This was publicly reported yesterday. Tim
---------- Forwarded Message ---------- Subject: openvas 2.x race condition Date: Sunday 04 Sep 2011, 23:56:48 From: Bugs NotHugs <bugsnoth...@gmail.com> To: fd <full-disclos...@lists.grok.org.uk>, bugtraq <bugt...@securityfocus.com>, vu...@securityfocus.com, v...@secunia.com, submissi...@packetstormsecurity.org, xfo...@iss.net, v...@frsirt.com, t...@openvas.org > openvas-server/openvas/oval_plugins.c > [...] > results_filename = "/tmp/results.xml"; > if (g_file_test (results_filename, G_FILE_TEST_EXISTS)) > { > log_write ("Found existing results file in %s, deleting it to > avoid conflicts.", results_filename); it unlink /tmp/results.xml avoid symlink attack then spawn process that write stuff to /tmp/results.xml chinese apt can make symlink point to any system file during race and win race! -- BugsNotHugs Shared Vulnerability Disclosure Account ----------------------------------------- -- Tim Brown <mailto:t...@openvas.org> <http://www.openvas.org/>
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