsh = xs_daemon_open(); - if (!xsh) { - perror("Couldn't get xsh handle."); - rcode = 1; - goto out; - } - domid = getDomidByName(xsh, domname); - - if (domid < 1) { - perror("Error,Can't destroy domId, domId should > 0\n"); - rcode = 1; - goto out; - } + /* find domain ID */ + if (!(dominfo = libxl_list_domain(ctx, &num_doms))) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to find domain %s\n", argv[1]); + goto cleanup; + } -#ifdef XENCTRL_HAS_XC_INTERFACE - xc_handle = xc_interface_open(NULL, NULL, 0); - if (xc_handle == NULL) { -#else - xc_handle = xc_interface_open(); - if (xc_handle < 0) { -#endif - perror("Couldn't open xc handle."); - rcode = 1; - goto out; - } + for (i = 0; i < num_doms; i++) { + char *domname = domid_to_domname(xsh, dominfo[i].domid); + if (domname == NULL) + continue; - /* TODO PCI clean - paths = self._prepare_phantom_paths() - if self.dompath is not None: - self._cleanup_phantom_devs(paths) - - xc_domain_destroy_hook(xc_handle, domid); - */ - - xc_domain_pause(xc_handle, domid); - rcode = xc_domain_destroy(xc_handle, domid); - - // free Device Model - sprintf(path,"/local/domain/%d/image/device-model-pid", domid); - s = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, path, &len); - if( s != NULL) - { - DMid = atoi(s); - free(s); - DEBUG("Deivce Model Id is %d\n", DMid); - } - else - { - rcode = 1; - DEBUG("can't read Deivce Model Id\n"); - goto out; - } - kill(DMid, SIGHUP); - for( i=0; i< 100; i++) - { - if(DMid == waitpid(DMid, &status, WNOHANG)) - break; - sleep(0.1); - } - if( i == 100) - { - DEBUG("DeviceModel %d took more than 10s " - "to terminate: sending SIGKILL\n", DMid); - kill(DMid, SIGKILL); - waitpid(DMid, &status, 0); + if (strncmp(argv[1], domname, strlen(argv[1])) == 0) { + if (libxl_domain_destroy(ctx, dominfo[i].domid, NULL) == 0) + ret = 0; + else + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to destroy domain %s\n", argv[1]); + free(domname); + goto cleanup; } - sprintf(path,"/local/domain/0/device-model/%i", domid); - xs_rm(xsh, XBT_NULL, path); + free(domname); + } - // unlink pipe - sprintf(path,"/var/run/tap/qemu-read-%d", domid); - ret = unlink(path); - sprintf(path,"/var/run/tap/qemu-write-%d", domid); - ret = unlink(path); - - //notify backend to reap the source assigned to this VM - sprintf(path, "xenstore-ls /local/domain/%d/device > /var/tmp/xdestroy_device.%d", domid, domid); - ret = system(path); - sprintf(path, "/var/tmp/xdestroy_device.%d", domid); - f = fopen(path, "r"); - if ( f == NULL) - { - DEBUG(" error to open device file\n"); - return -1; - } - DEBUG("- begin to reap\n"); - while(1) - { - if( fgets(buf, 256, f)== NULL) - break; - else - { - if( buf[0] != 0x20) - { - backend = device_backend(xsh, buf, domid); - if( backend != NULL) - { - notify_backend(xsh, backend); - free(backend); - } - } - } - } - DEBUG("- end to reap\n"); - fclose(f); - sprintf(path, "rm /var/tmp/xdestroy_device.%d", domid); - ret = system(path); - extra_call(domname, DMid); -out: - if (xsh) - xs_daemon_close(xsh); - if (xc_handle) - xc_interface_close(xc_handle); - return rcode; -} + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to find domain %s\n", argv[1]); -int main(int argc, char **argv) -{ - if (argc != 2) { - printf("Miss destroy name\n"); - return -1; - } - xlist(argc, argv); - //shutdown_domain(argv[1]); - destroy_domain(argv[1]); +cleanup: + if (dominfo) + libxl_dominfo_list_free(dominfo, num_doms); + if (ctx) + libxl_ctx_free(ctx); + if (log_file) + fclose(log_file); + xs_daemon_close(xsh); - return 0; + return ret; } diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-utils.c new/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-utils.c --- old/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-utils.c 2013-06-11 00:14:01.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-utils.c 2014-07-08 01:33:20.000000000 +0200 @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ return s; } -static char *domid_to_domname(struct xs_handle *xsh, uint32_t domid) +char *domid_to_domname(struct xs_handle *xsh, uint32_t domid) { unsigned int len; char *path; diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-utils.h new/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-utils.h --- old/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-utils.h 2013-06-11 00:14:36.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-utils.h 2014-07-08 01:33:22.000000000 +0200 @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ #include <xenstore.h> +char *domid_to_domname(struct xs_handle *xsh, uint32_t domid); + char *domid_to_vm_uuid(struct xs_handle *xsh, uint32_t domid); int xlist(int argc, char **argv); diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-vmresync new/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-vmresync --- old/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-vmresync 2011-03-14 21:54:30.000000000 +0100 +++ new/tools/xen-utils-0.1/xen-vmresync 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 @@ -1,61 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/python - -import urllib2 -import urllib -import base64 -import binascii -import string -import os -import re -import sys - -agentconf= '/opt/novell/zenworks/zos/agent/agent.properties' - -VMResync = '\ -<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> \n\ - <function name="VMResync"> \n\ - <instanceID>%s</instanceID> \n\ - </function> \n\ -' - -''' -VMResync = '\ -<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> \n\ - <function name="VMResync"> \n\ - <instanceIDSet> \n\ - <item> \n\ - <instanceID>%s</instanceID> \n\ - </item> \n\ - </instanceIDSet> \n\ - </function> \n\ -' -''' - -if __name__ == "__main__": - argv = sys.argv - if len(argv) != 2: - print 'WRONG parameters' - print 'xvmresync domName' - sys.exit(-1) - - domName = argv[1] - - input = open(agentconf, 'r').read() - r = re.compile("(zos.agent.server=)([\d|.]*)").search(input) - serverip = r.group(2) - if serverip is None: - #print "can't found server ip" - sys.exit(-1) - - url = 'http://%s:9090' % serverip - - vmresync_xml = VMResync % (domName) - data = {'event': 'AIS', 'encode': '0', 'data': base64.encodestring(vmresync_xml)} - output = urllib2.urlopen('%s/%s.po' % (url, 'VMResync'), urllib.urlencode(data)).read() - r = re.compile("(<result>)(.*)(</result>)").search(output) - result = r.group(2) - if result != '0': - #print 'vmresync error' - sys.exit(-1) - - sys.exit(0) -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-commit+unsubscr...@opensuse.org For additional commands, e-mail: opensuse-commit+h...@opensuse.org
