This was publicly reported yesterday.

Tim

----------  Forwarded Message  ----------

Subject: openvas 2.x race condition
Date: Sunday 04 Sep 2011, 23:56:48
From: Bugs NotHugs <bugsnoth...@gmail.com>
To: fd <full-disclos...@lists.grok.org.uk>, bugtraq 
<bugt...@securityfocus.com>, vu...@securityfocus.com, v...@secunia.com, 
submissi...@packetstormsecurity.org, xfo...@iss.net, v...@frsirt.com, 
t...@openvas.org

> openvas-server/openvas/oval_plugins.c
> [...]
> results_filename = "/tmp/results.xml";
> if (g_file_test (results_filename, G_FILE_TEST_EXISTS))
>    {
>      log_write ("Found existing results file in %s, deleting it to
> avoid conflicts.", results_filename);

it unlink /tmp/results.xml avoid symlink attack then spawn process
that write stuff to /tmp/results.xml

chinese apt can make symlink point to any system file during race and win race!

-- 

BugsNotHugs
Shared Vulnerability Disclosure Account

-----------------------------------------
-- 
Tim Brown
<mailto:t...@openvas.org>
<http://www.openvas.org/>

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